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Nederlandse samenvatting  
Tijdens de krediet crisis in 2007 was het wereldwijde financiële systeem dichtbij een 
ineenstorting en staten besloten ‘hun’ financiële instellingen te redden. Een voorname 
reden voor deze bijna ineenstorting is de diepe motivatie van financiële actoren om 
illiquide activiteiten en bezittingen zoals vastgoed om te zetten in financiële bezittingen: 
de continue drang om het financiële domein te vergroten. België en Nederland (de 
Lage Landen) waren geen uitzondering met grootschalige reddingsoperaties van 
bank(verzekeraars) zoals Fortis en SNS. Als onderdeel van de Eurozone volgden 
beide landen ook het standaard recept voor de daaropvolgende Grote Financiële Crisis 
voorgeschreven door de Europese Centrale Bank bestaande uit ruim monetair beleid 
dat een schuld gedreven herstel stimuleert vooral via kapitaalintensieve activiteiten 
zoals vastgoed. Desalniettemin, waar in Nederland, synchroon met financiële markten, 
stedelijke ontwikkeling tot stilstand kwam bleef de Belgische nevel gestaag groeien en 
vastgoedprijzen stijgen. 
 Om dit verschil te verklaren stelt deze dissertatie ‘financialisering’ - de 
toenemende dominantie van “financiële actoren, markten, gebruiken, maatstaven en 
verhalen” (Aalbers, 2017a, p. 3) - centraal. ‘Finance’ en vastgoed zijn tegelijkertijd 
meer bepalend geworden binnen nationale en stedelijke politieke economieën en meer 
met elkaar verweven geraakt. Ook stellen (semi-)publieke instituties zich steeds 
competitiever en ondernemender op. Een focus op stedelijke ontwikkeling zet het 
analyseren van veranderingen binnen en tussen vastgoed, finance en de staat 
centraal. Dit vereist de analyse van niet-financiële bedrijven zoals 
vastgoedontwikkelaars, financiële actoren zoals banken en hun interactie met 
staatsorganen om het hedendaagse kapitalisme beter te begrijpen. 
 De dominantie van finance over Anglo-Amerikaanse stedelijke ontwikkeling is 
uitvoerig onderzocht. Echter, vergelijkende studies in continentaal Europa en 
onderzoeken die de limieten van financialisering tonen zijn schaars. Ook wordt de 
financiële dimensie van stedelijke ontwikkeling vaak genegeerd in stedelijk onderzoek. 
Daarom presenteert deze dissertatie twee geschaalde, vergelijkende, diepgaande 
case studies gebaseerd op financiële/kwantitatieve analyses en 55 elite interviews. De 
Nederlandse casus helpt om beter te begrijpen hoe financialisering plaats vindt terwijl 
de Belgische casus belangrijke barrières belicht. 
Nederlandse stedelijke ontwikkeling is sterk gefinancialiseerd: alle belangrijke 
actoren zijn, in verschillende mate, erg open om financiële instrumenten 
opportunistisch te gebruiken. Ook maken sterke overheid instituties het niet alleen 
mogelijk om grootschalige, kapitaal intensieve projecten waarin private en (semi-
)publieke actoren nauw samenwerken te realiseren, maar ook om een meer op de 
markt gerichte planologie te introduceren die de weg plaveit voor financialisering 
daarbij de investerings-logica prioriterend boven de gebruikerswaarde van de 
gebouwde omgeving. De daaropvolgende schuld-explosie, de toestroom van 
‘ongeduldig’ kapitaal, zorgt ervoor dat grote sommen geld naar de creatie van nieuwe, 
compacte stedelijke districten stromen. De eigenaren van dit “rampzalige geld” hebben 
II 
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een abstracte visie op de stad die vooral gebaseerd is op financiële parameters. Als 
gevolg hiervan zijn stedelijke ontwikkeling en schuld-gedreven vastgoedmarkten 
belangrijke economische groeimotoren geworden, er is sprake van een vastgoed-
financieel gedreven groei regieme. 
Kortom, financialisering verandert stedelijke ontwikkeling structureel, 
voornamelijk via een massale instroom van ‘ongeduldig’/gefinancialiseerd kapitaal, 
vooral, maar niet alleen, waarneembaar via een grote toename van schuldniveaus bij 
alle belanghebbenden, van project-ontwikkelaars tot kopers van vastgoed. Deze 
toename van ‘imaginair’ kapitaal, m.a.w. verhandelbare aanspraken op “de productie 
van toegevoegde waarde en op de waarde van de onderliggende bezittingen welke 
beide in relatie worden geproduceerd, zowel in tijd als in plaats” (Pani & Holman, 2014, 
p. 218), maakt het tempo van stedelijke ontwikkeling afhankelijk van volatiele, 
internationale financiële markten en transfeert de controle naar financiële actoren en 
markten in plaats van planologen.  
Belgische stedelijke ontwikkeling is nauwelijks gefinancialiseerd: belangrijke 
actoren zijn veel minder open voor het opportunistisch omarmen van financiële 
instrumenten. Vastgoedprojecten zijn relatief klein, en worden vaak grotendeels 
gefinancierd door actoren met een lokale oriëntatie. Deze verstrekkers van geduldige 
kapitaal – lange termijn aandelen en schuld verstrekt door actoren die prioriteit geven 
aan langdurige relaties en lange termijn perspectieven die ook niet financiële 
doelstellingen hebben – vormen een belangrijke barrière tegen financialisering omdat 
ze huiverig staan ten op zichtte van externe financiering omdat ze hun invloed niet 
willen delen. Daarnaast heeft de geregionaliseerde, gefragmenteerde Belgische staat 
een veel zwakkere neoliberale omwenteling gefaciliteerd: private actoren speelde al 
lang een zeer belangrijke rol in de manier waarop de Belgische gebouwde omgeving 
gevormd wordt. Gecombineerd met de lange doorlooptijd van projecten en 
kleinschaligheid stroomt dit geduldig kapitaal geleidelijk naar de stapsgewijze 
ontwikkeling van een eeuwig uitdijend suburbaan landschap. Hierdoor wordt de vorm 
en het tempo van stedelijke ontwikkeling vooral bepaald door lokaal georiënteerd 
private vastgoedbedrijven en individuele vastgoedwensen en veel minder door 
internationale financiële markten. Binnen de Belgische politieke economie wordt 
vastgoed veel meer gezien als een individuele investering die bescherming behoeft: 
de financialisering van vastgoed om de economie te laten groeien heeft lagere 
prioriteit.  
Net als veel andere recente onderzoeken neemt dit doctoraat de financiële 
dimensies van stedelijke ontwikkeling serieus en biedt het zo nieuwe inzichten over 
wat stedelijke ontwikkeling drijft daarbij de steeds prominentere rol van financialisering 
aantonend. Echter, deze andere onderzoeken zijn teveel gefocust op ‘het aantonen 
van’ financialisering daarbij de diversiteit tussen kapitaal verstrekkers negerend. 
Daarom is de belangrijkste aanbeveling voor verder onderzoek om de verschillende 
tijds horizonnen van kapitaalverstrekkers – het (on)geduld van kapitaal – meer centraal 
te stellen in onderzoek naar stedelijke ontwikkeling. 
III
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English summary   
During the credit crunch in 2007 the global financial system was close to a meltdown, 
setting in motion a wave of state rescues of domestic financial institutions. The credit 
crunch also revealed that the deep motivation of financial actors to liquify illiquid 
activities and assets (such as real estate) in order to further enlarge the financial 
sphere can be extremely destructive. The Netherlands and Belgium (i.e., the Low 
Countries), where states were saving large bank(insurers) such as Fortis and SNS, 
were no exception. As part of the Eurozone, both countries also followed the general 
cure for the following Great Financial Crisis prescribed by the European Central Bank 
of loose monetary policies which thus stimulated a debt-fueled recovery, especially 
through capital intensive activities such as real estate. However, in the Netherlands 
urban development halted and real estate markets crashed, but Belgian urban 
development experienced only a minor hiccup and prices increased steadily. 
 This dissertation aims to explain this difference. It argues that ‘financialization’—
i.e., the increasing dominance of “financial actors, markets, practices, measurements 
and narratives” (Aalbers, 2017a, p. 3)—is a crucial concept. Scholars have shown how 
finance and real estate have become both increasingly dominant (within domestic and 
urban political economies) and increasingly interconnected with each others’ changing 
“accumulation dynamics”. They have also demonstrated how various state agencies 
and context specific conditions play crucial roles in shaping these processes 
reconfiguring “regulation dynamics”. Studying urban development puts analysing the 
changes between these three domains central: it requires analysis of the changing 
behaviour of non-financial corporations (e.g., real estate developers), financial actors 
(e.g., banks and institutional investors) and their interaction with state agencies in order 
to better understand contemporary capitalism.  
Although the dominance of finance over urban development in Anglo-American 
countries has been studied extensively, comparative studies on continental European 
“variegations” and case-studies showing the limits of financialization processes are 
scarce. More in general, the financial dimension of urban development is often 
neglected in urban studies literature. To fill this gap, this dissertation presents two 
multi-level, comparative in-depth case studies based on both financial/quantitative 
analyses and 55 elite-interviews that demonstrate how financializaton processes have 
interacted differently with urban development of Belgium and the Netherlands. It 
therefore offers a better understanding of barriers towards financialization and a more 
thorough understanding on how financialization reshapes urban development.  
In the Netherlands, urban development is highly financialized: this is because 
relevant actors are, to varying degrees, very open and quick to adopt financialization 
tools and use them opportunistically. Also, Dutch state agencies have a directive role 
in urban planning, thereby not only enabling the creation of large scale, capital 
intensive projects in which private and public actors cooperate closely, but also 
facilitating more market-oriented planning policies that underpin financialization 
prioritizing investment logics over the use value of the built environment and fueling 
IV
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debt production. The resulting prominence of ‘impatient’ capital providers leads to 
capital flowing into new, compact urban districts in large sums, as “cataclysmic money” 
of which the providers have an abstract vision on cities that is primarily based on 
financial parameters. Consequently, urban development and debt-fuelled real estate 
markets have become important engines for economic growth: a real estate finance 
driven growth regime has been established. 
Thus, financialization structurally changes urban development through a 
massive influx of ‘impatient’/financialized capital including, but not exclusively, through 
the take-up of debt by all actors involved, ranging from the developers to the buyers of 
real estate. This increase of fictitious capital, i.e. marketable claims “on the production 
of surplus value and on the perceived value of the underlying asset–both of which are 
relationally produced in time and space” (Pani & Holman, 2014, p. 218) makes the 
pace of urban development dependent upon volatile, global financial markets and puts 
financial actors/markets in control, rather than urban planners. 
Unlike the Netherlands, Belgian urban development is financialized to a low 
degree: this is a result of how actors relevant for urban development are much less 
open to adopting large amounts of financialization tools. To the contrary, many 
development projects are of a relatively small size and usually, for a considerable part, 
financed by individuals and investors that have a local orientation. Thus, these patient 
capital providers–i.e., long-term equity and debt provided by actors who emphasize on 
enduring relations  and  long-term  goals  that  include  non-financial objectives—act 
as an important barrier against financialization, as they are hesitant towards the 
adoption of financialization tools because of how these decrease their influence. 
Moreover, the fragmented, regionalized Belgian state has established a less 
pronounced ‘neoliberal turn’, e.g., Belgium already had an extensive history with 
private (real estate) ownership and private actors, who were and are dominant in 
shaping its built environment. Combined with the long duration of (sub)urban projects 
and the piecemeal approach, patient capital flows gradually into the production of a 
sprawling, built environment. Accordingly, the pace and form of urban development 
relies less on global financial markets and more on locally-oriented, private firms and 
individual real estate desires. Within the Belgian political economy real estate is 
conceptualized as individual investment that needs protection: financializing it in order 
to spur economic growth seems to not be a priority. 
In line with many recent studies, this PhD thesis takes the financial dimensions 
of urban development seriously, thereby offering new insights on what drives urban 
development and showing the powerful role of financialization processes in a wide 
range of contexts. However, these other studies are still skewed towards showing the 
presence of financialization and thereby neglect the variation of capital providers. To 
overcome this, this PhD thesis suggests that future research should put the different 
time-horizons of capital providers (i.e., the patience of capital) central in analyzing 
urban development.  
V
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Chapter 1 Introduction: rise of financialized capitalism and urban 
development 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2007 the global financial system almost came to a standstill. In the following years, 
states all across the Western world ‘saved’ their domestic banks through the provision 
of trillions of euros and dollars in state support and guarantees. The Netherlands and 
Belgium (i.e., the Low Countries) were no exception. Their large, internationally-
orientated domestic banks experienced huge problems and the Belgian and Dutch 
state stepped in and nationalized one of their largest domestic commercial banks, 
respectively Fortis and ABN Amro. Both banks were true ‘global’ players who managed 
balance sheets of respectively €674 billion and €987 billion in late 2006. This banking 
support was followed by guarantees for other banks (Belgian KBC, Dutch ING) and a 
second round of nationalizations (Belgian Dexia, Dutch SNS Reaal). Moreover, as part 
of the Eurozone, both countries followed the general cure for the Great Financial Crisis 
that had been prescribed by the European Central Bank, namely stimulating a debt-
fueled recovery through quantitative easing and low interest rates, especially through 
capital intensive activities such as real estate.  
 So, large Belgian and Dutch banks were hit hard by the global financial crisis 
and their states adopted similar solutions in rescuing them, also, the economic 
‘recovery’ was partly steered by similar European (monetary) policies. However, when 
we look at urban development and economic growth, striking differences come to the 
fore. Whereas in the Netherlands urban development halted and the number of large 
real estate development corporations shrunk from 25 in 2008 to 5 in 2013 (Mackaaij 
and Nozeman, 2014, p. 17), Belgian urban development experienced only a minor 
hiccup. Moreover, whereas Dutch real estate prices went down tremendously 
(Buitelaar et al., 2016), Belgian prices kept increasing steadily. Also, the Belgian 
economy grew in a slow but steady pace with only a minor downturn in 2008 and a 
stronger recovery than the Netherlands, which had experienced a much stronger 
increase between 2003 and 2008 followed by a deeper recession (OECD, 2017). This 
raises questions such as could there be linkages between financial markets, urban 
development and economic cycles? Why did Dutch urban development come to a 
standstill while in Belgium the construction of new houses, offices and retail properties 
remained rather stable? And, did state agencies try to ‘rescue’ urban development in 
similar ways as they rescued commercial banks? 
 Answering such questions not only requires thorough, more historical, analyses 
on transformations in political economies that steer urban development. It also points 
us towards crucial linkages between real estate activities, finance and economic 
growth. In this regard, a major change could be the increased dominance of financial 
actors, markets and logics, i.e., the rise of financialized capitalism (Aalbers, 2017a; 
Lapavitsas, 2009; van der Zwan, 2014) that made finance dominant over American 
urban development. While there are many case-studies describing in rich detail the 
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financialization of urban development in the Anglo-American context (Ashton et al., 
2016; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Peck and Whiteside, 2016), comparative studies on 
continental European “variegations” (Dixon, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2007) and 
case-studies showing the limits of financialization processes are scarce (cf. 
Christophers, 2015). To fill this gap, this dissertation presents a study on how 
financializaton processes have interacted differently with urban development in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, thus offering respectively a better understanding of 
barriers towards financialization and a more thorough understanding on how 
financialization reshapes urban development.  
 This introduction starts with a short, general description on the rise of finance 
and how it relates to the built environment (section 1.2). In section 1.3, subsequently, 
it is argued that the financialization of urban development is a crucial topic to analyse 
both this rise of finance and the increased connections and interdependence between 
finance, real estate and state agencies. It also discusses the research questions that 
are leading in this PhD thesis. Section 1.4, subsequently, elaborates on the steps 
needed to answer these research questions by presenting the methodology and 
related methods used to study the financialization of urban development in the Low 
Countries. Section 1.5, finally, presents the structure of this doctorate. 
 
1.2 Financialization and the built environment  
The credit crunch in 2007 revealed a toxic link between financial practices and real 
estate, in essence, it revealed how financial actors are deeply motivated to liquefy 
illiquid assets such as real estate in order to further enlarge the financial sphere 
(Gotham, 2006; Aalbers, 2012; Ashton, 2009). The resulting ‘Great Financial Crisis’ 
has shifted scholarly attention towards processes of financialization and delivered 
insights on, among other things, the rise of housing finance (Fernandez and Aalbers, 
2016; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008), the interlinkages between financial and real 
estate markets (Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Ashton, 2009; Weber, 2015), and the 
financialization of urban (re-)development (Rutland, 2010; Halbert and Attuyer, 2016; 
Savini and Aalbers, 2016; Halbert et al., 2014). This work not only shows how finance 
and real estate have become both increasingly dominant within domestic and urban 
political economies and increasingly interconnected with each other. It also shows how 
state agencies play a crucial role in facilitating or stimulating these processes. 
Consequently, “to understand either finance or real estate, we need to understand their 
connections and interdependence” (Aalbers, 2013a, p. 17). 
However, surprisingly little comparative work has been conducted to investigate 
the multi-layered and multi-scalar processes of the financialization of real estate, its 
geographical variegation and the role of state agencies. This doctoral thesis is part of 
a broader research project that tries to better understand these increased 
interconnections between finance, real estate and state agencies. This wider research 
project uses the metaphor of the Real Estate/Financial COMplex (REFCOM) based on 
  
13 
 
the idea that “to understand either finance or real estate, we need to understand their 
connections and interdependence” (Aalbers, 2013a, p. 17). In this respect, in 
financialized capitalism, REFCOM has replaced the military/industrial complex as a 
main mechanism or structure that configures political economies. However, the exact 
contours are still vague and the goal is “not to introduce a new master concept but to 
understand the spatialities of contemporary capitalism and bring together a range of 
literatures” (Aalbers, 2013a, p. 1). 
This dissertation scrutinizes how these increased connections between real 
estate, state agencies and finance play out in Belgium1 and the Netherlands and how 
this effects their urban and domestic political economies. It shares the theoretical goal 
to introduce finance into studies of urban political economies and to bring more 
geography (i.e., the influence of context) into critical political economy (Aalbers, 
2013a). Accordingly, the aim is to develop a more profound scalar understanding on 
the financialization of real estate through a comparative multi-scalar case study on the 
Low Countries. These share an advanced, internationally oriented financial sector and 
waves of neoliberal policy adoption through European integration but with rather 
different practices related to the built environment. Therefore, they are interesting 
cases to investigate the extent to which the financialization of real estate has expanded 
across continental Europe. For doing so, small N-studies allow the researcher to create 
a deep understanding of the phenomena under investigation (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Although deep historical conceptualizations exist through which financialized 
capitalism, for example, could be seen as the last convulsion of the hegemony of 
American-led capitalism (Arrighi, 1994), the focus of this PhD thesis is, in line with the 
general time horizon adopted in financialization scholarship, on its recent 
manifestation. Accordingly, the origination of financialized capitalism relates to the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 1970s and waves of financial liberalization and 
reregulation combined with digitalization, thus making finance much more footloose 
(Froud et al., 2002; French et al., 2011; Pryke and Allen, 2000; Aglietta, 1998; Aglietta 
and Breton, 2001). As a result, the size of financial markets and the influence of 
financial actors on political economies increased rapidly, reaching historically 
unprecedented dimensions (Hudson, 2010; Lapavitsas, 2009; Hardie et al., 2013a; 
Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016). A rich body of work has empirically demonstrated how 
financial actors and financial logics increasingly shape practices of four actors that are 
important for the functioning of political economies (see chapter 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of this literature): non-financial corporations (Orhangazi, 2008; Krippner, 
2005; Allen and Pryke, 2013), households (Forrest and Hirayama, 2014; Aalbers, 
2012; Martin, 2002), the state (Lagna, 2015a; Hendrikse, 2015) and financial 
institutions (Hardie and Howarth, 2013; Harmes, 1998) thereby reshaping domestic 
and urban political economies (Macheda, 2012; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013; Weber, 
2010; Gotham, 2014). 
                                            
1 The Belgian state is highly regionalized. As further explained in the methodological section, 
chapters 3 and 4 analyze the national level while chapter 5 is focused on the region Flanders.  
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The rise of financialized capitalism 
From a critical political economy perspective, financialization processes are crucial as 
they underpin the current dominant stage of capitalism—neoliberal capitalism—
through enabling the continuous creation of new (financial) markets, thus facilitating 
the further expansion of capitalism (Fine, 2010; Fine, 2013; Hudson, 2010; Leyshon 
and Thrift, 2007; Brenner et al., 2010). Put differently, finance puts continuous pressure 
on a wide range of activities to be transformed into financial assets that are paper 
claims (e.g., shares and bonds) on future wealth production, i.e., fictitious capital 
(Harvey, 2006; Pani and Holman, 2014). As such, to sustain the growth of capitalism, 
fictitious capital requires the real economy to create enough value to enable paying 
back the initial capital provided plus interest or dividends. In particular for Anglo-
American countries, some scholars argue that, instead of underpinning it, 
financialization has become so powerful that it should be labelled as dominant over 
neoliberal capitalism (Krippner, 2005; Andersson et al., 2014; Hudson, 2010). They 
label it as a new era of capitalism: financialized capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2009; Haiven, 
2011; van der Zwan, 2014). 
In financialized capitalism certain cities have become important centres of 
command and control (Sassen, 2001; Stanback and Noyelle, 1982; Bassens and van 
Meeteren, 2014). Not only are financial actors increasingly concentrated within the 
specific areas of main financial centres, their investments in and loans to real estate 
have reached historically unprecedented levels, consequently blurring lines between 
financial and real estate markets (Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Torrance, 2009; Coakley, 
1994; Hudson, 2010). Likewise, whereas Western states during the Fordist era tended 
to spread economic activities and wealth equably and geographically even, states now 
increasingly bet on their strong horses trying to channel investments towards those 
urban areas that seem to have the most prosperous future (Brenner, 2004; Brenner, 
2009). In this regard, ‘spatial Keynesianism’ has been, to a certain extent, swapped for 
policies that aim to increase real estate investment values, that aim to optimize the 
built environment’s value as a financial asset (Guironnet et al., 2016; Weber, 2010; 
Haila, 2015; Byrne, 2016). Consequently, inequalities are now reproduced 
geographically in a much more pronounced way (Martin and Minns, 1995; Hebb and 
Sharma, 2014).  
The financialization literature primarily looks at cases where financialization did 
occur, making it seem like the rise of financialized capitalism is universal and 
ubiquitous across the West (cf. Christophers, 2015). The Belgian case also helps to 
better understand the working of important barriers to the process of financialization 
that are under-researched and still poorly understood. In this regard, patient capital–
long-term equity and debt provided to firms by actors who emphasize stable, enduring 
relations and long-term goals that include non-financial objectives (Stockmans et al., 
2010; Chrisman et al., 2011; Lehrer and Celo, 2016)–is a crucial concept. In other 
words, this PhD thesis pays ample attention to “the complex processes of 
transformation, which sometimes advance and at other times hamper the advent of 
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finance capitalism in the advanced political economies” (van der Zwan, 2014, p. 120 
emphasis added).  
 
The variegation of financialized capitalism 
As relatively recent phenomena, financialization and neoliberalization are also shaped 
by context specific elements such as the specific character of domestic institutions and 
(political) actors steering an economy. Therefore, neoliberal or financialized capitalism 
is looked at as “variegated” in the sense that it is not only driven by tendencies within 
global capitalism towards convergence (such as the rise of global finance and the 
continuous pressure to create new (financial) markets), but also points to how these 
general tendencies are shaped by elements of domestic and urban political economies 
into local specificities (Dixon, 2011; Brenner et al., 2010; Peck and Theodore, 2007; 
Moulaert et al., 2016). To distinguish how a dominant global tendency, namely 
financialization, creates variegated local specificities, this doctoral thesis focusses on 
if and how financialization has structurally changed urban development in two 
countries that are open economies with well-developed financial sectors and subject 
to similar neoliberal European legislation but have different real estate practices. 
Whereas neoliberal capitalism revolves around the commodification of an ever-
expanding amount of activities and resources into regular markets, financialized 
capitalism revolves around turning activities, resources and regular markets into 
commodities to be traded on financial markets (Polanyi, 1957; Peck, 2013; Fine, 2013; 
Jessop, 2015; Lapavitsas, 2011; Leyshon and Thrift, 2007). However, acknowledging 
the institutional embeddedness of markets, that is the existence of political economies,  
requires a way of thinking in which economies do not transform in a ‘nature-like-
manner’ but to recognize that economic transformations have political origins (Peck, 
2013; Polanyi, 1957): state agencies actively support the “rolling out” of financialized 
capitalism through reregulation, institution building and other interventions (Coq-
Huelva, 2013; Gotham, 2014; Weber, 2010). Put differently, the possible shift from 
neoliberal to financialized capitalism not only relates to an economic shift in which 
capital intensive industries—such as real estate and finance itself—become more 
dominant within economies. It also relates to an ideological shift in which a strong belief 
in ‘financial markets’ is added to ‘market oriented’ thinking. Accordingly, in policy 
making, market oriented approaches are complemented by ‘investment logics’: 
subsidies are replaced by, among other things, revolving funds, TIF-structures and 
state investments that require financial gains from subsidized subjects in order to be 
able to finance future state projects (Ashton et al., 2016; Chiapello, 2015). This gives 
birth to ‘real estate finance’ driven growth regimes in which state agencies actively try 
to restructure urban and domestic political economies in the way that real estate and 
financial activities become the engines for economic growth (Hofman and Aalbers, 
n.d.; Smart and Lee, 2003; Gonzalez and Oosterlynck, 2014). 
Although since the Great Financial Crisis this reliance on real estate and finance 
as engine for economic growth has deepened (Jordà et al., 2014; Fernandez and 
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Aalbers, 2016), it is hard to argue that financialized logics have fully replaced neoliberal 
logics: these logics seem to co-exist and/or reinforce each other in varying degrees in 
various contexts. Accordingly, it is hard to pin point precisely where and when 
financialization structurally changes a domestic or urban political economy. 
Nonetheless, the Regulation Approach (hereafter RA) offers an interesting perspective 
to start theorizing about this. RA starts from the proposition that capitalism—i.e., an 
accumulation regime with a complementary pattern of production and consumption 
(Jessop, 2001)—does not contain a self-limiting mechanism of its own, it needs 
mediatory mechanisms that can grow into a specific mode of regulation: “a set of 
mediations which ensure that the distortions created by the accumulation of capital are 
kept within limits which are compatible with social cohesion within each nation” 
(Aglietta, 1998, p. 44).  
To establish social cohesion, a mode of regulation is required in order to solve 
the tension between individual wishes and societal needs. Relatively stable, ‘Fordist’ 
collective wage agreements did so through enabling social progress. However, 
whereas neoliberalization hollowed out these collective arrangements victimizing large 
parts of the labour force (Wacquant, 2001), financialization introduces debt, global 
financial markets and institutional investors as new structuring principles in 
relationships between individuals, the state and capital (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; 
Boyer, 2000; van der Zwan, 2014; Fine, 2010). In other words, “Financial integration 
has become the leading force of globalization. It is in the financial sphere where there 
have appeared some of the key institutional forms of the new growth régime” (Aglietta, 
1998, p. 66). 
 Nevertheless, both between and within countries “accumulation and regulation 
dynamics” morph into distinct forms, in complex variegations, that also variegate over 
time, thus suggesting a complex mosaic of local diversity in (spatial) economic 
activities, class relations and political conditions (Lipietz, 1980; Moulaert et al., 2007). 
In this regard, the more mobile global capital becomes the fiercer the regional 
competition for these capital flows (De Decker et al., 2005; Martin, 2006). The most 
seminal examples are loosely coordinated ensembles of private and public actors that 
adopt entrepreneurial, pro-growth policies to put cities on the global map, thereby 
aiming to attract (global) capital, ‘desirable’ (i.e., talented) people and business activity 
(Molotch, 1993; Lauermann, 2016; Harvey, 1989; Logan and Molotch, 1987). However, 
especially in countries with strong central states, these growth machines have to deal 
with supra-local state agencies that develop urban policies that can contrast with their 
locally formulated (pro-growth) policies (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Lipietz, 1980; 
Moulaert and Jessop, 2013). In this respect, comparing the modus operandi of urban 
development in Belgium and the Netherlands is an interesting topic as it contrasts a 
fragmented, regionalized state that is passive in urban planning (Belgium) with a strong 
state agencies that are directive in urban planning (Taşan-Kok, 2010; Uitermark, 2005; 
Kesteloot and Maesschalck, 2001; Kesteloot, 1990) giving birth to contrasting, rather  
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place-specific urban regimes (Terhorst and Van De Ven, 1997; Oosterlynck and 
Swyngedouw, 2013; Kesteloot and Saey, 2002; Loopmans, 2008). 
The RA approach, as discussed above, thus enables recognition of the 
existence of variegated mixtures of, to a certain degree, a financialized mode of 
accumulation (i.e., growth regime), combined with, to a certain degree, financialized 
and/or neoliberalized modes of regulation at various levels of scale. In other words, 
this conceptualization enables the possibility of a real estate finance driven regime 
“embedded in [a] neoliberal mode of regulation” (Hofman and Aalbers, n.d., p. 5). 
Distinguishing differences between accumulation and regulation dynamics at various 
scales is too daunting a task for this dissertation. In particular because the current 
theoretical debate at the urban level is primarily concerned with regulation dynamics 
(Brenner et al., 2010; Peck, 2017) therefore lacking a perspective on current urban 
accumulation dynamics (cf. Nijman, 2015).  
Therefore, this PhD thesis merely acknowledges this complexity and aims to 
distinguish some indications for transformation of both modes of accumulation and 
regulation in regard to urban development at various levels of scale. As such, this PhD 
aims to sketch the rough contours of what a multi-scaled transformation from neoliberal 
to financialized capitalism in the Low Countries could look like, thus possibly enabling 
future research-projects that focus on a wider realm than sec urban development to 
develop a more comprehensive perspective. Also, although the RA and the Polanyian 
approach allow to open up the realm for contestation, for counter-hegemonic 
movements fighting the destructive forces of capitalism (Moulaert et al., 2007; 
Kirkpatrick, 2016; Uitermark, 2005) this dissertation focuses on the primary political 
and economic actors that shape the dynamics around urban development, and not 
those who contest this. 
 
Real estate within financialized capitalism 
This dissertation puts the defining element of the built environment, real estate2, 
central. As a locally produced, capital intensive product, real estate connects the local 
built environment with domestic or global finance. But, real estate development is also 
the outcome of a complex web of institutions that reflect deep processes within political 
economies and can help bring about a better understanding of the features of these 
political economies (Halbert and Attuyer, 2016; Halbert et al., 2014). Real estate is 
defined as both commercial, that is office, retail, industrial, hotels, and so on, and 
residential properties, that is both rental and owner-occupied, excluding infrastructure. 
This dissertation primarily looks at real estate development, the intermediary between 
capital, local governance and the production of the built environment. But, it also delves 
into real estate investment, capital investment into new and existing real estate 
                                            
2 It is acknowledged that infrastructure is another important element of the built environment. As 
there is much overlap between both the literature on and practices in the financialization of 
infrastructure (see chapter 3), this PhD thesis uses real estate and the built environment 
interchangeably.  
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including all kinds of financial flows such as rental income, maintenance costs, taxes, 
debt and so on. 
Real estate plays a key role in many financialization processes. Two distinct 
functions can be distinguished within real estate. Firstly, real estate is being used as 
collateral for debt generation in increasingly complex ways, such as debt securitisation 
and derivatives. In these transactions the value of real estate is conceptualized to be 
reliable so it offers security for complex financial activities (Kaika and Ruggiero, 2016; 
Savini and Aalbers, 2016; Mosciaro, n.d.). However, as the credit crunch in 2007 
illustrated, these values can be less reliable than expected: when real estate and 
finance become extremely interwoven, real estate markets, such as the American 
housing market, start to mimic movements on financial markets thereby evaporating 
the function of real estate and land as meaningful collateral (Aalbers, 2012; Ashton, 
2009; Harvey, 2011). 
Second, real estate is increasingly conceptualized as a financial asset: a way of 
investing that is comparable to investing in other financial assets, such as shares and 
bonds, which narrowly focuses on expected risk-adjusted rate of returns (Hebb and 
Sharma, 2014; Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Theurillat et al., 2010; Coakley, 1994; Theurillat 
et al., 2016). Loose monetary policies, a growing wall of institutionally managed capital 
seeking investment opportunities and low profitability within other investment outlets 
further increases investment flows towards real estate investment properties (Dixon 
and Monk, 2014; French et al., 2011; Gotham, 2006; Lizieri and Pain, 2014). Feeling 
the urge to ‘compete’ for these international capital flows, urban governments 
increasingly prioritize satisfying financial desires, i.e., expected risk-adjusted rate of 
returns, over the creation of a functioning built environment (Peck and Whiteside, 2016; 
Hebb and Sharma, 2014; Harvey, 2006; Theurillat et al., 2016) i.e., lived spaces 
(Lefebvre, 1996). 
The discussion above indicates that the rise of financialized capitalism in which 
real estate plays a quintessential role can have different implications for practices 
related to the built environment. Also, recognizing the multi-layered and multiple 
dimensions of financialization processes indicates that these processes can 
“penetrate” almost “everything” (cf. Engelen et al., 2014), “everywhere” (cf. Hendrikse, 
2015). In this regard, it seems to be particularly useful to focus on whether, and if so, 
why and when, financialization processes can set in motion a structural transformation 
of domestic or urban political economies. Crucially, it should be emphasised that 
financialization processes are systematically re-produced throughout various contexts 
but that these various contexts always morph financialization into specific variegations 
(Dixon, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2007; Coq-Huelva, 2013; Gonzalez and 
Oosterlynck, 2014).  
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1.3 Studying the financialization of urban development 
The discussion above illustrates that to explain why the credit crunch in 2007 has had 
varying effects on the Low Countries, despite their similar large, internationally 
interconnected banking sectors, requires a more thorough understanding about the 
interaction of finance, real estate and state agencies within both countries. As such, a 
thorough, scale-sensitive understanding of the interaction of financialization processes 
with both political economies is needed. To develop such an understanding, this 
section argues that it is fruitful to put urban development central in the analyses. 
Studies on how financialization processes affect the built environment have 
highlighted many different elements such as: changes in housing provision and related 
transformations in housing systems (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008; Fernandez and 
Aalbers, 2016; Forrest and Hirayama, 2014; Fields and Uffer, 2014); financial 
innovations that use real estate as input for complex debt and derivatives transactions 
(Aalbers, 2012; Ashton, 2009; Pani and Holman, 2014); local government’s increased 
willingness to sell public assets or development rights to financial actors (Pacewicz, 
2013; Weber, 2010; Ashton et al., 2016; O’Neill, 2013); the ways in which investment 
needs of financial actors are translated into the built environment (Weber, 2015; 
Guironnet et al., 2016; Byrne, 2016; Corpataux et al., 2009) and consequently integrate 
financial and real estate markets (Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Henneberry and Roberts, 
2008; Coakley, 1994; Merrifield, 1993); and, sporadically, through analysing 
transformations within real estate development corporations (Sanfelici and Halbert, 
2015). This doctoral thesis especially contributes to the two later strands of literature. 
For doing so, this PhD thesis puts urban development central to studying the 
increased connections between and importance of finance, real estate and state 
agencies. Urban development is a crucial process as it puts studying ties between 
actors from these three domains central. As chapters 4 and 5 will argue and 
demonstrate in more detail, real estate development corporations that are the 
intermediary between landowners, planning agencies, financial institutions, 
construction firms and buyers of properties are closely connected with all actors 
relevant to the financialization of urban development. Consequently, as the core 
business of these corporations is attracting capital to produce the built environment 
developers are highly dependent on external capital and thus excellent observers of 
changes within capital provision (cf. Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975). But, their actions 
are also inevitably locally embedded as developers produce a spatially fixed 
commodity. In other words, developers mediate the financial sphere, for the provision 
of capital, and the real, local economy for the construction of physical buildings (Halbert 
et al., 2014). 
As chapter 6 will show, other crucial actors that facilitate urban development are 
government agencies, and in particular local governments. Although financialization 
processes have been described in a wide variety of urban contexts, only a few, 
especially Anglo-American cities, have been labelled as ‘fully financialized’. In these 
cases, there has been a clear shift from the provision of public goods and services in 
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a managerial manner towards the first waves of neoliberalization that installed an 
entrepreneurial stance to financialized forms of governance (Ashton et al., 2016; 
Kirkpatrick, 2016; Peck and Whiteside, 2016). Whereas the entrepreneurial phase 
prioritizes large urban projects focused on inter-urban-competition at the international 
level for investments, tourists and the wealthy sections of the population (Harvey, 1989; 
Haughton et al., 2013; Lauermann, 2016) the financialized phase relates to financial 
actors becoming dominant over urban governance, thus directing urban development 
in finance’s favour and ultimately extracting value from the built environment (Weber, 
2010; Weber, 2015). Nevertheless, chapter 6 will further scrutinize this periodization 
and the interlinkages between neoliberalization, financialization and 
entrepreneurialism at the urban level. At least, this first examination suggests that both 
finance and real estate have become more important for cities and municipalities, 
consequently placing urban development high on the local political agenda 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Martinelli et al., 2013). 
Given their importance to urban development, analyses in this dissertation will 
be primarily focused on transformations within the real estate development sector and 
urban governance related to urban development. The main aim is to investigate the 
financialization of urban development through two country case studies that, as 
chapter 2 will show, share many elements with regard to the rise of financialized 
capitalism, but yet, have different modes of urban development: small-scale piecemeal 
private-led in Belgium versus large scale (semi-)public-led in the Netherlands (Halleux 
et al., 2012; Taşan-Kok, 2010). And, as discussed in more detail in chapter 2, whereas 
at the start of this PhD thesis there were, to the author’s knowledge, no studies on 
financialization in Belgium, in the Netherlands financialization processes have been 
researched extensively (Aalbers et al., 2011; Engelen et al., 2010; Engelen, 2015; 
Fernandez, 2011; Bezemer and Muysken, 2015), as have the very close ties between 
real estate actors and state agencies. This has for instance resulted in a parliamentary 
commission of enquiry on wide spread fraud and cartels in the construction of roads 
and canals (Dorée, 2004; Priemus, 2004). Nonetheless, in both countries literature on 
urban development neglects taking financialization processes into account (e.g., 
Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016; Zonneveld and Evers, 2014; van der Krabben and 
Jacobs, 2013; Van Den Broeck and Verachtert, 2016; De Decker et al., 2005; 
Loopmans, 2008).  
To investigate the (non-)financialization of urban development, three main 
Research Questions will be leading: 
 
 Research Question 1a) To what extent is the financialization of urban 
development observable in the Netherlands? And, how does it take place? 
 Research Question 1b) To what extent is the financialization of urban 
development observable in Belgium/Flanders? And, how does it take 
place? 
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As discussed above, financialization is looked at as processes that started during the 
1970s and 1980s in which “financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and 
narratives” (Aalbers, 2017a, p. 3) become so dominant that they set in motion the 
structural change of domestic and urban political economies. Urban development is 
defined in a narrow way and understood as the process of producing new properties 
in both urban and suburban areas, as such, real estate development and urban 
development, which are used interchangeably.  
  As discussed above, to create a better understanding of the financialization of 
urban development it is crucial to put the main producers of the built environment in 
the center of discussion. In a very stylized view one could distinguish real estate 
development corporations, broadly defined as every entity that produces new real 
estate, urban governance, those state agencies that are crucial to facilitate (and 
regulate) urban development, and real estate buyers, those who buy the newly 
developed real estate (i.e., both households and institutional/private investors all 
usually (partly) financing the purchase through debt) (van Gool, 2013; Lizieri, 2009). 
However, as chapter 4 will point out, the empirical reality is much more diffuse, showing 
all kinds of complex mixtures and interrelationships between these actors. Also, as the 
literature review above shows, the rise of financialized capitalism suggests that it is 
likely that real estate development corporations, investors and urban governance have 
opened up for financialization processes. And, it is also crucial to take into account real 
estate markets that could introduce financialization processes both through the 
financial desires of investors who are the main buyers of rental residential units and 
commercial real estate and the financialization of households that are the main buyers 
of non-rental residential units. 
Hence, it is through analyzing the real estate corporations, urban governance 
and real estate markets since the early 1990s that this doctoral thesis aims to answer 
this main research question for each country. Belgium is a highly regionalized country 
with fragmented state agencies, as such, the research project started with a focus on 
Belgium as a whole (see chapters 2, 4 and 5), but, as discussed in more detail in 
section 1.4.1 and chapter 6, in order to study urban governance this work zooms in 
into Flanders.  
Answering this first set of main research questions would allow to further investigate 
the origination of the financialization of urban development through answering a 
second set of main research questions: 
 
 Research question 2) Are there important differences in the way the 
financialization of urban development takes place in the Netherlands and 
Belgium/Flanders? How and in what ways are these differences context 
specific?  
 
These questions aim to distinguish between processes that are systematically re-
produced across borders and processes that are context specific. Put differently, these 
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questions help to study the variegation of financialization process analysed through its 
impact on urban development, thereby contributing to a comparative, political economy 
perspective. Such a perspective also enables the  conceptualization of non-
financialized or moderately financialized realms. Hence, context specificity could also 
point out the barriers to financialization processes.  
 
 Research question 3) How does financialization structurally change urban 
development? 
 
Financialization is thus defined as setting in motion structural change in the ways in 
which urban development takes place. According to the empirical literature discussed 
above, the structural change financialization causes could be exemplified by making 
finance dominant over urban development. Then, the structural change observed is 
that financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and/or narratives become 
dominant over urban development. In other words, finance starts to shape the pace 
and form of urban development. 
 For instance, many American cities opened up to more speculative forms of 
finance including new ‘innovative’ instruments (Kirkpatrick, 2016; Pacewicz, 2013; 
Peck and Whiteside, 2016). In this regard, Chicago was a frontrunner which adopted 
an instrument that enabled the sale of future property tax revenues (i.e., Tax Increment 
Financing, TIF) to investors in order to fund urban development projects. This 
increased financial flows to Chicago, thereby contributing to “over-building” (Weber, 
2015; Weber, 2010), and it also made urban development dependent on the success 
of current projects as it necessitated to pay back the TIF-investors. However, Chicago’s 
structural budget shortages and willingness to adopt similar financialization 
instruments in other domains moved the City into a continuous search for new financial 
instruments. Put differently, it required the continuous sell of future municipal income 
streams in order to compensate for current budget deficits (Ashton et al., 2016; Farmer, 
2014; Kirkpatrick, 2016). Accordingly, the City of Chicago now prioritizes urban 
development projects that have the potential to deliver substantial (property tax) 
income streams, i.e., urban projects that satisfy the desires of investors (Weber, 2010). 
But, this strategy requires a stable investor’s appetite, when this appetite becomes 
less—for instance due to downturns on financial markets—urban development halts. 
The structural change thus observed is that financial actors have become important in 
influencing the form of Chicago’s urban development and that financial markets 
influence its pace 
Answering the three research questions above requires a deep understanding 
of both cases. The next section presents a methodological approach for developing 
such an understanding. 
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1.4 Methodology  
This section first “examines the logic and rationale which underpins the use of 
particular methods” (Roberts, 2014, pp. 1–2), i.e., the methodology that structures this 
research project and helps to answer the three main research questions stipulated 
above. The core idea behind the methodology is that, in order to develop a thorough 
understanding of the financialization of urban development, a deep understanding of 
both political economies at different levels of scale is essential. For doing so, in-depth 
case studies are effective instruments (Burawoy, 1998; Gerring, 2007).  
This section then discusses the “techniques adopted to accumulate and collect 
data about an object of inquiry” (Roberts, 2014, p. 1), i.e., methods. As every chapter 
has a short method section, this section revolves around those elements that are 
relevant for all chapters. Among other things, during two phases of fieldwork, much 
data was gathered including 55 open structured interviews, financial data (e.g., annual 
reports) and general statistics. This data was enriched by both the author’s previous 
working experience in real estate finance, primarily as junior analyst at IPD/MscI, and 
his own experience living and working in the Low Countries during the entire period of 
the dissertation (four years). This allowed for many informal conversations and 
meetings with people working in real estate, finance and related state agencies on 
conferences, workshops, and lectures. Taken together, this created a deep 
understanding of both cases. 
Financialization relates to both the fluid processes and a structural 
transformation of political economies, while the built environment consists of local, 
fixed objects. Therefore, to analyse the financialization of urban development, i.e., to 
answer the main research questions, it is essential to adopt an approach that 
acknowledges the multiple dimensions and layers of financialization processes. For 
doing so, a critical realist epistemology is adopted that focuses “on necessity and 
contingency rather than regularity, on open rather than closed systems, on the ways 
in which causal processes could produce quite different results in different contexts” 
(Sayer, 2000, p. 5). As such, critical realism tries to find the middle-ground between 
universalist, law-seeking approaches and anti-naturalist, idiographic approaches thus 
rejecting both overly positivists and overly postmodern approaches (Sayer, 2000; 
Steinmetz, 2004; Moulaert and Jessop, 2013).  
Consequently, the financialization of urban development, is conceptualized as 
an open, contingent and contextually variegated process (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002; Brenner, 2009; Jessop et al., 2008; Sayer, 2000). This makes it difficult to point 
out causal responsibility as there are many interacting structures and mechanisms in 
place creating messy, path dependent, incremental change (Oosterlynck, 2012; 
Lindblom, 1959). Moreover, actors distill from this complexity what is important for them 
and base their actions on this reduced complexity (Moulaert et al., 2016). In this regard, 
understanding change implies acknowledging that actions are constrained by “past 
and present path-dependent structural legacies rooted in the organization” (Moulaert 
and Jessop, 2013, p. 18) of domestic and urban political economies. Nevertheless, this 
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perspective also acknowledges that there could be structural transformations that 
reflect the rise of new dominant tendencies within contemporary capitalism, such as 
financialization and neoliberalization, that reshape political economies (Moulaert et al., 
2016; Martinelli et al., 2013).  
However, the systematic reproduction of dominant processes through complex 
socio-economic historic-geographies inherently relates to uneven and variegated 
processes, both geographically and temporarily, thus creating variegated pathways 
(Brenner et al., 2010; Jessop et al., 2008). Dominant processes within global political 
economy, primarily financialization and neo-liberalization, also bring localities into 
conversation as these processes create shared, local experiences in which 
respectively financial logics and practices (financialization) and  market-like logics, 
efficient solutions and subjectification to neoliberal ideals (neo-liberalization) are put 
central in urban development (Robinson, 2015; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Peck and 
Whiteside, 2016; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Accordingly, analysing how and why 
localities experienced similar “critical junctures” (Schneiberg, 2006) not only helps to 
shed more light on their individual pathways thereby answering research questions 1a 
and 1b. Furthermore, as both cases are analysed through similar methodological 
anchors, they can therefore be compared to each-other through reflecting on the found 
similarities and differences, thereby shedding light on variegation (cf. Novy et al., 2013 
research question 2). As such, the Belgian and Dutch cases are not only compared 
with each-other but also brought in conversation with the broader literature on 
financialization in the Western context (answering research question 3).  
To distinguish financialization as setting in motion a structural transformation of 
urban development meaningful change caused by financialization processes should 
be observed. However, at the onset of the research project it is only clear that this 
change would differ between domains and actors. As a result, the various chapters 
aim to develop a more sophisticated understanding of financialization’s ability to cause 
transformation through different case-studies within the Low Countries. 
1.4.1 Case selection 
The general research project uses comparable methods and theoretical concepts to 
study the ‘existence’ and ‘appearance’ of REFCOM like structures and mechanisms in 
the United States and the United Kingdom (Hofman and Aalbers, 2017; Fernandez et 
al., 2016; Ward, n.d.), Spain and Italy (Di Feliciantonio and Aalbers, 2017; Di 
Feliciantonio, 2016), Russia and Poland  (Büdenbender and Golubchikov, 2016; 
Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016), Brazil and Italy (Mosciaro, n.d.), Hongkong and China 
(Zhang, n.d.), Germany and France (Gertjan Wijburg and Aalbers, 2017; Gert Jan 
Wijburg and Aalbers, 2017). Accordingly, within this research framework the 
Netherlands and Belgium are logical cases as they expand the research project into 
two small, Eurozone countries that both have well-developed, large financial sectors 
with long histories and are thus likely cases to facilitate financialization processes 
related to real estate. As argued below, brought in conversation with the international 
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literature both cases also offer insights into how the financialization of urban 
development plays out in the Western context. 
 To create a better understanding on how the multilayered and multiscalar 
process of financialization affects urban development differently in both countries, this 
PhD thesis is based on multi-stage, in-depth case studies that use both quantitative 
and qualitative methods (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Hall, 2003; Steinmetz, 2004). In each 
chapter different cases are studied and their selection is explained. But, every case 
has been selected with the aim to better understand certain elements of the 
financialization of urban development. In-depth case studies—that are according to 
some scholars “a precondition for any comparative assessment of theory” (Steinmetz, 
2004, p. 383)—enable the development of an insider view to gain in depth contextual 
information on “how a causal mechanism operates and under what conditions it is 
activated” (Roberts, 2014, p. 5). Taken together the multiple case studies discussed 
throughout this doctoral thesis helps to increase the understanding of the (non-
)financialization of urban development by highlighting different elements of it in both 
countries. As such, an in-depth understand of the two cases brought in conversation 
with (i.e., compared with) the general literature enables to “explain rather than only to 
describe” (Pickvance, 2001, p. 11; see also Robinson, 2015) how the financialization 
of urban development takes place. 
The Netherlands and Belgium are strong cases to study the financialization of 
urban development. This can be seen in how, on the one hand the Low Countries 
share many characteristics. They are flat, small countries with extensive coastal areas 
containing the largest ports of Europe. Both countries are densely populated with a 
highly educated work force, high average household wealth, relatively strong economic 
performance, an advanced and international oriented financial sector with a rich 
history, and a polycentric urban structure (de Vries, 2015; Chang and Jones, 2013; 
Allianz, 2014). Both political economies are open to foreign investments and 
international trade. Furthermore, by late 2014, the households, state institutions and 
non-financial firms supporting these economies had accumulated one of the highest 
debts to GDP ratio’s in Europe (roughly 325%). As illustrated in chapter 2, these 
stretched balance sheets indicate that financialization processes could originate in 
both countries. Also, with open economies, the countries depend on both the global 
economy and global finance for their economic performance. 
Moreover, as parts of the Eurozone, both countries have similar socio-economic 
experiences, such as the liberalization and Europeanization of the financial sector, but, 
also the rise of neoliberal policy interventions that prioritize market oriented solutions 
for public problems (Warner and Clifton, 2014; Mügge, 2006). Furthermore, until the 
late 1980s, when many empirical accounts locate the beginning of the processes of 
financialization in Europe, the countries had comparable models of Fordist economic 
development, with powerful labour unions and a strong state which aimed to distribute 
wealth equally. Political parties were embedded in dense networks of specific religious 
or ideological institutions that formed ‘pillars’ that influenced all spheres of life (Quentin 
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and van Hamme, 2011). However, steady ‘depillarization’ and severe economic 
downturns during the 1980s combined with the introduction of European legislation 
during the 1990s created opportunities for new, post Fordist paradigms to take root in 
both political economies: i.e., to find new arrangements to temper the wild force of 
global (financializing) capitalism (Aglietta, 1998).  
On the other hand, in regulating the built environment the Dutch urban planning 
system—where state agencies play a much more directive role and the processes itself 
is more institutionalized—creates compact cities also containing large stocks of social 
housing whereas Belgian’s sprawled built environment consists of large, often 
detached houses primarily owned by households (Halleux et al., 2012). This relates 
back to a long history with distinctive, regional economic development trajectories 
further spurred by state reforms in the 1970s that regionalized—or fragmented— state 
institutes and political parties.  
The economic geography of Wallonia was very successful in facilitating rapid 
industrialization in the 19th century. But, it became locked in in supporting its decaying 
traditional industries during deindustrialization in the 1980s. Flanders, in contrast, not 
only experienced an economic boom with the rise of a consumer’s society peaking in 
the 1960s, it was also rather successful in creating–through ‘entrepreneurial policies’ 
that mostly consisted of reducing labour costs, attracting foreign investments, and 
investing in (high-tech) clusters—a ‘Third industrial revolution’ from the late 1980s 
onwards. Hence, Flanders’ economy became technology led housing ‘modern 
industries’ such as chemicals and the car industry. Where Brussels3 was the gravity 
point for industrial and colonial capital, it now has become—next to the ‘Belgian 
financial centre’—a major provider of jobs in the service sector in particular related to 
the activities of the European Union (Buyst, 2011; Oosterlynck, 2012; Kesteloot et al., 
1990; Oosterlynck, 2007; Loopmans, 2007). Accordingly, and as will be discussed 
through chapters 4—5, Brussels is Belgium’s prime office market, and residential 
markets in Flanders are relatively prosperous compared to Wallonia. Nevertheless, 
there are many similarities in real estate practices  within Belgium(JLL, 2015; 
Hanseeuw, 2014; Clark et al., 2016).  
 It is expected that financialization processes are possible in both countries, but, 
that as the result of the differences (especially around the way the built environment is 
produced) the financialization of real estate could take two different, European 
variegations. Or, not take place at all as there could be too many barriers for finance 
to become dominant. Therefore, both political economies are looked at as cases that 
could deliver insights on how domestic and urban political economies morph the rise 
of financialized capitalism into specific local variegated forms of urban development. 
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, there were also some pragmatic 
issues related to the (within) case selection. The main advantage of small N-studies is 
that it allows the researcher to create a deep understanding of the phenomena under 
                                            
3 In this paper Brussels is synonym to ‘Brussels metropolitan area’ except when stated differently in 
the text. 
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investigation (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Since developing such an understanding is time 
consuming, it is advantageous that during my doctoral thesis I worked at a Belgian 
university and lived in a Dutch city. Also, because I originate in the Netherlands, and 
therefore speak Dutch, and previously studied and worked in the Netherlands, I was 
already well informed about many elements of the Dutch case.  
However, as I am not fluent in French, the Belgian case was restricted to 
documents and interviewees who/which could be accessed in Dutch or English. For 
chapters 2, 4 and 5 this did not contain a problem as many documents and interviews 
were in Dutch or English. However, to study urban governance it was necessary to 
focus only on Flanders as for studying Wallonia or Brussels French language 
capabilities are a necessity. This is in line with common research practices in Belgium, 
most of the urban research focuses on either Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels. 
Moreover, as the regional pathways have become very different, it would have implied 
studying four cases instead of two (i.e., Flanders, Brussels, Wallonia and the 
Netherlands). Nonetheless, even after four years I don’t know all the nuances of the 
Belgian political economy, therefore, the extensive comments of my Belgian co-
supervisor Stijn Oosterlynck on all drafts related to the Belgian case were very 
important for this doctorate. 
 
1.4.2 Quantitative data-sources 
The research questions aim to develop a thorough understanding on the 
financialization of urban development through studying its appearance in two 
countries. Therefore, as argued above, in-depth case studies are a crucial way to 
develop such an understanding. There is plenty of information on real estate and 
finance in the Low Countries, however, there is surprisingly little comparative, historical 
data available. For instance, to gather historical data on the outstanding debt of 
domestic real estate development corporations was impossible in both countries.  
Data that is most comparable is gathered by international agencies as OECD 
and Eurostat. However, as chapter 2 illustrates, even historical data on financial assets 
and liabilities is only available from the mid to late 1990s onwards. Also, this type of 
macro-level data is almost always strictly focused at the national level. This fallacy of 
“methodological nationalism” (cf. Peck and Theodore, 2007) does not allow for the 
various scales of financialization processes to be fully captured, and it hinders analyses 
at the urban level (cf. Harvey, 2012). 
 Therefore, as the methods sections in each chapter describe, chapters 4—6 
had to use data that was gathered in different ways from varying agents ranging from 
statistical bureaus and central banks towards professional real estate magazines. 
Accordingly, this kind of data does not allow for direct comparisons to be made through 
statistical analyses (Bryman, 2012). As a result, throughout this PhD thesis, 
quantitative data is primarily used to create rough indications for important 
developments that had to be verified through interviews (see section 1.4.3) and other 
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secondary sources. They primarily included financial newspapers, non-academic 
books, and real estate magazines.  
With respect to data availability, there was much more data available on the 
Dutch case. This is because, in the Netherlands, both the real estate/financial sector 
and state agencies gather standardized information that is shared through different 
channels and media, such as, but not limited to, professional real estate magazines 
Property NL and Vastgoedmarkt, real estate consultancy firms and realtors, the semi-
private knowledge/education center ASRE, and government agencies as PBL. In 
contrast, the standardized information produced in Belgium is primarily available 
through consultancies/realtors such as JLL and Cushman & Wakefield who produce 
similar—but highly debated (van Loon, 2015)—reports in the Netherlands. Moreover, 
with a centralized Dutch state and regionalized/fragmented Belgian state, in the Dutch 
case there is much more comparative data at the municipal level that was gathered 
through the central statistical bureau, CBS. As further reflected upon through the 
empirical chapters, this informational asymmetry is an important characteristic for 
differences between practices around urban development. 
At the level of individual firms (chapter 5, corporations of Immobel and TCN) 
and real estate activities and finance of individual municipalities (chapter 6, 
municipalities of Apeldoorn and Antwerp) annual reports offered a very useful data 
source. Annual reports not only give a precise overview of changes in financial flows 
over time, but they are also based on comparable accountancy principles, thereby 
making the data easily comparable. However, the municipal annual reports were less 
comparable as both countries/regions use very specific, bureaucratic forms of 
accountancy. Nevertheless, these reports did deliver intriguing insights on how 
important developments work out financially. Accordingly, social scientists who study 
financialization processes should add these financial sources to their research tool 
box.  
 
1.4.3 Elite Interviewing 
Both real estate and finance are rather opaque, complex sectors with layered 
organizations. There tend to primarily be more experienced actors at the top of the 
hierarchy, who are more aware of the organization’s history, and changes throughout. 
However, these key actors usually do not publicly elaborate on their activities in detail. 
This thereby makes primary information difficult to come by. Moreover, public sources 
and academic publications are relatively scarce on this topic, especially in Belgium. 
Also, although quantitative data is helpful to measure and map general developments 
(see section 1.4.2), in this research project, quantitative data alone was not substantial 
enough to create a better understanding of major transformations at the intersection of 
finance, real estate and state agencies.  
To fill this gap interviews with people who are experienced and have knowledge 
about the decision making processes in the higher echelons of the organizations are 
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crucial. A small part of this target group relates to relatively approachable occupations 
such as urban planning professionals and consultants.  However, a much larger part 
of possible interview candidates are “those who occupy senior management positions” 
(Harvey, 2010, p. 5) and that could be labelled as the elite. Interviewing the elite comes 
with certain particularities, and this section presents how said particularities were 
handled, and how this could have influenced the content of the empirical chapters.  
The main data-source that provides the basis for chapters 3—5 are 17 
interviews that took place in Belgium and 30 interviews that took place in the 
Netherlands with key players, ranging from CEOs of real estate corporations and banks 
to high level officials from planning departments conducted between April 2014 and 
May 2015. For chapter 6, eight new interviews were conducted with actors involved 
with the local government of Apeldoorn (3) and Antwerp (5), these interviews took 
place in July and August 2016 (see Appendix I).  
Each of the 55 interviewees had over ten years of varied working experience, 
often at different organizations and corporations. The firms/organizations these, mostly 
male, respondents owned or were working at the moment of the interview included real 
estate development corporations (NL: 6; BE: 7), all major domestic banks, (NL: 5; BE 
2), listed and unlisted real estate investment funds both for private and institutional 
investors, (NL: 5; BE: 1), municipalities/municipal real estate organizations (NL: 1; BE: 
6), supra-local (planning) agencies (NL: 2; BE: 2), lobby organizations, (NL: 3; BE: 1) 
institutional investors, (NL: 2; BE: 1), other real estate financiers (NL: 1, BE: 1), real 
estate advisories (NL: 2; BE: 1), a housing association (NL: 1),  trust industry (NL: 1), 
an asset manager (NL: 1), the national bank (NL 1), the province (NL: 1), and the 
department of domestic affairs/planning (NL: 1). Most interviewees were working in 
senior positions such as director, managing director, CEO, or senior analyst (see 
Appendix I, list of interviewees). 
 First, elite interviewing comes with many barriers making interview-candidates 
hard to approach. Harvey (2010, p. 195) advices: “Researchers should attempt to 
pursue as many different avenues as possible in a polite, yet persistent and 
opportunistic manner”. This is often a hard and time consuming task (England, 2002; 
Conti and O’Neil, 2007), in particular because highly -ranked people have many 
gatekeepers, so as to protect their valuable time (Thomas, 1993). To minimize the 
problems that surround gaining access I decided to start my fieldwork in the 
Netherlands were I already had established a small professional network during two 
previous jobs in real estate/finance and business conferences. I started by interviewing 
people from this network  
At the end of every interview I asked if the interviewee had other interview 
candidates in mind. This snowball technique (cf. Bryman, 2012) proved to be very 
fruitful: mentioning an interviewee’s name to a possible interviewee generally let to the 
acceptance of an interview invite. In a later stage, when I had very specific ideas about 
who to interview, cold calling would often work surprisingly well, although, respectively 
twelve interview candidates in the Netherlands and six in Belgium rejected interview 
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requests, or simply did not respond. In the case of financial and real estate corporations 
this was often not a problem as there were plenty of other possible candidates. 
However, the four rejections of different suitable interview candidates in the Dutch 
National Bank were more problematic as it is a crucial actor in the processes studied 
in chapter 3. In this case I had to be very persistence, for instance by visiting a lecture 
of an interview candidate within the DNB and inviting her/him for an interview 
afterwards. Persistence did pay off, but it took much more time than with other 
interviewees. Nonetheless, overall I was able to interview the people I aimed for: the 
elite within real estate, finance and the state. So, in this regard, my own experience 
and that of other members of our research group (cf., Büdenbender and Lagna, n.d.; 
Wijburg and Aalbers, n.d.) contrasts with the literature on elite-interviewing that claims 
getting access is very tough. 
This dissertation started as a broad investigation into transformations within 
finance, real estate and related state agencies. So, besides the structure to first 
research the national scale in both countries and then the urban scale, it was unclear 
what the precise topic(s) of the PhD thesis would be. However, after finishing the first 
30 interviews in the Netherlands, the topic of comparison was much clearer: to study 
the (non-)financialization of urban development in the Low Countries. Also, with some 
interviewees I had developed a close dialogue of “academics moving between 
respondents … part of a complex web of information flow” (Clark, 2000, p. 8) making 
them very willing to connect me directly with other very useful interviewees in Belgium. 
Consequently, the interviews in Belgium were much more focused, and, I reached a 
level of saturation after approximately 17 interviews in which all elements related to 
changes in urban development had been discussed in great detail with a wide range 
of actors (Gerring, 2001). I have had much less knowledge about the Belgian case. 
Therefore, I worked to compensate this by attempting to read much more on Belgium. 
However, this was problematic as much less information is available on this topic, both 
from an academic perspective and information published by the real estate and finance 
industries (see section 1.4.3). As a result, the interviews in Belgium were less 
advanced in the sense that interviewees more often had to explain basic elements 
during the interview. Also, I was less able to interpret if an interviewee was truthful 
about a topic. I tried to minimize these effects by verifying important topics and issues 
with the various interviewees. Also, the level of abstraction in chapters 3—5 decreases 
this ‘asymmetry’ between the sophistication of the interviews.    
Second, as elite interviewees are often well-trained, well-informed speakers, it 
was important to start an interview well prepared (England, 2002; Conti and O’Neil, 
2007). My working experience in real estate and finance had already made me familiar 
with many terms, developments and dominant ideas that enabled–together with a 
thorough literature study–the setting-up of a topic list. However, what proved to be 
particularly fruitful, was to personalize this topic list based on reading background 
documents about the interviewee and her/his company published in the financial 
newspapers, on their website, and in other sources. This established rapport (Berry, 
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2002; McDowell, 1998) letting interviewees speak very openly, and, often revealing 
information that was rather confidential, but also often led to conversations that went 
on longer than planned. This worked both for Dutch and Belgian interviewees, thus 
decreasing the ‘information gap’ described above.   
All interviews were taped, but, trust and rapport were further established by 
letting the interviewee her/himself decide how to be cited, based on draft versions of 
publications. I remained the right to cite them anonymously except when a quote would 
contain confidential information. If they opted for anonymity, their name is not listed in 
Appendix I, but a description that indicates their background is still available. Two 
chapters are published articles and both journals had different requirements for quoting 
interviewees: European Planning Studies required the datum of the interview with 
every quote while Socio Economic Review only required to have “(interview)” behind 
every quote. To smooth the process of guaranteeing anonymity, the other chapters 
use the more anonymous way of Socio Economic Review and Appendix I uses a list 
without the interview dates, as otherwise anonymity could not be guaranteed. Both 
supervisors did have access to all taped interviews and the tapes are stored in a safe, 
offline, encrypted place by the researcher. Also, the respondents that were quoted 
were given the opportunity to respond and give feedback on draft versions of both 
academic papers and essays in Dutch that are based on the main research findings. 
Doing so led to the establishment of a “close dialogue” with some interviewees, or, in 
a couple if instances, even to follow-up interviews in less formal settings (Clark, 2000).  
A third important element of elite interviewing is the use of positionality. Here, 
experiences are mixed, from lively pleas to act as a naive researcher so the 
experienced interviewee wants to “’enlighten’ their junior interlocutor” (Welch et al., 
2002, p. 621), to “try and move between ... positions in an interview, while not alarming 
a respondent by one’s apparent multiple personality problem” (McDowell, 1998, p. 
2138). As is clearly observable from my LinkedIn and Twitter accounts, I have working 
experience in the real estate industry and pronounced opinions on certain topics. 
Furthermore, as I knew already much about many interviewees and their firms through 
interview preparation, being honest about my positionality made most sense to me. 
This knowledge allowed for the critical engagement with an interviewee when (s)he 
seemed to explain manners in a way that seemed to be beneficial to her/him or her/his 
institution’s interests (Clark, 2000). Sometimes this set in motion tough discussions as 
many interviewees were sharp of tongue and often successfully attacked questions 
that I formulated badly. In a later stage I also engaged with interviewees in discussions 
about my own thoughts about phenomena in Dutch and Belgian real estate and 
finance. These discussions—often based on propositions—created even more 
interesting new insights. 
Positionality also relates to me being reflexive about my own position as 
researcher to the research topic (Herbert, 2000). During my master-thesis, I became 
fascinated by the production of urban space and the underlying financial and real 
estate dynamics. I started to work part time at a small real estate developer, Monviso 
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Vastgoed. After graduation I worked 1.5 year full time at MscI/IPD that creates the most 
important real estate benchmarks. Accordingly, I learned a lot about the finance behind 
real estate. During the doctoral thesis, in which I conducted research and taught for 
the KU Leuven, I had a very independent position that I used to write critical 
publications. Nevertheless, although I am critical about certain developments in the 
real estate sector, I do not feel distanced from it. Rather, this critical mindset has 
increased my interest in the topic. For example, my current job search includes both 
academic positions and positions within real estate firms.  
1.5 Structure of the PhD thesis 
All chapters aim to find out if, and if so how, financialization structurally changed a 
dominant actor/element related to urban development. As Figure 1.1 below 
summarizes, chapter 2 first explores the presence of financialization processes 
related to real estate at the national level. It offers a quantitative exploration of the rise 
of finance and real estate within the Low Countries together with an introduction of 
both political economies.  
During the first interview phase it became clear that this dissertation offered a 
unique opportunity to study changes in the way Dutch institutional investors invest into 
the built environment. Access to both data and key actors enabled to unravel the black 
box of finance allowing to make a contribution to the international literature as financial  
agency often remains a black box. But, the recent history of real estate investments of 
Dutch institutional investors also helps to better understand wider changes in the Dutch 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure PhD: Financialization and urban development in the Low Countries  
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political economy that are key to understand the financialization of urban development. 
Therefore, to study whether the financialization of urban development takes place 
differently in the Low Countries chapter 3 first focuses exclusively on the Netherlands 
analysing one, under-researched element in depth: the financialization of real estate 
investment strategies of Dutch institutional investors who have shifted from primarily 
local direct holdings in properties towards truly global real estate portfolios primarily 
through participations in real estate funds. This chapter also puts fictitious capital 
central as a crucial theoretical concept to better understand the current processes of 
financialization in regard to real estate.  
Chapter 4 is a comparative chapter that focuses on the business models of real 
estate developers who are the intermediaries between capital and the production of 
the built environment. By doing so it highlights important differences between the 
behaviour of developers in both countries, but, also between both political economies 
that interact differently with the rise of financialized capitalism. The crucial difference 
is that Dutch developers were open towards financialization processes and 
financialized accordingly while patient capital formed an important barrier in Belgium. 
Through two typical case studies, Immobel and TCN, chapter 5 aims to reveal how 
these differences play out at the level of the individual firm. To develop a better 
understanding on what the financialization of urban development looks like chapter 6 
analyses the role of municipalities. In both countries, municipalities became more 
active on real estate markets, thus getting actively involved in real estate projects or 
land activities and therefore behaving like an entrepreneurial state agency. The 
conclusion, finally, answers the main research questions. This allows not only to 
increase our understanding on the relationship between financialization processes and 
real estate, but also, to better understand the conditions that contribute or hamper the 
rise of financialized capitalism. 
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Chapter 2 The rise of financialized capitalism reflected through changes on 
the balance sheets of the Dutch and Belgian political economy 
 
The idea to quantitatively explore the financialization of political economies through 
balance sheets arose during a collective research project with Callum Ward and 
Gertjan Wijburg. Accordingly, many elements of chapter 2 resonate with Ward, van 
Loon and Wijburg (n.d.). 
2.1 Introduction 
As chapter 1 discussed, finance and real estate have become more dominant within 
political economies and more interconnected with each other. Also, in some countries 
the dominance of finance has become so strong that it is now the crucial feature of the 
way capitalism functions, i.e., financialized capitalism. To analyse the extent to which 
both the rise of financialized capitalism and real estate is observable in the Low 
Countries, this chapter4 presents quantitative data that aims to give a comparative 
overview of the rise of both finance and real estate vis-à-vis the regular economy in 
Belgium and the Netherlands.  
For doing so, Section 2.2 first presents a conceptualization of financialized 
capitalism and a way to explore its presence in the Low Countries. This quantitative 
exploration is structured through a discussion of the balance sheets of important actors 
from both political economies and how these changed over time. Section 2.3 discusses 
the merits and demerits of this heuristic device while sections 2.4 and 2.5 offer 
analyses on how these balance sheets have respectively changed for the Netherlands 
and Belgium. These sections indicate that finance and real estate have become 
dominant elements within the Dutch and Belgian political economy, consequently 
making them interesting cases to study the origination of financialization processes. 
The conclusion, section 2.6, reflects on how this first quantitative exploration is useful 
for the better understanding of the (non-)financialization of urban development in the 
Low Countries.  
 
2.2 The rise of financialized capitalism 
Section 1.2 shows that the rise of financialized capitalism is observable through 
“financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives” (Aalbers, 2017a, 
p. 3) and is becoming dominant in the functioning of political economies (by) 
structurally transforming the practices of important actors within political economies, 
namely non-financial firms, financial institutions, states and households. Especially in 
Anglo-American countries, a shift is observable from neoliberal urban and domestic 
political economies towards financialized versions. However, as financial and regular 
markets are shaped by institutions, context and historical conditions such a 
                                            
4 Another single-authored paper, heavily drawing on chapters 1 and 2, that further explores 
financialization processes related to the Belgian political economy is currently under review. 
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transformation has political origins and is shaped by the actions of important 
(economic) agents (Peck, 2013; Polanyi, 1957; Deeg and Jackson, 2006). Moreover, 
as financialization relates to multilayered and multiscalar processes it can play out 
differently among every actor and scale (French et al., 2011; Sokol, 2013). Therefore, 
financialization processes related to these four actors are discussed in more detail 
below. 
First, the financialization of non-financial corporations relates to a transformation 
of business models, a qualitative shift whereby the adoption of financial logics 
prioritizes a focus on financial profitability over productive investments and long-term 
growth (Orhangazi, 2008; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Put differently, “profit-
making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production” (Krippner, 2005, p. 181). For example, a car manufacturer for 
which the securitisation of and trade in car loans becomes more profitable than selling 
cars. As a consequence, leveraged growth, for instance through merges and 
acquisitions, financial assets and complex financial instruments such as derivatives 
become central to business models that aim to boost a corporation’s value, e.g., 
reflected through high stock market capitalization (Pike and Pollard, 2009; Froud et al., 
2006).  
Second, the financialization of households relates to two developments. First, 
many states replaced government lending in order to stimulate the domestic economy 
with mortgage production. In this “privatised Keynesianism” mortgage-debt has to 
accelerate booms on housing markets, thus boosting consumer confidence and 
(subsequently) real spending so domestic economies could thrive (Watson, 2010; 
Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016). However, the extreme relaxation of mortgage 
conditions in the United States also spurred a pyramiding of low quality debt, then 
giving birth to an almost meltdown of the global financial system (Aalbers, 2012; 
Ashton, 2009; Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012; Harvey, 2011). Second, there is a shift 
observable within Western countries whereby the state retreats from the provision of 
public goods (Davis, 2009; Martin, 2002). Households are increasingly responsible to 
manage their own funds and to provide themselves with schooling, health care, and 
pensions often allocating this task to institutional investors whose power has increased 
tremendously (Harmes, 1998; Clark, 2000; Dixon and Monk, 2014; Aglietta and Breton, 
2001).  
Third, rather recently accounts show how different state agencies interact with 
this new era of financialized capitalism. There is a wealth of empirical case studies 
showing how local and national state debt has opened up to financialization tools 
(Hendrikse, 2015; Pani and Holman, 2014; Weber, 2010; Gotham, 2014; Lagna, 
2015b; Lagna, 2015a). Usually, this involves replacing traditional forms of debt, i.e., 
bonds, with more complex forms such as derivatives, collateralized debt obligations 
and tax increment financing, often promising lower debt costs or more attractive debt 
levels but in reality often creating badly understood financial risks that can accumulate 
into sizeable financial losses. But, waves of privatization and financialization have also 
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put the provision of public goods, e.g., infrastructure, to a considerable degree outside 
the realm of the state. Therefore, these activities opened up for processes of 
financialization. For instance, roads have become financial investments and water 
provision a tool for complex debt generation (Allen and Pryke, 2013; Torrance, 2009; 
O’Neill, 2013). Therefore, on the one hand financialization of the state relates to 
opportunistic financial behavior: “how governments [i.e., state agencies] wield the 
market-based practices and technologies of financial innovation to pursue statecraft 
objectives” (Lagna, 2015a, p. 167). On the other hand,  state agencies become 
“entangled”  (Ashton et al., 2016) with financial actors in often badly understood ways 
“altering socio-legal arrangements and policies to accelerate the circulation of capital, 
revalorize space, and increase market liquidity” .. [financialization] close[s] off .. public 
debate on alternative courses .. based on, for example, public investment, social 
redistribution, and social justice” (Gotham, 2014, p. 19).   
A fourth financialization process, the financialization of financial institutions, 
relates to a couple of developments. First, a tendency has been observed whereby 
banks in many countries started to loosen their long-term relations with corporations 
as banks adopted market-oriented business models based on inter-bank borrowing 
bypassing depositors as main providers of money. The creation of growing debt and 
its trade through global capital markets created large financial markets and turned 
financial activities into an important source of profit (Hardie and Howarth, 2013). In this 
regard, housing related debt has become a crucial element of both banking activities 
and the functioning of financial systems whereby residential real estate is 
conceptualized as crucial collateral (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Turner, 2016; 
Jordà et al., 2014). In addition, banks started to develop or expand investment banking 
activities, making trading in listed and non-listed firms an important part of their 
business strategies (Wojcik, 2012; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013), i.e., exemplifying 
“the rise of financial markets for their own good” (Aalbers, 2008, p. 149).  
Second, as many households have delegated the management of their rising 
stock of financial assets to investment funds, pension funds and insurers, the 
managers of these funds, institutional investors, have become important actors in 
global finance (Clark, 2000; Dixon and Monk, 2014; Froud et al., 2002; Harmes, 1998). 
As conventional assets as bonds and securities cannot absorb the influx of institutional 
money (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016), there is pressure on all kinds of ‘raw materials’, 
such as non-listed firms (Froud et al., 2006), mortgages (Aalbers, 2008), and 
infrastructure (O’Neill, 2013), to be transformed into financial, tradable assets. Taken 
together, literature on the financialization of financial institutions illustrates how 
“finance is increasingly becoming ‘decoupled from production to become an 
independent power, an autocrat over the real economy’ ” (Cox in Aalbers, 2008, p. 
149). 
 In conclusion, whereas during neoliberal capitalism welfare arrangements were 
dismantled, making households more responsible for their current financial affairs 
within financialized capitalism, households are pushed into long term financial planning 
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that make their future welfare highly dependent on financial market activity. Firms 
moved from conventional expansion on regular markets towards expansion on/via 
financial markets. State agencies discovered ‘financial alchemy’ and transformed 
subsidies into revolving funds prioritizing investment logics. Banks moved from 
supporting real economies and markets to speculation on financial markets. As such, 
the ways in which financialization takes place differ throughout the various actors. But, 
where financialization processes structurally change a political economy scholars label 
it as a new era of capitalism: financialized capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2009; Haiven, 2011; 
van der Zwan, 2014). This relates both to a new logic of accumulation—putting 
financial speculation central (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Fine, 2013)—and a new logic 
of regulation that puts financial investment logics central among households, state 
agencies, non-financial firms and financial institutions (Chiapello, 2015). To 
quantitatively explore if the realm for financialization processes has increased, and 
consequently that the Low Countries have moved towards financialized capitalism, the 
next sections analyse the increased presence of finance and real estate among the 
four actors (i.e., NFCs; households; state agencies and financial institutions) discussed 
above. 
2.3 A quantitative exploration: balance sheets as heuristic device 
Figure 2.1 (Fernandez, 2016; Engelen et al., 2010) displays some indicators of the 
power of finance within both political economies, suggesting that indicators for 
financialization increased considerably since the mid 1990s in both Belgium and the 
Netherlands. In both countries  banks’ total assets grew large (relatively to GDP) and 
turned to capital markets to fund their increasing funding gaps. But, also deposits 
increased significantly. In the Netherlands, this was combined with a large increase of 
private credit provision that remained modest in Belgium. Capital markets, measured 
through stock market capitalization, rose moderately in Belgium and decreased 
moderately in the Netherlands.  Nevertheless, both the level of most indicators relative 
to GDP and the increase itself is much more pronounced in the Netherlands suggesting 
that finance has grown faster and become more prominent within the Dutch political 
economy.  
Whereas Figure 2.1 shows that elements of finance have become more dominant 
within both political economies, the discussion above and in section 1.2 suggests that 
within the four other dimensions of a political economy (i.e., households, state, banks 
and non-financial corporations) opportunities for financialization processes could also 
have increased considerably. To investigate this, data is available that allows for 
thecomposition consolidated financial balance sheets of these four actors starting in 
the early to mid-1990s. Using consolidated accounts removes the ‘double counting’ of 
the financial assets and liabilities of sub-levels. 
Comparative real estate data is only available for non-financial corporations 
through Eurostat. To assess the increase relative to the entire economy over time and 
to be able to compare the assets and liabilities between the Netherlands and Belgium,  
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They are expressed as percentage of GDP. To balance out extreme years the data is 
ordered through 4-year averages. Periods are chosen according to the following logics: 
first data available (period I), the rapid expansion of finance in the build up to the 
financial crisis (period II), latest data available (period III) (cf. Ward et al., n.d.).  
The resulting Figures 2.2 and 2.3 can be looked at as a heuristic device that 
allows a quantitative screening of the changing importance of both finance (through 
financial assets and liabilities) and real estate (through real estate related debt and 
assets) since the early 1990s. Stylistically, the discussion of these balance sheets in 
the subsequent sections is ordered through the four different actors and related to the 
academic literature on the Low Countries. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that 
these actors are interconnected and, as chapter 1 argues, it is precisely these 
interconnections that are at the centre of this dissertation. Moreover, these balance 
sheets only offer a quantitative screening. They do not offer insights on, for instance, 
how assets and liabilities are concentrated or spread within the different actors. As 
such, for instance, although households could look very rich, financial wealth could be 
concentrated among a select group of people. Neither do the balance sheets offer 
information about the motives of the holders of these assets and liabilities. 
Nonetheless, combined with relevant academic literature, the balance sheets create 
interesting insights into the rise of finance and real estate within the Belgian and Dutch 
political economies. 
 
2.4 Real estate and finance on the balance sheet of the Dutch political economy  
Compared to other European countries, the ratio of both financial assets and liabilities 
to GDP of the Netherlands is very high (Brown et al., 2014). Figure 2.2 clearly shows 
how among all four actors, financial assets and liabilities have become relatively more 
important to the real economy (i.e., GDP). And, indeed,this can also be seen in how 
various studies describe how various financialization processes have been observed 
throughout these actors: there is a rich literature on the financialization of the Dutch 
political economy.  
During the 1990s, banks switched to market oriented banking, then using 
excessive mortgage production and securitisation of residential mortgages as a 
growth-model that was expressed through an aggregated bank balance sheet that 
started to include more foreign and complex assets and liabilities (Engelen, 2015; 
Chang and Jones, 2013). The link with residential real estate as crucial input for Dutch 
banking growth has been described extensively (Aalbers et al., 2011; Engelen, 2015; 
Aalbers, 2008). However, although it led to the nationalization of the fourth largest bank 
SNS Reaal (Boon et al., 2014), the creation of excessive commercial real estate related 
debt has not been studied yet. Ultimately, the large amount of assets and liabilities 
related to both domestic and foreign real estate debt and strong ties with global finance 
led to severe banking losses during the Great Financial Crisis and the nationalization 
of two of the four largest domestic banks (ABN Amro and SNS Reaal). 
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The central state first shrank its balance sheet through a wave of privatisations 
and decentralization of tasks in order to comply to the Maastricht treaty that required, 
among other things, bringing state debt below 60% of GDP. Many (partly) privatised 
entities such as housing associations, universities and health care organizations got 
involved in haute finance, for instance by using derivatives to finance ambitious real 
estate projects or to use them in a very speculative manner (Engelen et al., 2014; 
Aalbers et al., 2017). During the financial crisis the state started to borrow heavily in 
order to save domestic financial institutes, which increased both state debt and equity 
holdings of the state in financial institutions (Bezemer and Muysken, 2015, p. 7). 
Households experienced a strong increase in real estate wealth, mortgage debt 
and pension fund savings. The first two elements are a clear expression of the 
financialization of the Dutch housing markets (Bezemer and Muysken, 2015; Aalbers 
et al., 2011; Aalbers, 2008). The latter relates to the combination of economic growth, 
increased labour participation, pension fund reforms, and a mandatory pension fund 
system, which set in motion the creation of a huge pool of Dutch institutional money. 
This accumulated into the largest pension asset to GDP ratio in the world that was 
primarily invested in foreign bonds and equity (Fernandez, 2011; Dixon and Monk, 
2009; McCarthy et al., 2016; Hollanders, 2016). 
In particular large non-financial corporations switched towards a focus on capital 
gains instead of growth in production. This is expressed through increased debt, and 
in particular, through the increase of equity in other firms (asset side): from 28% to 
GDP in the first period to 67% in the most recent period (Bezemer and Muysken, 2015; 
Engelen et al., 2008). Waves of privatisation and deregulation opened up Dutch 
corporate governance for providers of financialized capital that stimulated large, 
internationally oriented Dutch corporations to adopt growth strategies that focused on 
bolstering financial results. Nevertheless, corporate borrowing remained relatively 
stable over time suggesting a less dramatic change in the relationship between banks 
and corporations that only moderately turned toward the global debt markets (Engelen 
et al., 2008; Engelen et al., 2010; Bezemer and Muysken, 2015). 
Unfortunately, there is no data available for all actors (i.e., banks, central state, 
households and non-financial corporations) for each period displayed in figure 2.2 
about their real estate holdings. Moreover, the data available only gives a rough 
estimation of real estate prices. Nonetheless, for the central government, non-financial 
corporations and household’s real estate is in periods 2 and 3 by far their most valuable 
asset and much of their liabilities also relate to real estate activities. Only for 
households there is real estate price data available on the entire period that shows, in 
line with the literature (cf., Aalbers et al., 2011; Bezemer and Muysken, 2015) a 
considerable increase in housing values to GDP. The central government mostly owns 
real estate that is used by government agencies, but this could be an interesting realm 
for future studies as the latest government has started to sell many properties that are 
not used by state agencies anymore. The ways in which Dutch corporations use real 
estate holdings is under-researched. However, the values reported by Eurostat seem 
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to be rather high because many corporations tend to rent their properties. Therefore, 
this is an interesting area for future research. Banks mostly act as lenders and 
intermediaries for property owners and not as property owners themselves. However, 
due to the many bankruptcies since 2008, they did become owners of sizeable property 
portfolios (DNB, 2013), however, this is not observable in the OECD data.  
 
2.5 Real estate and finance on the balance sheet of the Belgian political economy  
Belgium and the Netherlands have similar ratios of both financial assets and liabilities 
to GDP. Therefore, Belgium’s ratio is also very high compared to other European 
countries. Figure 2.3 (below) clearly shows how, compared with the early 1990s, the 
financial assets and liabilities of all four actors have become more important, relative 
to the real economy (i.e., GDP). However, at the start of this PhD thesis, there were, 
to the author’s knowledge, no academic studies explaining if and how this stretching 
of balance sheets has enabled financialization processes related to real estate. 
Banks: privatisation during the 1990s transformed a reservoir of deposits that 
were traditionally managed by risk averse public agencies into an engine for 
opportunistic commercial bank growth (Chang and Jones, 2013; Ardaen, 2012; 
Depuydt, 2010). Belgian banks became highly connected to international finance, thus 
making extensive use of shadow banking in order to attain credit and thereby importing 
risks from global finance on their balance sheets. Therefore, the credit crunch created 
severe problems and led to the nationalization of two of the four largest in-Belgian 
active banks, i.e., Fortis and Dexia (Chang & Jones, 2013). Whereas Dutch banks 
played a clear role by also fuelling domestic real estate markets through excessive 
borrowing, the role of Belgian banks towards domestic real estate markets remains 
understudied. 
 The stretching balance sheet of non-financial corporations does suggest an 
expanding realm for financialization processes. However, to the author’s knowledge, 
no case studies on the financialization of Belgian firm(s) has yet been published. Also, 
a large part of the increased liabilities consist of equity that is often provided by wealthy 
Belgian households who aim to increase their multi-generational wealth in a slow, low-
risk manner (Daems, 1998; Molly et al., 2012). According to the literature (Deeg et al., 
2016; Lehrer and Schmid, 2015; Fichtner, 2015) this patient capital could create an 
important barrier to processes of financialization as it resists the adoption of high levels 
of external capital, or complex financial products as patient capital providers are 
hesitant to cede control over their business model to financial actors.  
State: successive waves of regionalization have created three regions that 
operate rather autonomously but still need to cooperate on many issues requiring 
multiscalar compromises that are often used only after extensive periods of time and 
long negotiations with employers’ organizations, labour unions and other corporatist 
structures. This ultimatley leadsto slow economic restructuring (Oosterlynck, 2010; 
Moulaert and Willekens, 1985; Stouthuysen and Jans, 2009). Also the heavily indebted 
  
43 
 
Belgian state, to meet the Maastricht criteria, implemented austerities and 
privatisations. But, it did so at a slow pace. Furthermore, state agencies often remained 
important shareholders within these partly ‘privatised’ organizations. In line with the 
Netherlands, the Great Financial Crisis also led to the increased participation of the 
state into financial actors primarily Forits and Dexia. In regard to public assets and in 
particular government buildings, both the rise of sale and lease back constructions and 
the sale of public infrastructure (such as the Brussels airport) are interesting, under-
studied areas (Deruytter and Derudder, 2015). 
Households financial assets remained stable but on high levels consisting of 
portfolios that are primarily managed by households themselves of savings, equity in 
listed and non-listed firms, securities (especially Belgian state bonds) and, particularly 
low-leveraged residential real estate. Although pensions are mainly provided by the 
state through a pay-as-you go system, recent reforms combined with an increased 
sense that the state would not be able to meet all future financial obligations, have 
made self-funded pension schemes more popular, thereby increasing the amount of 
institutionally managed assets (Naczyk, 2012). With a long tradition of self-provision, 
mortgage debt to GDP is rather low and private landownership dominant thus resulting 
in a landscape of fragmented ownership (De Decker, 2011; De Decker et al., 2005; 
Kesteloot and Maesschalck, 2001). However, rising land and housing prices combined 
with low interest rates and policy changes (that make interest rates partly deducible) 
have recently led to an uptake in mortgage debt. This suggests that at least some 
segments of home-buyers are beginning to experience the rise of housing finance 
(Damen et al., 2016; Meeus and De Decker, 2013; Winters and Van Den Broeck, 
2016). 
 
2.6 An increased potential realm for financialization in the Low Countries 
Despite the Great Financial Crisis, in all four actors, except the Belgian banks, financial 
assets and liabilities have increased more significantly than the Low Countries’ real 
economies have grown (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Due to the lack of data the growth 
in real estate assets is more difficult to describe quantitatively. But, in the most recent 
period, real estate assets are the largest possession of households, non-financial 
corporations and the central state in both countries. Also, a considerable part of the 
debt of all four actors relates to real estate activities. The sheer size of real estate 
assets(roughly 5.5 times GDP in the last period in the Netherlands and 4.5 in Belgium) 
and financial assets (respectively roughly 7 and 7.5 times GDP) confirms that both real 
estate and finance have become crucial elements of both the Dutch and Belgian 
political economies. This is in line with the general developments described in the 
financialization literature, and suggests the origination of a real estate finance driven 
growth regime (Jessop, 2001; Hofman and Aalbers, n.d.; Aglietta, 1998; Boyer, 2000).  
Ultimately, this brings to the fore that the potential realm for financialization 
processes related to real estate has increased considerably in both countries.  
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However, these processes have received much scholarly attention in the Netherlands, 
but not nearly as much in Belgium. This can be seen in, for example, how Belgian 
scholarship on financialization was, at the start of this PhD thesis in 2013, non-existing. 
Thus, the information gathered within this current thesis begins to shed light on a 
matter that has thusfar been under-analysed. 
To identify interesting research areas for comparative research, Table 2.1 
summarizes the developments described above, including the literature. It also 
indicates where processes of financialization interact with real estate practices: 
 
Households, housing finance: While the rise of housing finance and its influence on 
the Dutch political economy has been studied extensively there are only a few recent 
publications that describe, but do not explain, the probable start of a similar process in 
Belgium (Winters and Van Den Broeck, 2016; Damen et al., 2016; Meeus and De 
Decker, 2013). Therefore, a comparative study on the rise of housing finance could be 
very interesting. As the rise of housing finance in the Netherlands and concessive 
financialization of residential real estate has already been researched thoroughly this 
will not be a central topic in this dissertation. However, the (non-)financialization of real 
estate markets will be a crucial factor to developing an understanding on how the 
financialization of urban development does (not) take place. 
 
Households, asset management: While a much larger part of the financial assets of 
Dutch households are managed through pension funds and insurers (i.e. by 
institutional investors) financial assets in Belgium are primarily managed by 
households themselves: in the most recent period displayed in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, 
Belgian households had 83% to GDP in equity and 60% to GDP in institutional 
managed money versus respectively 36% and 171% in the Netherlands. A much larger 
amount of equity managed by households themselves could be an indication for the 
existence of large stocks of family capital. This multi-generational wealth that is looking 
for sustainable growth is an important type of patient capital, because it can function 
as a barrier to financialization processes (Lehrer and Schmid, 2015; Arregle et al., 
2007; Deeg et al., 2016). On the other hand, institutional investors are an important 
force for financialization (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Harmes, 1998; Froud et al., 2002; 
Dixon and Monk, 2014; Clark, 2000; Wissoker, 2013). Both patient capital and 
institutional investment will be, as this doctoral thesis will argue, crucial elements to 
explain the (non-)financialization of urban development in the Low Countries. 
State. Since the start of this doctoral thesis in 2013 various studies have described the 
active involvement of state agencies that are enabling processes of financialization 
(Gotham, 2014; Lagna, 2015a; Pani and Holman, 2014; Ashton et al., 2016; Hendrikse, 
2015). This includes two studies on the Netherlands, that show how real estate was 
transferred to asset rich semi-public entities that opened up  financialization processes 
(Engelen et al., 2014; Aalbers et al., 2017). Recently, in Belgium some semi-public 
agencies such as universities went to bond markets to find new sources of income as  
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state budgets are insufficient to cover maintenance costs (Sephila and Moens, 2015). 
Therefore, it could be extremely interesting to compare an asset rich Dutch university 
(e.g., VU) with an asset poor Belgian university (e.g., VUB) to analyse if and how these 
differences spur various processes of financialization. However, as these 
developments only became observable within the third year of this PhD thesis, they 
have not yet been studied.  
Another interesting realm relates to the construction of public infrastructure in 
particular roads, railways and canals. During the 1980s and 1990s Dutch construction 
firms made price arrangements that became illegal after the implementation of 
European legislation. Construction firms also ‘pampered’ civil servants, making “cartels 
and collusion … structural and widespread” (Dorée, 2004, p. 184). After a 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and various lawsuits, construction firms received 
high fines and the Dutch government implemented a trajectory of cultural change that 
aimed to establish ‘market-like’, ‘professional’ relationships (Priemus, 2004; Marrewijk 
and Veenswijk, 2016). In this more ‘business-like realm’ Design Build Finance and 
Maintain (DBFM) contracts became more popular whereby private consortia bid very 
low in order to receive these long-lasting government contracts, thereby resulting in 
severe financial problems for construction firms (Hueskes et al., 2016). In Belgium, 
with an enduring urge to lower government budgets in order to comply to European 
budget norms, public private partnerships also became rather popular during the 
2000s. As  a result, in particular the DBFM-contracts, as they, for a while, enabled to 
put infrastructure costs off the state’s balance sheet, became rather popular in Belgium 
(Hueskes et al., 2016). 
A recent wave of PhD theses on Public Private Partnerhsips (hereafter PPP) on 
infrastructure projects in the Low Countries (see Hueskes et al., 2016 for an overview) 
shows how this structure, that was imported from an Anglo-American realm, often is in 
conflict with the existing institutional context in both political economies. This centres 
our attention to how linkages between state agencies and real estate actors can 
change over time, and it would be extremely interesting  to put, in line with the 
international literature (Allen and Pryke, 2013; Torrance, 2009),. In this regard, chapter 
6 is a first attempt for doing so at a lower scale level. This is done through studying the 
rise of new municipal instruments (including PPPs) in order to steer urban development 
and how this connects municipal finance to (financialized) real estate markets. As 
chapter 6 focuses on a long period it allows to analyse if(in line with the construction 
of public works) the closeness of ties between civil servants and other real estate 
actors also varies over time. 
 
Banks the role of banks in the financialization of the Dutch housing markets has already 
been described extensively. However, in both countries, there are no studies on the 
ways in which banks are connected to commercial real estate markets and real estate 
development activities. Hence, this will now become a central topic throughout this 
doctoral thesis. 
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It could be very interesting to analyse how the large portfolios of real estate of non-
financial corporations influence their business strategy. Is real estate looked at a 
necessary input for the production process, or, are firms treating their land and real 
estate assets also as investment properties or collateral for loans? However, as 
chapter 1 argues, this doctoral thesis uses a more specific approach through looking 
at urban development and thereby putting real estate development corporations (so a 
small part of all non-financial corporations) central in the analyses.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter indicates that finance and real estate have become 
dominant elements within the Dutch and Belgian political economy. Therefore, it could 
be expected that, together with the stretching of balance sheets of almost all actors 
within both political economies, it is likely that the realm for financialization processes 
has expanded—potentially witnessing the origination of a real estate finance driven 
growth regime (Smart and Lee, 2003; Hofman and Aalbers, n.d.). Consequently, both 
countries seem to be fruitful terrain to study the financialization of urban development.  
Bringing the balance sheets in conversation with the literature, shows that there 
are many connections between the actors that need to be further scrutinized. 
Moreover, the ‘nature of’ the stretched balance sheets could be rather different. For 
instance, Belgian household’s assets seem to be often invested domestically in risk 
averse, conservative ways potentially functioning as “patient capital”, while a large part 
of Dutch household’s assets is institutionally managed and invested in opportunistic 
ways on global financial markets, potentially spurring financialization processes. Put 
differently, it could be that increased financial assets and liabilities are used in different 
ways suggesting different pathways of both political economies. Therefore, the next 
chapters will analyse different sub-units within the various actors to analyse whether, 
and if so how, urban development has financialized in both countries. Central in these 
analyses will be how capital providers (i.e., banks, institutional investors private 
investors) interact with the producers of the built environment (i.e., real estate 
developers, municipalities) and how state agencies influence this interaction.  
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Chapter 3 How Real Estate Became ‘Just Another Asset Class’: The 
Financialization of the Investment Strategies of Dutch Institutional Investors 
 
This chapter is a paper that has been published:  
Loon, J. van, and Aalbers, M.B. (2017) How Real Estate became ‘Just Another Asset 
Class’: The Financialization of the Investment Strategies of Dutch Institutional 
Investors. European Planning Studies, 25(2), pp. 221—240.   
 
I have gathered the empirical data for this chapter and wrote a first, very long version 
of the chapter. Then, Manuel Aalbers re-wrote it into a much shorter version. From 
there, and during the subsequent reviewing-process, we worked together on the paper. 
The only adjustments made below are the addition of section-numbers and change of 
the Figure and Table numbers. 
 
Abstract 
The managers of a growing wall of money are continuously searching for investment 
opportunities. The financialization literature describes how this mobile capital puts 
pressure on commodities, debt, public services and economic activities to transform 
into investable, tradable, financial products. Regarding real estate, these investigations 
show how opaque, local, nonstandardized goods, highly depending on both local 
legislation and developments, have been transformed into liquid, globally traded 
financial assets. By analysing the real estate investment strategies of Dutch 
institutional investors since the 1980s, this paper shows how a quantitative framework 
increasingly provides the basis for institutional investors’ real estate investment 
strategies. Direct ownership of properties has been exchanged into shares of 
properties, that is, fictitious capital, creating an impetus for ‘objectified numbers’ to 
measure the performance of these indirect investments. As knowledge about real 
estate has been outsourced, Dutch institutional investors now perceive real estate 
increasingly as ‘just another asset class’, thereby increasing leverage and volatility. 
This paper not only shows how finance ‘financialized’ itself by adopting a quantitative 
investment perspective, but it also offers an empirical account on how investment 
properties are transformed into financial assets that put pressure on state agencies to 
mobilize urban planning to deliver more of such assets. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s financial re-regulation, digitalization and demographic developments 
are important drivers for the creation of a large, mobile pool of capital-seeking profitable 
investments. As many households have delegated the management of their savings to 
investment funds, pension funds and insurers, the managers of these funds, 
institutional investors, have become important actors in global finance (Clark, 2000; 
Dixon and Monk, 2009; Harmes, 1998). The financialization literature offers rich 
empirical accounts on how the increase in institutional money has transformed a wide 
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variety of (public) goods, firms and economic activities into financial assets (Aalbers, 
2008; Engelen et al., 2014; O’Neill, 2013; Weber, 2010). 
But, as studies often focus on the effects of the rise of financialized capitalism, 
“finance itself…is all too often black boxed” (Christophers, 2015, p. 191). This paper 
aims to contribute to unravel the black box of finance by showing how financial actors 
(institutional investors) themselves can start prioritizing short-termism, financial 
calculations and logics. It does so by analysing how Dutch institutional investors, who 
manage an estimated 6% of all global institutional assets (OECD, 2013), have 
financialized their real estate investment strategies. The credit crunch of 2007 revealed 
how financial actors are deeply motivated to liquefy illiquid assets such as real estate 
to further enlarge the financial sphere, further integrating real estate and financial 
markets (Aalbers, 2012; Gotham, 2006; Hudson, 2010). 
The resulting Great Financial Crisis has shifted scholarly attention towards 
‘financialization practices’ and delivered sophisticated insights on, among other things, 
the rise of housing finance/debt (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2008), the interlinkages between financial and real estate markets (Lizieri 
and Pain, 2014; Aalbers et al., 2017), the financialization of urban (re)development 
(Guironnet et al., 2016; Weber, 2015) and, crucial to our argument, the tendency to 
treat real estate and land as a financial asset (Haila, 1988; Harvey, 2006; Kaika and 
Ruggiero, 2016; Merrifield, 1993; O’Neill, 2013; Savini and Aalbers, 2016; Teresa, 
2015; Theurillat et al., 2016). Work on the latter illustrates how institutional investors 
have transformed the most spatially fixed investment class, real estate, despite its 
indivisibility, immobility, illiquidity, long-term investment horizon and dependence on 
specific local rules and practices (Coakley, 1994; Lizieri, 2009), into tradable financial 
assets such as shares, bonds and securities. 
Accordingly, state agencies and public policies are increasingly steered into 
facilitating financial investments into real estate and infrastructure, thereby triggering 
changes in organisational culture and transforming urban planning from providing 
public goods to facilitating the creation of financial assets (Deruytter and Derudder, 
2015; Engelen et al., 2014; Guironnet et al., 2016; Halbert et al., 2014; O’Neill, 2013). 
Furthermore, investment into real estate is being mobilized as part of the ‘soft power’ 
of states, in international politics (Büdenbender & Golubchikov, 2016). Whereas there 
are many studies on the intermediaries–primarily real estate developers/consultancies 
and local governance–who translate these financial goals into the built environment 
(Halbert and Attuyer, 2016; O’Neill, 2013; Savini and Aalbers, 2016; Weber, 2015), 
there is surprisingly little knowledge of how financial goals have come to dominate the 
real estate investment strategies of institutional investors and how this affects the built 
environment. Although Henneberry and Roberts (2008) demonstrate clearly the effects 
of the financialized real estate investment strategies of British institutional investors, to 
the authors’ knowledge the only research that shows how and why this process takes 
place is on Swiss pension funds (Corpataux et al., 2009; Theurillat et al., 2010). 
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To fill this gap, this paper presents a likely case: Dutch institutional investors are 
both strongly embedded into global finance and in a hybrid Dutch political economy 
with highly financialized elements (Engelen et al., 2010). As this paper will illustrate, 
since the 1990s the investment strategies of Dutch institutional investors increasingly 
mimic Anglo-American practices and have become structured around financial metrics. 
Crucial is the transformation of direct ownership of properties into real estate shares, 
a form of fictitious capital that removes the link between the investor and the 
geographies their investments are located in, as fictitious capital “represents the ‘self-
moving substance’ of finance capital” (Godden, 2011, p. 860), where the price paid for 
fictitious capital (i.e. shares, securities and debt) may “fluctuate according to their own 
laws quite independently of the movement of the value of the real capital” (Harvey, 
2006, p. 278). Consequently, instead of acting as a non-correlating asset that hedges 
portfolios against risks on financial markets, real estate is treated as any other financial 
asset making investment portfolios, and therefore investments in the built environment, 
more volatile (see Mosselman, 2013). 
The next section of this paper, first, discusses how pension funds and insurance 
companies change the management of their growing pool of investment capital, and, 
second, introduces the concept of fictitious capital to better understand this change. 
Subsequently, we describe the rise of Dutch institutional investors embedded in a 
financializing Dutch political economy, and present an in-depth examination of how 
institutional investors increasingly use a quantitative framework as the basis for their 
real estate investment strategies—they started to perceive real estate increasingly as 
just another asset class. However, the final part of this paper points to some 
detrimental effects of this view, such as spurring geographical uneven development. 
 
3.2 Institutional capital in search of investment opportunities 
Since the 1970s, a growing imbalance between the growth rate of the stock of savings 
and gross domestic product (GDP) is observable within some countries, creating a 
large pool of investment capital. In addition, waves of financial liberalization and 
deregulation combined with digitalization have made finance much more footloose 
(Clark, 2000; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016). Even though households are responsible 
for the inflow of money to institutional investors, decisions related “to capital allocation 
have become increasingly centralized”(Harmes, 1998, p. 101) to institutional investors. 
In 2012, $30 trillion of the $78 trillion assets under management by institutional 
investors globally was managed by investment funds, $25 trillion by insurance 
companies and $22 trillion by pension funds (OECD, 2013). For the Netherlands, a 
country that has, at 159.3%, the highest pension-fund-assets-to-GDP ratio in the world 
(OECD, 2015, p. 9), it is estimated that €383 billion is managed by investment funds 
and €1439 billion by 414 pension funds and 101 insurers, respectively (Gebraad, 
2014). With regard to pension funds, 15 funds have portfolios above €10 billion, and 
many funds have outsourced both administrative tasks and asset management to 
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external asset managers, whereby the largest four Dutch asset managers combined 
at the end of 2012 had €643 billion assets under management–APG (€336 billion), 
PGGM (€145 billion), MN (€95 billion), Syntrus Achmea (€67 billion)–and the largest 
foreign asset manager, Blackrock, €100 billion (OECD, 2014). Although it is 
acknowledged that there are important differences between pension funds and 
insurers (hereafter collectively referred to as institutional investors), in the Dutch case 
their real estate investment strategies have financialized in a rather similar fashion. 
The literature on pension fund capitalism offers detailed accounts of how 
financial liberalization has enabled pension funds to develop more sophisticated 
investment strategies for their rapidly growing asset portfolios, thereby often 
implementing an Anglo-American institutional architecture structured around financial 
logics (Clark, 2000; Corpataux et al., 2009; McCarthy et al., 2016). Fundamental to 
pension funds’ investment models is ‘Modern Portfolio Theory’ (Markowitz, 1952) that 
is aimed at finding a match between future liabilities, optimal asset performance and 
risk minimization. In order to create stable income to meet long-term liabilities, 
institutional investors need to diversify their assets under management, and the 
performance of different assets should be as uncorrelated as possible (Clark, 2000; 
Corpataux et al., 2009). 
With a growing and internationalizing asset portfolio, the strategy of portfolio 
diversity creates the urge to have clear, standardized numbers about asset values 
which can be easily compared and benchmarked (Aglietta, 2000; Dixon and Monk, 
2009). The language to describe assets financially consists of seemingly easily 
understandable numbers: asset value is measured via its fair value, asset performance 
via rates of return and investment costs, and risks are estimated via probabilities (Perry 
and Nölke, 2006; Theurillat et al., 2010). Quantification techniques are used to 
translate qualitative information into quantitative information, into “objectified truths” 
(Aalbers, 2011a; O’Neill, 2013). But, as conventional assets such as bonds and 
securities cannot absorb the influx of institutional money, there is pressure on all kinds 
of ‘raw materials’, such as non-listed firms (Froud et al., 2006), mortgages (Aalbers, 
2012), (student) loans (Montgomerie, 2009), infrastructure (O’Neill, 2013) and building 
rights (Weber, 2015), to be transformed into financial, tradable assets. Put differently, 
institutional investors pressure for financialization as “Income streams from a wide 
range of assets are converted into new investment products for dispersed investors 
through techniques that disaggregate and continually reassign ownership to allow for 
more and faster-paced exchanges” (Weber, 2010, p. 252). Real estate is the largest 
alternative asset (Andonov et al., 2015). 
This process of financialization, as the recent financial crisis has demonstrated, 
has been problematical: the transformation of investments embedded within complex 
economic geographical contexts into financial assets does not make real risks 
disappear (Aalbers, 2012; Pani and Holman, 2014). Regarding real estate 
investments, the underlying assumptions of portfolio theory–such as approaching risks 
as calculable probabilities (Theurillat et al., 2010)–seem to be a poor translation for the 
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complex geographies properties are located in (Lizieri, 2009). But, also, while real 
estate investments can be “positive in terms of generating the risk-adjusted market 
rates of return necessary to fulfil the fiduciary duty of pension funds, this approach can 
and does lead to investment optimization based on potential profit rather than broader 
public good” (Hebb and Sharma, 2014, p. 489). 
This is most clearly observable in the way financialized real estate investments 
are concentrated within very specific areas, that is, the areas that are believed to offer 
the best ‘risk-adjusted rates of return’ (Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Theurillat et al., 2016). 
In the United Kingdom–where real estate investments can be read as financial assets 
through the Investment Property Databank benchmark delivering calculated numbers 
on fair values, rate of returns and investment costs–investors are now buying 
properties for their financial characteristics rather than for their potential within the 
urban fabric, thereby mimicking the benchmark, concentrating investments in select 
locations and creating herd behavior (Henneberry and Roberts, 2008; Lizieri and Pain, 
2014). 
Since the 1990s, institutional investors have set in motion the securitization of 
real estate ownership via the rise of Real Estate Investment Trusts, transforming 
sizeable stacks of global investment property into listed and non-listed shares 
(Andonov et al., 2015; Gotham, 2006). For some scholars, this transformation is a form 
of “financial engineering” as it transforms real estate investment into a “logic of portfolio 
management, investors compare the financial risks and yields of one real estate 
investment fund (in offices, flats, infrastructure), with another, but above all with those 
of other categories of financial assets” (Theurillat et al., 2016, p. 1514 emphasis in 
original). Consequently, in real estate markets similar practices as observed in stock 
markets such as herding (to properties in specific locations), higher trading 
frequencies, more volatile capital markets, and an integration of financial markets 
(debt), property investment markets and equity markets can be witnessed (Coakley, 
1994; Henneberry and Roberts, 2008; Lizieri and Pain, 2014). 
The transformation described here illustrates how institutional investors shifted 
their investments from ‘real’ economic sectors where “returns and risk are understood 
in relation to the particular spaces and times in which production and economic cycles 
take place” into “the financialized sphere of the economy, [where] the risk-returns 
dichotomy corresponds to…a financial engineering exercise” (Corpataux et al., 2009, 
p. 321). These financial investments can be labelled as fictitious capital, that is, 
marketable claims “on the production of surplus value and on the perceived value of 
the underlying asset–both of which are relationally produced in time and space” (Pani 
and Holman, 2014, p. 218). Fictitious capital is a crucial condition for the capitalist ‘real’ 
economy as it extends capital “in advance, in anticipation of future labor as a counter-
value” (Harvey, 2006, p. 266). It is expected that the investments made with fictitious 
capital, such as in machinery or infrastructure, improve the production process creating 
more surplus value, allowing paying back the received capital plus interest. However, 
by borrowing money, the capital becomes tied to specific uses, while investors prefer 
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investments they perceive as liquid enabling easy switching to activities that are 
perceived to be more profitable or more in line with future liabilities. Fictitious capital 
removes these barriers because a piece of paper, for example, a security or a bond, is 
produced that is backed by an unsold commodity, and these papers can be traded 
themselves (Godden, 2011; Harvey, 2006). The prices of these titles may then 
fluctuate according to their own laws “quite independently of the movement of the value 
of the real capital” (Harvey, 2006, p. 268), for example on stock exchanges. 
Within financialized capitalism, fictitious capital increasingly grows 
“independently of the economy’s ability to pay” (Hudson, 2010, p. 421), making 
repayment of the expected future dividends and interest payments problematic. 
Inevitably, crises hit, often triggered by an unexpected, relatively small event, a so-
called Minsky moment: “moments when claims to value are no longer taken ‘at face 
value’ but instead fail to achieve liquid transferability into other forms of capital” 
(Haiven, 2011, p. 115). Consequently, extreme uncertainty about fictitious values 
arises, resulting in strong devaluations and severe economic downturns (Jessop, 
2015; Nesvetailova, 2006). Fictitious capital also has an essential role as lubricant for 
the production process, in particular by spurring development in the ‘real’ economy and 
the built environment as it makes large investments possible (Harvey, 1978; Harvey, 
2006; Teresa, 2015). Therefore, the argument is not that fictitious capital and related 
practices such as securitization are inherently destructive, but that the dominance of 
fictitious capital is endemic to financialized capitalism and results in more volatile 
accumulation cycles and more devastating periods of devaluation (Aalbers, 2008; 
Harvey, 2006). 
Another essential element of fictitious capital is that it replaces direct investment 
into economic activities by investment into shares, securities and bonds that are only 
indirectly related to economic activities (Pani and Holman, 2014). Therefore, a focus 
on financial profitability, often established via forms of financial engineering, starts to 
prevail over a focus on the production process (Aglietta, 2000). Consequently, 
attention shifts to financial techniques to increase the fictitious capital of assets such 
as debt generation to fund share buy-back programmes, leveraged takeovers and 
dividend payouts, or making financial assets leading within business models (Froud et 
al., 2006). 
To sustain the ‘credibility’ of fictitious values, that is, the belief that future income 
will meet expected rates of return, perception has become crucial. Put differently: “is 
not that their fictionality yields no matter (without matter, fictionality would be easily 
discredited), but that the matter which it yields, often excessive in its 
realness…includes within that realness a constant anxiety that the secret will explode” 
(Godden, 2011, p. 858). Doubts or higher expectations about these mystified values 
cause large up- and down-swings in the daily expression of fictitious values via, for 
instance, stock exchanges, leading to extremer manias and panics (Kindleberger, 
2000). But, in regard to the built environment, there is also space to contest fictitious 
values, for instance, by “ ‘telegraphing’ the true costs of operating housing’ so that 
  
55 
 
market actors know that they cannot ‘get their leverage on their tenants’ backs” 
(Teresa, 2015, p. 480). 
In sum, in the last decades, a growing pool of investment capital is searching 
for investment opportunities. This money is often owned by a large number of 
households, but the decision power around the investments is delegated to specialists, 
in the Dutch case primarily pension funds. Based on the literature, it is expected that 
Dutch institutional investors have adopted a strong financial perspective in which the 
‘risk-adjusted rate of return’ becomes the leading rationale (Hebb and Sharma, 2014). 
However, despite a wide range of papers showing the effects of what, for lack of a 
better label, we could call ‘the financialization of finance’, empirical accounts on how 
this process takes place are rare. 
The theoretical discussion above suggests that the financialization of real estate 
investment strategies could be operationalized through the following three indicators. 
First, key to these strategies is that financial calculations concerning risk and rewards 
become central, preferring a quantitative over a qualitative assessment, thereby 
reducing the relationship between the investor and the real, existing geographies that 
properties are located in. Second, short-termism thrives as long-term investing is 
replaced by investment forms that are perceived to be more liquid. Third, these 
strategies put the management and regulation of real estate investments increasingly 
into the realm of financial technocrats as others are considered unable to understand 
the financial numbers. The remainder of this paper will present an analysis of the 
transformation of real estate investment strategies of Dutch institutional investors and 
report to what extent these financialization strategies have materialized. 
The decision-making process regarding the real estate investment strategies of 
Dutch institutional investors is located within a select group of powerful actors, which 
can be seen as members of an ‘elite’. Elite interviewing enables the researcher to 
derive “richness of detail and historical complexity [which] allows one to reconstruct a 
coherent representation of how and why particular phenomena came to be” 
(Schoenberger, 1991, p. 188). In total 30 interviews were conducted with a wide variety 
of actors, all working in Dutch real estate or finance, 18 of which have been used for 
this paper. The firms/organizations these respondents owned or were working for 
included real estate investment funds, asset managers (who invest on behalf of 
pension funds), lobby organizations, real estate developers, banks, private real estate 
investors, trust firms, real estate financiers, real estate consultancies, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the real estate department of the central state and the Dutch National 
Bank. Almost every interviewee had at least ten years of experience and had been 
working for different firms/organizations, including institutional investors. Furthermore, 
most interviewees were working in senior positions such as director, managing 
director, CEO, senior analyst and so on. 
All interviewees had the possibility not only to deliver feedback that, for instance, 
led to the rewriting of certain quotes in less colloquial terms (that we subsequently 
translated into English), but also to new conversations that further deepened our 
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understanding of the process, with some interviewees a “close dialogue” was 
established (Clark, 2000). In this text, we only refer to an interviewee when using direct 
quotes; an extensive list of interviewees can be sent on request. The interview data 
are complemented by the professional experience of one of the authors who has been 
employed as junior analyst in the Dutch real estate investment market. In addition, 
many public information sources such as books and journals for real estate 
professionals (from which we in particular adopt some ideas around organization 
structure, i.e. Figures 3.2 and 3.4), statistical data, annual reports and newspaper 
articles are used. 
 
3.3 The financialization of real estate investment strategies 
The Dutch political economy has changed tremendously since the 1980s and it now 
combines high degrees of financialization with elements of strong market coordination, 
in particular relating to the power of labour (Engelen et al., 2010). As Figure 3.1 
illustrates, rising incomes and rising employment rates in the 1990s embedded in a 
mandatory pension fund system led to a large influx of pension and insurance money 
that further accelerated as a result of profitable investments. Figure 3.1 also shows a 
shift from investments into long term, mostly Dutch, state debt to equities and bonds. 
Until the late 1980s, most Dutch pension funds stuck to a straightforward strategy by 
buying (Dutch) assets for the cash flow they generated, mainly via dividend and interest 
payments. Restricted by stringent rules regarding acceptable investments and a lack 
of expertise within institutional investors themselves, the dominant strategy was to 
allocate a pre-established amount to mostly fixed income (mostly long-term debt), and 
to a lesser extent real estate, and equities. In line with other reforms–such as (semi-
)privatization and liberalization of banking–during the 1990s also the investment 
requirements for institutional investors were relaxed, for example allowing institutional 
investors to invest more abroad (Fernandez, 2011; McCarthy et al., 2016). 
With continuously increasing streams of investment capital, institutional 
investors felt the urge to professionalize and adopted more sophisticated portfolio 
strategies that relied on ‘Modern Portfolio Theory’ (Markowitz, 1952). In their 
investment strategies, it became key to think thoroughly about how the risks of assets 
in a portfolio relate to each other in order to find an optimal mix of assets from a 
risk/reward perspective. Translating this ‘theory’ into practice required adopting asset 
liability management (ALM) or similar models that can be used to select those assets 
which generate enough value to meet liabilities in the future within a certain risk 
appetite. Diversification of investment portfolios, in both asset types and location, 
became central. In the 2000s, ALM models became institutionalized and are now 
mandatory for pension funds. The subsequent sections will demonstrate how the 
adoption of this more quantitative assessment framework motivated Dutch institutional 
investors to reconceptualize real estate as “just another asset class” (Interview, 26 
August 2014). Figure 3.3 gives crucial information on the scale of this transformation 
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that made it possible to place real estate investments into ALM: even though the share 
of real estate investments of the total investment portfolio remained rather stable with 
a low of 8.5% in 2009 and a high of 12.2% in 2001, since the 1990s many institutional 
investors switched to listed and unlisted shares in real estate funds. Their investments 
also internationalized, from an estimated €4.3 billion in foreign real estate assets in the 
late 1980s to an estimated €72 billion in 2012 (Wit, 2014), a 17-fold increase in roughly 
25 years. 
 
Figure 3.1 Assets under management by Dutch institutional investors since the mid 1970s (in billion 
Euro) 
 
Source: CBS (2014a) 
 
3.3.1 Real estate investment strategies in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, institutional investors had on average 10% of their entire investment 
portfolios invested into direct, mostly Dutch, real estate holdings. The dominant 
portfolio strategy in the 1980s was to invest a fixed percentage into real estate. 
However, due to a lack of available properties, the larger institutional investors could 
rarely realize their targets. Nonetheless, aggregated direct real estate holdings grew 
in line with the total assets under management (see Figures 3.1 and 3.3). Directly 
investing in real estate means that investors own and manage their properties, implying 
that investors are active throughout the entire real estate pyramid displayed in Figure 
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3.2. To develop a better understanding about the way institutional investors invested 
into real estate in the 1980s, each level of it is briefly discussed below. 
 
Figure 3.2 The real estate pyramid, a stylized version of the general real estate investment strategies 
of institutional investors in the 1980s 
 
 
 
Fund management The top of the real estate pyramid is best characterized as located 
within financial markets rather than within real estate markets. Here, the overall 
portfolio strategy of an institutional investor is created. In the 1980s, this meant 
deciding which parts of the portfolio to allocate to long-term loans, real estate and 
equity. Decisions are made based on quantitative data, usually involving important 
strategic decisions, which are communicated downwards through concrete policies 
and targets. 
 
Portfolio management On the portfolio level, it is decided to which real estate 
segments–commonly residential, offices and retail–and countries the investments 
should be allocated. In the 1980s, for most funds, portfolio management basically 
meant dividing the investment mandate between Dutch residential, office and retail real 
estate, and for selected funds also foreign, mostly American, offices. Many institutional 
investors invested in residential real estate because they felt an urge to help solve the 
housing shortage; while subsidies and state guarantees took away investment risks 
and guaranteed a minimum rate of return. 
 
Asset management At the real estate asset management level, the investor actively 
participates in the property markets by buying and selling properties in line with its real 
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estate portfolio strategy. As portfolio strategies were rather undeveloped and fund-level 
strategies prescribed to invest a growing influx of institutional money into real estate, 
funds tried to buy all properties that were available on the (Dutch) market. Algemeen 
Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP), the largest Dutch pension fund, acted as “a vacuum 
cleaner, swallowed up all the available real estate on the Dutch investment market” 
(Interview, 22 July 2014). In order to acquire properties, investors had to operate in an 
opaque yet seemingly simple investment market: “it was common practice to calculate 
the value of a property on the back of a box of cigars to see if a deal could go through” 
(Interview, 11 June 2014). It was well accepted that brokers played double roles, and, 
market data, if available at all, were very unreliable. Some actors even liked the 
opaqueness, and many agents “did not consider the financier; the money would come 
through anyway” (Interview, 27 August 2014), giving birth to incidents related to fraud 
(Wit, 2014). 
 
Property management Because institutional investors owned and maintained the 
buildings themselves, that is, they were also property managers, they obtained a 
wealth of qualitative and quantitative information about their properties, containing 
information about local rent levels, maintenance, rental contracts, their tenants and so 
on. However, due to poor information and computing technology (ICT) systems and 
the non-existence of R&D departments, this wealth of information was not translated 
into quantitative information that could be applied at the fund management level. 
 
‘Real estate development’, finally, is conceptualized as something ‘outside’ the 
pyramid, considered to be much riskier than investing in existing properties. 
Nevertheless, using different rationales, many institutional investors were also active 
as real estate developers. The construction-sector pension fund, for instance, used 
real estate development to create work for their members. Another reason to develop 
real estate was that the quality of properties developed by other real estate developers 
did not meet investment criteria. Moreover, building new properties had a symbolic 
importance. It was, for example, a matter of prestige to develop the first American-style 
shopping mall in the Netherlands. 
 
As the next section will illustrate, the adoption of more quantitative investment 
strategies on the fund level created pressure on the property level to adopt a less real 
estate focused and more financial perspective on real estate investing. Consequently, 
the different layers of the pyramid were outsourced. 
 
3.3.2 The financialization of real estate investment 
To illustrate the developments in the 1990s, we describe the changing strategies and 
practices of ABP, the pension fund for civil servants and also the industry leader. ABP 
is atypical as it is by far the largest pension fund and more strongly embedded in state 
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institutions. However, as this section will illustrate, other Dutch institutional investors 
adopted ABP’s new investment strategy, thereby pointing to the centrality of ABP to 
understand this transformation. During the 1980s, ABP was the largest real estate 
investor in the Netherlands, and–inspired by other Dutch institutional investors such as 
the pension funds of Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij and Shell who were active in 
the US–started to get familiar with investing in foreign real estate. On a portfolio level, 
ABP increasingly implemented more sophisticated investment strategies, creating an 
urgency to think about real estate as an asset class. What kinds of risks were related 
to it and, more importantly, how did its value correlate with other asset classes in ABP’s 
portfolio? To answer these questions, ABP started developing ‘objective criteria’ 
combined with more sophisticated market analyses inspired by practices in the US.  
The professionalization of ABP’s real estate investment strategy also included 
the decision to start investing indirectly into real estate. That decision was partly the 
outcome of enduring conflicts between ‘financial’ and ‘real estate’ people within 
institutional investors, whereby “many property guys (sic) thought they did great and 
the non-property folks thought they had no control over real estate” (Interview, 27 
August 2014). Interviewees talking about this period often point to a difference in 
language, culture and focus between the real estate department acting at the property 
level and the fund management of institutional investors. During the 1990s, the more 
quantitative minded agents became dominant, and “they preferred listed [real estate] 
with long historical data, transparency, real time prices, high liquidity because you can 
enter and exit” (Interview, 22 July 2014).  
A technique developed by Geltner (1993), which estimated real estate’s volatility 
in a mathematical way, also enabled the analysis of real estate in the same financial 
language as shares. Furthermore, direct property holdings were increasingly seen as 
something negative needing much staff and attracting negative attention in the media. 
In 1994, the director of ABP, Mr Frijns, announced ABP’s new strategy: to switch to 
indirect real estate investments and develop a global real estate portfolio. Frijns 
strongly believed that real estate funds would make it possible to place real estate 
investments into portfolio management and, by doing so, obtain a higher rate of return. 
Furthermore, indirect real estate was seen as a necessity to expand abroad as buying 
direct real estate demanded much local expertise and also created many legal 
challenges. Many considered Frijns’s speech as a turning point in the thinking of Dutch 
institutional investors about real estate investments (FD, 1995). However, as ABP was 
still state-owned, the plan for ‘going indirect’ needed to be supported by an 
independent study, which was delivered by the Boston Consultancy Group (1992). This 
report, merely consisting of 26 PowerPoint slides, was a necessary instrument to 
convince the board of directors that indirect real estate investment was preferable.  
After ABP’s privatization in the mid-1990s, it was able to transform its real estate 
organization into three separate real estate funds in new legal entities: retail (Winkel 
Beleggingen Nederland), offices (Kantorenfonds NL) and residential (Vesteda). As 
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Figure 3.3 Real estate investments of Dutch institutional investors (in billion Euro) 
 
Source: CBS (2014b) 
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates, many other institutional investors followed. This development 
was further institutionalized by the adoption of Anglo-American practices, in particular 
benchmarking of the performances of real estate funds (starting in 1995 with IPD) and 
the adoption of fair value principles through the implementation of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) standards during the 2000s. 
In sum, the influx of investment capital pushed Dutch institutional investors on 
a pathway of professionalization. Herein, ALM strategies based on diversification—
through the internationalization of asset portfolios—and operating within markets 
perceived as liquid became key. Real estate continued to play a role, but when 
investing abroad, investing indirectly was seen as the preferred alternative. Yet, 
indirect real estate investments were also increasingly preferred for Dutch assets, as 
it was perceived that shares in real estate funds were easier to sell. 
 
3.3.3 Real estate investment practices in the 2010s 
The shift from direct holdings to shares is paralleled by an increased focus on 
quantitative, financial assessment. As the shift is an ongoing process, there is still a 
wide variety of investment practices including funds that only invest into (Dutch) direct 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1982 1992 2002 2012
Direct Real Estate Pension Funds Direct Real Estate Insurers
Indirect Real Estate Pension Funds Indirect Real Estate Insurers
  
62 
 
properties (cf. Mosselman, 2013). Figure 3.4 illustrates how these financialized real 
estate investment strategies function. 
 
On the ‘Fund Management’ level, “a pure financial perspective, without in-depth 
knowledge of the bricks and mortar” (Interview, 22 July 2014) has become dominant. 
In 2007 the implementation by parliament of the ‘Financieel Toetsingskader’ (Financial 
Assessment Framework) has made ALM models compulsory for pension funds and 
forced the adoption of international accountancy standards based on fair value 
calculations (IFRS) (Dixon and Monk, 2009). Moreover, the committees that define the 
risk parameters related to the investments of pension funds now favour indirect real 
estate investments over direct (Dutch) real estate (Langejan et al., 2014). However, in 
their calculations basic elements of investing into real estate such as leverage are 
ignored, thereby overestimating the risks related to Dutch real estate and 
underestimating its rate of return (cf. Mosselman, 2013). In addition, the Dutch National 
Bank (DNB), which follows a financial logic in assessing the activities of institutional 
investors, has become a very powerful regulator since the crisis. 
 
Portfolio management Nowadays, on a portfolio level, strategies are developed to 
create the perfect mix of participations in listed and unlisted funds, often complemented 
by direct real estate holdings obtained in the past. One of the possibilities is a ‘fund of 
fund’ structure in which the participating institutional investors have no voting rights. 
Their only decision is to invest in the fund or not. Moreover, institutional investors who 
still create their own portfolio strategies, that is, those who buy shares of different real 
estate funds, often rely on external advisors. Some have even outsourced the 
assessment of investments, or, as an advisor for many major pension funds formulates 
it: 
We dig very deep [to] understand the numbers, but you have to translate it in a way 
that a pension fund can use the information. When you provide many details of the 
real estate itself, then you know they will only read the abstract which they will not 
understand. Therefore, you really have to translate the information to the level of 
thinking of your client. (Interview 26 May 2014) 
This level of thinking prioritizes (expected) total rates of return. And benchmarking 
introduced in 1995 by British firm IPD, enables to compare the performance of the 
different funds via one comprehensive number: the total rate of return. When it comes 
to portfolio management, contemporary real estate classes also include debt products 
such as residential mortgage-backed securities, commercial mortgage-backed 
securities and, as a result of the global rise of listed and unlisted real estate funds, a 
wide range of foreign listed and unlisted real estate funds to choose from. 
 
Asset and property management When investing indirectly in real estate, asset and 
property management has become the responsibility of the real estate funds. 
Depending on the legal status, and in particular with listed real estate, important 
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Figure 3.4 The financialization of Dutch institutional investor real estate strategies; the Real Estate 
Pyramid anno 2014 
 
 
 
 
information about the quality of the investments, such as rental contracts, maintenance 
costs and budgets of redevelopment projects, is not disclosed. It has become 
extremely difficult for investors in indirect real estate to obtain meaningful data about 
their investment objects:  
Very basic, visiting shopping malls. We [real estate fund] just opened a mall in 
[foreign city] and I received many text messages. They [financial analysts] were on 
holiday in that city and visited the mall…they had comments like …‘not so many 
people with a bag’! (Interview, 26 September 2014) 
 
Real estate development Nowadays, real estate development is primarily used if it 
increases the expected rate of return and not so much to satisfy wider goals such as 
increasing employment for fund members. In global portfolios, some funds may 
develop real estate in emerging markets that lack high-quality properties, while the 
funds expect demand from end users. Furthermore, in European retail real estate, a 
couple of funds compete for those places seen as most lucrative for shopping malls. 
Once such a position is obtained, it becomes necessary after a certain period of time 
to redevelop the retail properties in order to maintain its market position. Again, 
re/developing is used to increase the expected rate of return by securing a strategic 
geographical location. 
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3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we have demonstrated how the adoption of Modern Portfolio Theory by 
Dutch pension funds has resulted in the dominance of a quantitative investment 
assessment (indicator 1). Put differently, object-oriented investing ‘that focus[es] on 
what it is that is invested in’ has been replaced by a central ‘focus on the financial 
gains’(Sayer in Clark, 2014, p. 393). By adopting this more narrow, financial 
perspective, Dutch institutional investors have transformed the ‘opaque’ real estate 
market of the 1980s into a ‘seemingly transparent’ market that is described and 
performed in a couple of ‘key Figures’ (see Table 3.1). 
At the same time, investments into real estate remain spatially fixed in two 
distinct ways. First, real estate will never fully behave as ‘just another asset’ and most 
investments in real estate are still fixed in time and place. Investments might be based 
on the assumption that they can be disinvested upon immediately, and although this 
may be the case for some real estate derivatives, actual real estate transactions remain 
sticky and slow (Weber, 2015). Second, real estate increasingly becomes the spatial 
fix for the over-accumulation of capital (Fernandez et al., 2016; Harvey, 2006). It is one 
of the contradictions of capital that in order to find a fix, in the sense of a ‘solution’ to 
over-accumulation, real estate, the ‘spatial’ fix, needs to be treated as if it is not 
spatially fixed but liquid (cf. Gotham, 2006). Problems arise from this inherent 
contradiction between the metaphorical and the material elements of the spatial fix. 
Consequently, the geography of pension funds’ investments has become more 
selective. Although these funds receive pension contributions from across the 
Netherlands, entire provinces have become blank space in their investment portfolios:  
Who still invests in [the province of] Zeeland? Of course, people need to live there, 
but, why should I, as provider of residential real estate who can freely choose were 
to earn most money, invest over there? It is very unpleasant to say, but then I choose 
Amsterdam and similar regions where people want to live—now and in the future. 
(Interview, 27 August 2014) 
In this regard, not the intrinsic value of properties and their location but a perception of 
their fictitious value, reflected in stock prices and capital values calculated through 
IFRS standards, has become key. These values are more determined by perception 
and the availability of capital than by the unique characteristics of properties including 
rental income (Buitelaar and Dongen, 2016). Put differently, the actual use of buildings 
has become secondary, resulting in real estate developments that lack a sophisticated 
perspective on how to contribute to better functioning cities where the final owners of 
the investment capital, in this case the pension fund members, have to work and live 
(cf. Guironnet et al., 2016; Halbert and Attuyer, 2016; Savini and Aalbers, 2016). State 
agencies, crucial within Dutch urban planning, also have shifted from a perspective in  
which the provision of public goods was central towards a new focus in which ‘the 
entrepreneurial state’ is essential (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016; Hajer and Zonneveld, 
2000; Taşan-Kok, 2010). Central to this shift is that the creation of high real estate 
prices is essential; hence, the national state supports: 
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Table 3.1 The financialization of real estate investment strategies, summary  
   1980s/pre-financialization 2010s/post financialization 
  
   
   
   
 F
in
a
n
ci
a
l m
a
rk
et
s 
Fund 
management 
straightforward strategies, including 
wider societal/political goals, low 
expectations for rates of return, 
low-risk investments 
strong focus on 'risk adjusted rate of 
return', outsourcing investment 
strategies, important role for calculative 
practices (e.g. ALM/FTK/IFRS) and 
financial supervisors (DNB/AFM) 
R
ea
l E
st
a
te
 m
a
rk
et
s 
Portfolio 
management 
restricted set of asset classes, 
mostly Dutch direct real estate 
wide variety of asset classes, 
international portfolios, mostly shares in 
listed and unlisted real estate funds 
displayed as 'financial assets', compared 
through benchmarking 
  Asset 
management 
opaque real estate market, property 
prices based on 'gut feeling' and 
subsidies,    properties bought 
based on available capital 
seemingly transparant real estate 
market, property value calculated via 
fair value 
Property 
management 
emotional relationship to 
investment properties,  great deal 
of knowledge on property level but 
not translated into investment 
strategies 
distance to investment properties, 
assessed through aggregated (financial) 
numbers 
 
other state agencies with knowledge and experimentation and the development of 
alternative forms of financing and new revenue models that can promote the 
achievement of national goals and make urban planning developments fundable.  
(National Department of Infrastructure and Environment, 2012, p. 3) 
On the urban level, we already see many cities that increasingly implement policies to 
attract those people and activities which they think will increase real estate prices 
further, thereby spurring uneven regional development (Hochstenbach, 2016; 
Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012). Therefore, it is essential for future research to analyse 
how this increased market-orientated behaviour of various state agencies combined 
with the financialized behaviour of institutional investors finds its nexus in ‘real’ urban 
geographies and planning practices. Moreover, further conceptualization is needed on 
how financialization processes related to the built environment underpin the current 
phase of financialized or neoliberal capitalism(Aalbers, 2017a; Engelen et al., 2014; 
Fine, 2013; Duménil and Lévy, 2004). 
Regarding our second indicator, we did not find evidence for increased short-
termism in investment strategies. In-depth interviews with key actors reveal that the 
transformation was messy and included many (political) struggles. Short-termism has 
become technically enabled as shares in listed and unlisted real estate funds can be 
sold more easily than whole properties. However, to demonstrate that this leads to 
higher turnover ratios, more research is needed. 
The third indicator–investment decisions are increasingly controlled by financial 
actors and their logics–is clearly observable in the Dutch case. Quantitative-oriented 
people are now clearly in the lead, not only at institutional investors but also at their 
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regulators. The ascribed superiority of their knowledge is barely contested, neither by 
members of parliament nor by the ultimate owners of their investment money, 
employees, as it is considered too complex and too technical. 
Crucial to the financialization of Dutch institutional investors’ real estate 
investments was that direct ownership of properties had to give way to indirect 
ownership; the real estate holdings of Dutch institutional investors have become a form 
of fictitious capital distancing investors from the built environment (Pani and Holman, 
2014; Teresa, 2015). They have transformed ‘unique, idiosyncratic spaces and 
projects into a fungible financial product’ (Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 66). As real estate 
assets have been transformed into fictitious capital, their value becomes less 
dependent on the underlying properties and their direct surroundings–that is, the built 
environment–and more dependent on the volatility of financial markets. Channelling 
real estate investments through indirect holdings, therefore, increases the stock of 
fictitious capital, contributing to more volatile accumulation cycles and more insecurity 
for households (Harvey, 2006). But, also, by analysing real estate in the same way as 
other forms of fictitious capital such as shares and bonds, institutional investors have 
become less aware of important characteristics of their real estate portfolios such as 
high levels of leverage and the devaluation potential of real estate shares. 
Fictitious capital is considered a crucial condition for property investment as it is 
a capital-intensive industry. As a result of the financialization of real estate, property 
investment has become closely interwoven with the impatience of global financial 
markets, while historically it was used for more patient, long-term investments (van 
Loon, 2016). Real estate in the form of fictitious capital is now an essential element, or 
collateral, used for the enlargement of the pyramid of complex international debt claims 
which is backed up with an increasingly scarce amount of deposits (Haiven, 2011; 
Hudson, 2010; Nesvetailova, 2006; Savini and Aalbers, 2016). In this regard, the 
financialization of real estate investments seems to be an important contributor to 
international financial instability–finding its temporary nexus in the 2007 financial 
crisis–while the original investment focus was to use investment in property as 
countercyclical asset, especially under “spatial Keynesianism” (Brenner, 2004). 
Consequently, uncertainty increases for the final holders of this investment capital, for 
example, pension fund members, as unpredictable ‘Minsky moments’ will set in motion 
more pronounced periods of devaluation, creating more severe consequences in the 
form of lower benefits and/or higher premiums. 
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Chapter 4 Patient versus impatient capital: the (non)financialization of real estate 
development in the Low Countries 
 
This chapter is a paper that has been published:  
Loon, J. van (2016) Patient versus impatient capital: the (non)financialization of real 
estate development in the Low Countries. In: Socio Economic Review 14, 4: pp. 709—
728.   
 
The adjustments made in the published text are primarily ‘technical’; adding section-
numbers, updating references, changing the Figure numbers, and changing “ ‘…’ “ into 
“ “…”  “when using quotes. Also, based on delayed feedback by an interviewee, the 
word “almost” has been added to the sentence “faced bankruptcy in the early 1990s”. 
 
Abstract 
The recent history of real estate developers in the Netherlands and Belgium shows 
that financialization processes are geographically variegated. Although real estate 
developers, the intermediary between capital and the local built environment, faced a 
similar rise of more market-oriented banking, Dutch developers financialized their 
activities while their Belgian counterparts did not. The Dutch case demonstrates how 
financialized corporations can make accumulation cycles more extreme, particularly 
by placing the creation of fictitious capital at the centre of their business strategies. The 
Belgian case illustrates how patient capital, i.e. multi-generational wealth looking for 
sustainable growth, can function as a strong barrier to financialization processes, thus 
moderating the influence of financialized capitalism on the economy. 
 
Key words: financialization, patient capital, political economy, firm strategy, wealth 
JEL classification: G32 capital and ownership structure, value of firms, R30 general 
real estate markets, F43 economic growth of open economies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Today’s finance is much more footloose, a process initiated by the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods in the 1970s, spurred on by waves of financial liberalization and 
reregulation, and further accelerated by digitalization (Aglietta, 2000; Wojcik, 2012). 
Also, financial markets and the power of financial actors increased rapidly, reaching 
historically unprecedented dimensions (Hudson, 2010; Hardie and Howarth, 2013). 
The theoretical concept of financialization is used to analyse this “increasing 
dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at 
various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including 
financial institutions), states and households” (Aalbers, 2017a, p. 3). A rich body of 
work has demonstrated empirically how financial actors and financial logics 
increasingly shape practices in multiple domains: housing (Hudson, 2010), 
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corporations (Orhangazi, 2008), the national political economy (Engelen et al., 2010) 
and the public sector (Hendrikse, 2015). Financialization is labelled as a new era of 
capitalism: financialized capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2009). 
However, this literature primarily looks at cases were financialization did occur. 
This selective focus can make it seem like processes of financialization are universal 
and ubiquitous across the West. Consequently, important barriers to the process of 
financialization are under-researched and still poorly understood (Christophers, 2015). 
In other words, more attention should be paid to “the complex processes of 
transformation, which sometimes advance and at other times hamper the advent of 
finance capitalism in the advanced political economies” (van der Zwan, 2014, p. 120 
emphasis by author). Patient capital, both equity and debt providers with a long-term 
perspective, is one noted barrier that impedes financialization processes (Lehrer and 
Schmid, 2015; Deeg et al., 2016; Thatcher and Vlandas, 2016) freeing firms “from 
obsessive concern with short-term market indicators” (Culpepper, 2005, p. 175). 
Accordingly, patient capital in the form of multi-generational wealth of families puts 
non-financial considerations—such as social capital and reputation—central within 
business models (Arregle et al., 2007; Salvato and Melin, 2008; Chrisman et al., 2011; 
Colli, 2013). 
To reveal if the multilayered and multiscaled processes of financialization 
decreases possibilities for patient capital, this article examines the behaviour of a 
specific set of economic agents: developers of residential and commercial (office and 
retail) real estate. The core business of these non-financial corporations is attracting 
capital to produce the built environment; highly dependent on external capital they are 
excellent observers of changes within capital provision. But, their actions are also 
inevitably locally embedded as they produce a spatially fixed commodity. Developers 
mediate between the financial sphere, for the provision of capital, and the real economy 
for the construction of physical buildings (Halbert et al., 2014). Changes within their 
business strategies could reflect wider changes in political economies (Deeg and 
Jackson, 2006; Dixon, 2011). The rise of financialized capitalism could therefore be 
reflected through the financialization of corporations, a qualitative shift whereby the 
adoption of financial logics prioritizes a focus on short-term (financial) profit 
maximization over productive investments and long-term growth (Orhangazi, 2008; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). 
To investigate the resilience of patient capital towards financialization 
processes, the article adopts a comparative perspective concentrating on Belgium and 
the Netherlands, both characterized as small open economies with a highly educated 
work force, relatively strong economic performance, large banking sectors and the 
highest net household wealth in the Euro zone (Chang and Jones, 2013). However, 
whereas in the Netherlands processes of financialization are clearly observable 
(Engelen, 2015), the Belgian political economy has important barriers to 
financialization. An explanation of this difference relates to wealth accumulation. While 
the wealth of Dutch households is managed collectively through a mandatory pension 
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fund system controlled by institutional investors, wealth management in Belgium is an 
individual project. This has a profound influence on the political economy because 
individual wealth in the form of family capital, a type of patient capital, is an important 
barrier to financialization (Bebchuck and Roe, 1999; Arregle et al., 2007; Lehrer and 
Celo, 2016). On the other hand, institutional investors are an important force for 
financialization processes and impatience (McCarthy et al., 2016; van Loon and 
Aalbers, 2017). 
While the Low Countries experienced a similar rise of market-oriented banking 
(Chang and Jones, 2013), endemic to the rise of financialized capitalism (Lapavitsas, 
2009; Engelen, 2015), the recent history of Belgian developers shows the resilience of 
patient capital towards financialization processes. There, multigenerational wealth 
looking for sustainable growth stimulated firms to adopt a longer-term focus on 
profitability including nonfinancial considerations. In contrast, the case of the 
Netherlands offers an extreme case of financialization: debt-driven growth and 
complex financial instruments became crucial for developers aiming at short-term 
(financial) profit maximization. Put differently, while the strong presence of patient 
capital within Belgian developers hampered processes of financialization, Dutch 
developers opened up to a great extent to impatient capital further accelerating 
processes of financialization within the wider Dutch political economy. 
The article first discusses how patient capital can function as a barrier to the 
financialization of corporations. Then, it introduces the Netherlands and Belgium as 
countries that both experienced the rise of market-oriented banking but differ 
fundamentally on another important element of the rise of financialized capitalism, the 
prominence of institutional investors. Section 4.5 then shows, mostly based on 40 open 
interviews with actors in real estate, finance, and related state agencies, how Belgian 
and Dutch developers interacted rather differently with the rise of financialized 
capitalism since the 1990s. 
 
4.2. Financialization of corporations: patient capital as barrier 
A crucial aspect of the rise of financialized capitalism is that the main providers of 
capital for corporations, banks for loans (external capital) and shareholders for equity 
(internal capital), became more powerful and increasingly impatient (Fichtner, 2015; 
Deeg and Hardie, 2016). Since the 1990s, institutional investors rose as major 
shareholders transforming corporate decision-making processes around the principle 
of financial profitability (van Loon and Aalbers, 2017; van der Zwan, 2014). During the 
same period, banks in many countries started to loosen their long-term relations with 
corporations in which patient capital provided the glue for long-term interactions 
between banks and corporations: a bank “accompanied an industrial enterprise from 
the cradle to the grave, from establishment to liquidation throughout all the vicissitudes 
of existence” (Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 14). As banks adopted market-oriented 
business models attention shifted towards interacting with financial markets, finance 
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itself was turned into an important source of profit (Hardie and Howarth, 2013). 
Moreover, banks started to develop or increase investment banking activities, making 
trading in listed and not-listed firms an important part of their business strategies 
(Wojcik, 2012). 
The rise of financialized capitalism thus puts pressure on the provision of patient 
capital that consistently prefers long over short-term corporate objectives (Deeg and 
Hardie, 2016). Nevertheless, in particular, shareholders with a long-term investment 
horizon such as sovereign wealth funds (Deeg and Hardie, 2016; Thatcher and 
Vlandas, 2016) or multigenerational family wealth can still form a highly resilient form 
of patient capital (Lehrer and Celo, 2016) shielding firms from financialization 
processes (Culpepper, 2005; Fichtner, 2015; Lehrer and Schmid, 2015). In this 
respect, the multigenerational perspective of family owners makes immaterial 
components such as reputation, embeddedness in local communities, paternalism 
towards employers and endurance (almost) as important as financial considerations 
(Chrisman et al., 2011; Colli, 2013; Lehrer and Celo, 2016). Accordingly, risk averse, 
long-term planning horizons and social capital creation are central to familial firms 
(Arregle et al., 2007; Salvato and Melin, 2008; Fichtner, 2015), embedding them in 
“Durkheimian” institutions “are rooted in norms of community, solidarity and mutual 
obligations” (Lehrer and Celo, 2016, p. 738). But, family firms are also characterized 
by opaqueness, hostility to external advice, slow growth and internationalization based 
on retained earnings as family firms are resistance towards high levels of debt 
(Chrisman et al., 2011; Colli, 2013). 
However, the increased power of financial actors—this article focuses on 
impatient institutional investors (McCarthy et al., 2016) and especially market oriented 
banks (Hardie and Howarth, 2013)—puts pressure on non-financial corporations 
(including family firms) to change their long-term perspectives into a short-term focus 
on profitability (Aglietta, 2000; Orhangazi, 2008). This financialization—or becoming 
impatient (Deeg and Hardie, 2016)—of business models can take place by using stable 
cash flows or real estate to generate debt, which is in turn used to gear small profits 
into large (financial) profits (Froud et al., 2006; Kaika and Ruggiero, 2016). Institutional 
investors, for instance, used Thames Water’s monopoly over water provision and its 
predictable cash flows to create sophisticated financial instruments for debt 
refinancing, hence increasing dividend payouts (Allen and Pryke, 2013). Leverage is 
also often used for opportunistic growth via mergers, acquisitions and management 
buyouts, or for increasing the value of a corporation via share buyback programmes 
(Aglietta, 2000; Kaika and Ruggiero, 2016). These thick layers of debt heavily influence 
profitability and make business models more risky. This article focuses on debt fuelled 
growth, but it is important to acknowledge that corporations can also financialize 
through the adoption of financial instruments (e.g. derivatives) or financial assets (e.g. 
securitized car loans) (Pryke and Allen, 2000; Krippner, 2005). 
In both cases, the short-term focus on (financial) profit maximization is usually 
at the expense of productive investments (Orhangazi, 2008). Put differently, boosting 
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a corporation’s “fictitious capital”, i.e., marketable claims “on the production of surplus 
value and on the perceived value of the underlying asset” (Pani and Holman, 2014, p. 
218), starts to prevail over strategies supporting long-term economic performance 
(Harvey, 2006). In this model, creating a positive image for investors and customers is 
paramount (Pike and Pollard, 2009). Marketing and apparently good financial results 
are crucial as Apple’s financialized business model illustrates the “paradox of 
assembler misery and brand wealth” (Froud et al., 2014, p. 54).  
The financialization of firms in this article is thus conceptualized as a shift 
towards shortterm (financial) profit maximization usually through increased debt 
generation, i.e., the impatient side of Deeg and Hardie’s (2016) continuum. Whereas 
impatient capital stimulates corporations through at arms-length relations to achieve 
short-term financial goals patient capital stimulates corporations through enduring, 
close relations to achieve long-term goals that include many non-financial objectives 
such as socio-emotional wealth improvement (Stockmans et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 
2011; Lehrer and Celo, 2016). This conceptualization enables to analyse the extent to 
which the business strategies of Dutch and Belgian real estate developers have 
become impatient (i.e. financialized) through three indicators. First, the extent to which 
debt generation and leveraged growth have become central within the business 
models of developers. A second indicator is, just like in financialized real estate 
development, the marketing of projects and calculative practices to improve their 
fictitious value (Guironnet et al., 2016), the extent to which business strategies start to 
prioritize the creation of fictitious value over the production of the built environment. 
Third, as the result of the expanding investment portfolios of institutional investors and 
increased investment bank activities (Aglietta, 2000; van der Zwan, 2014), the 
increased shareholder ship of impatient, financial actors in real estate developers is a 
final indicator. 
Section 4.2 outlined the strong pressure on real estate developers to 
financialize; however, as the next section illustrates, the political economies of both 
countries seem to filter this pressure differently. Accordingly, they seem to offer differ 
possibilities for patient capital to be resilient for the dynamics of financialization 
processes.  
 
4.3 Financialization and the Low Countries 
This section demonstrates how Dutch corporations are more open towards 
financialization than Belgian firms, by first describing key elements of both political 
economies that filter processes of financialization, and subsequently briefly describing 
the rise of market oriented banking and financialization of non-financial corporations.  
 
4.3.1 Political economies ‘filtering’ financialization 
As Table 4.1 illustrates the Belgian and Dutch political economies have many 
elements in common. Both have small economies in terms of foreign investments  
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Table 4.1 Some characteristics of the Belgian and Dutch political economy 
 
  Year Belgium Netherlands Source 
A Macro economic indicators         
Gross domestic product (GDP)/capita 1995  $ 22.862   $ 22.899  OECD 
Gross domestic product (GDP)/capita 2013  $ 41.866   $ 46.174  OECD 
Population 2012 11.128.200 16.755.000 Eurostat 
percentage urban regions 2012 83% 84% OECD 
population growth 55-'12 25% 56% Eurostat 
B Household's Main Assets         
Homeownership (%) 1995 76% 59% Eurostat 
Homeownership (%) 2011 72% 67% Eurostat 
largest financial asset (in billion)* 2013  €   434   €  1.161  DNB, NBB 
Net household wealth/capita 2014  €    84.771   €    78.063  Allianz (2015, p. 82) 
C Debt         
Debt-to GDP ratio: household's mortgage 
1998 27% 55% EMF 
2014 47% 95% DNB, CBS, NNB 
Debt-to GDP ratio: non-financial corporate 2014 136% 127% McKinsey 
Debt-to GDP ratio: government 2014 135% 83% McKinsey 
D Financial sector         
bank concentration                                            
(% 3 largest banks of total assets) 2011 86% 81% Worldbank 
bank assets increase 2000-7 39% 48% 
Hardie and 
Howarth (2013) 
bank assets to GDP 2014 296% 382% NNB, DNB 
Non-interest income as percentage of 
gross income 
1990 18% 24% OECD 
2007 53% 54% OECD 
*(BE: shares, NL:  pension fund savings) 
 
and international trade: Dutch corporations focus more on trade, export and 
international expansion while Belgian ones more on investments by foreign 
corporations. The net wealth of households is one of the highest in Europe, but, 
households, state agencies and non-financial firms have also one of the highest debt-
to-GDP ratios in Europe.  
Until the 1980s both countries had comparable models of Fordist economic 
development, with powerful labour unions and a strong state aiming to distribute wealth 
equally. The political system was based on pillars—religious or ideological 
organizations that influenced all spheres of life. Severe economic downturns led to 
cutbacks in welfare provision and waves of privatization. However, whereas the 
Netherlands seems to obey the European regulation rather willingly, Belgian state 
agencies only take action when the urge, e.g., state debt is very high. Consequently, 
in many domains restructuring in Belgium, including austerity-policies, is rather mild. 
Also, Belgium devolved much more political authority to the regional level. While 
Wallonia continued to support its decaying traditional industries, Flanders was rather 
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successful in boosting new economies—by reducing labour costs, attracting foreign 
investments, and investing in high-tech clusters and modern industries. Brussels 
became a major provider of jobs in the service sector, while remaining the country’s 
financial centre. Some institutions from the old Fordist regime, such as labour unions 
and pillarized organization structures still play a prominent role (Oosterlynck, 2010). 
In the Netherlands, to the contrary, these institutions have decreased in 
importance, and the nerve of the decision-making process is still at the national level. 
Mercantilism, international competition and the search for collective solutions are 
deeply embedded within political culture. Although policies and discourses during the 
post-1980s reform period were “heavily skewed towards the wishes of capital rather 
than labour” (Bruff, 2011, p. 494), they were adopted relatively smoothly across the 
different layers of society. Essential in this model of negotiation and compromise are 
advisory organizations (e.g. SER, CPB) seen as neutral, but, for which economic goals 
dominate. Therefore, a market-oriented attitude proved fertile soil in the 1990s for 
opening up the political economy to processes of financialization (Engelen et al., 2010). 
The next section describes how Dutch and Belgian banks transformed their business 
models in rather similar ways—despite the differences outlined above. 
 
4.3.2 More market-oriented banking 
The creation of one European financial market, combined with national reregulation of 
banking, privatization and structural current account surpluses, enabled the adoption 
of market-based banking business in the Low Countries. Banks grew rapidly—both in 
assets and in credit provision—internationalized their balance sheets, and became 
major players on global capital markets. Banking operations were also heavily 
consolidated, in the Netherlands into three banks (ABN Amro, Rabo and ING) and four 
in Belgium (bnpparibasfortis, KBC, Belfius [formerly Dexia] and ING) (Chang and 
Jones, 2013) (Table 4.1d). 
In the Netherlands, the rise of market-oriented banking is mostly the result of 
reregulation during the 1990s, which relaxed the borrowing conditions for Dutch 
households setting in motion a housing boom and continuous demand for new, higher 
mortgages. Other reregulation allowed the securitization of mortgages, enabling Dutch 
banks to take the ever growing pile of mortgages off their balance sheets spurring rapid 
growth (Engelen, 2015). 
In Belgium public credit agencies—Openbare Krediet Instellingen (OKI)—
played a pivotal role in the management of a large reservoir of household deposits, 
mostly to provide conservative loans against low rates (Depuydt, 2010). During the 
privatization wave of the 1990s OKIs merged, and the deposits—no longer legally 
separate from portfolio investments—became concentrated in three listed banks. 
These banks had interbank lending at the centre of their ambitious growth models. 
They used the deposits and current account surpluses as collateral for leveraged 
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growth, becoming important players in the management of international capital 
streams (Chang and Jones, 2013). 
The recent growth and internationalization of the major Dutch and Belgian banks 
shows striking similarities as “patient capital was swapped for profit maximization” 
(Chang and Jones, 2013, p. 84). Fees and commissions became more important than 
interest margins on loans and deposits, and relationships with corporations became 
more at arm’s-length aiming to sell complex, often debt related, financial instruments 
(Table 4.1d). Whereas Dutch banks connected themselves to global financial markets 
mostly through securitization, Belgian banks became mostly connected through 
interbank borrowing. Once global capital halted banks experienced enormous losses, 
which were partly nationalized. 
 
4.3 Financialization of corporations 
Although Belgian and Dutch firms obtain similar capital from equity markets(Hardie and 
Howarth, 2013, p. 6), the sources are profoundly different. Belgian firms receive patient 
capital from wealthy Belgian households, whose second largest asset—after net real 
estate (€953 billion in 2013)—consists of listed and non-listed equity (€433 billion). 
Families use this equity in mostly Belgian corporations to grow their multigenerational 
wealth in a slow, low-risk manner. They use their controlling stakes to set business 
strategies around predictable results, cost efficiency and risk minimization. They resist 
high levels of external capital or financial innovation as it decreases their influence. 
Outsiders are further kept away by opaque corporate governance that blurs the lines 
between owners, directors and managers. As a result, corporations remain relatively 
small and domestically oriented also taking non-financial goals as socio-emotional 
wealth creation seriously (Stockmans et al., 2010; Molly et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, in the Dutch collective mechanism of wealth accumulation 
through a mandatory pension system, institutional investors manage the largest assets 
of Dutch households—€1.2 trillion in pension fund savings in 2013. Although nowadays 
much of these savings are invested abroad, in the 1990s pension funds pressured for 
important reregulation making it very attractive for impatient foreign investors to invest 
in internationally oriented Dutch corporations (Engelen et al., 2010; van Loon and 
Aalbers, 2017). Also, patient capital in the form of family capital is much less present 
in the Netherlands, only €91 billion in listed and unlisted equity in 2013. Stimulated by 
their shareholders, large, internationally oriented Dutch corporations adopted growth 
strategies that focused on the enlargement of fictitious capital, mostly through capital 
gains and mergers and acquisitions (Bezemer and Muysken, 2015). 
Hence, whereas in Belgium individual wealth accumulation seems to be an 
important barrier for the financialization of real estate developers by the creation of 
patient, family capital, Dutch collective wealth accumulation seems to be an important 
force for financialization by the creation of an impatient, institutional wall of money. 
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4.4 The (non-)financialization of real estate developers 
Comparable, aggregated quantitative data on long-term changes within the business 
models of real estate developers in the Low Countries is hard to find. Therefore, this 
section combines the relevant, available quantitative data with newspaper articles, 
public documents, and, in particular, 17 interviews in Belgium and 23 interviews in the 
Netherlands with key players, ranging from CEOs of real estate developers and banks 
to high level officials from planning departments. 
Section 4.4.1 first shows that the three main aspects of the financialization of 
developer business strategies—(a) the adoption of leveraged growth; (b) prioritizing 
the creation of fictitious value over the production of a functioning built environment; 
and (c) financial actors—mainly as shareholders—pressuring for a refocus on short-
termism—were much more visible in business models of Dutch than Belgian 
developers. Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 explain these differences by discussing 
developer practices in each country. Residential development, with mostly households 
as client/buyer and less risky finance models, and commercial real estate 
development, often for business as tenant and professional investors as buyer, are 
rather different practices. Still, analysing them together allows to analyse how 
processes of financialization differ in magnitude throughout the entire real estate 
sector. Consequently, it demonstrates how the working of patient capital cuts across 
disciplines and therefore offers a strong explanation about developments within both 
political economies. 
 
4.4.1 (Non-)financialization of Dutch and Belgian developers 
Since the 1980s Dutch and Belgian cities experienced an internationalization in both 
the users of commercial real estate (i.e. tenants) and the owners (i.e. property 
investors). The rise of the service sector and the consumer society, combined with 
economic growth, pushed demand for retail and office space up (Figure 4.1). The 
Belgian real estate investment market has remained opaque because, compared to 
the Netherlands, valuation procedures, information gathering, professional magazines 
and transparency are of considerably lower standards (Taşan-Kok, 2010). 
Consequently, it is very hard to gather meaningful, quantitative data on Belgian 
developers. 
As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate, before both the burst of the dotcom bubble (2001) 
and the credit crunch (2007–2008), the influx of capital and unrealistic estimations 
surrounding future demand led to the overproduction in both countries, especially of 
office space. Whereas overbuilding in the Netherlands was combined with a strong 
increase in leverage to commercial developers and, rapid, often leveraged, 
international expansion, Belgian developers reacted much more conservatively by 
focussing solely on top locations, switching to other segments of real estate, and 
expanding into neighbouring countries. Moreover, Belgian developers were keen to 
transfer risks to investors through complicated contracts. Also, while in the Netherlands 
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financial actors, mostly banks, were strongly presents as owners of Dutch real estate 
developers before 2008, the data on Brussels suggests that financial actors became 
more influential only after 2008 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Historically Belgian banks have 
not held considerable real estate development activities. Recently other financial 
actors, such as the insurance company AG and the financial investor Ackermans & 
van Haaren, became very active. However, as shown below, their long-term 
investment perspective did not set in motion the financialization. 
Comparing changes in loan provision is challenging. For Belgium only data on 
loans to all real estate corporations (straight grey line in Figure 4.2) and loans to all 
construction activity (round dots) are available, while for the Netherlands there could 
be some doubling of the data as it is obtained from different sources. In the Netherlands 
most credit streamed to developers under very relaxed borrowing conditions, while in 
Belgium borrowing conditions remained relatively stringent. When the crisis hit, banks 
in both countries refocused on domestic markets. Whereas Dutch banks substantially 
scaled down their lending, in Belgium loan provision continued, even creating a 
“relative credit bonanza” (Hanseeuw, 2014, p. 5). In the Dutch case, financial actors 
influenced the behaviour of real estate developers to a great extent, not only by 
becoming one of the larger real estate developers of Europe (e.g. ING Real Estate, 
Rabo with Bouwfonds and MAB), but also by over-financing developers. 
With regard to the development of residential real estate there are some crucial 
differences. As Table 4.1 illustrates, the Netherlands had a much stronger population 
growth. In the Dutch planning system, state agencies play a leading role and 
successfully steered the creation of a compact, rigidly ordered built environment. In 
Belgium, where landownership is more individual and state agencies less powerful, 
residential developments are small: individuals usually provide in their own housing. 
As a result, private households are the largest Belgian developers, and professional 
developers tend to be relatively small and locally oriented (Table 4.2). For the 
Netherlands, it is possible to distinguish between private commissions, rather rare 
compared to Belgium; housing associations which play a considerable role; and 
commercial developers, whereby the larger ones are often part of construction firms 
(BAM, Volkert Wessels), institutional investors (AM, Vesteda) or banks (Bouwfonds). 
As discussed below in more detail, housing associations did adopt complex financial 
instruments to enhance their short-term (financial) profitability. Moreover, listed 
construction firms and some financial developers also increased their debt ratio and 
grew rapidly through takeovers and the creation of large land possessions. 
Thus, the scarce comparative data available suggest that financial actors 
increasingly influence the business strategies of commercial, and in the Dutch case 
also residential, real estate developers. The next two sections will take a closer look at 
each country, showing how excessive debt generation in the Netherlands made 
developer business models short-term oriented, while in Belgium long-term 
perspectives prevail.  
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Figure 4.1 Estimation for activity developers: new building permits (x 1 million square meter) 
 
Note: Because each country uses a different standard, it is difficult to compare data on non-
residential real estate production.   Source: CBS (2015); Statistics Belgium (2015) 
 
4.4.2 The non-financialization of Belgian developers 
Where Belgian real estate development depended mostly on supporting urban sprawl, 
since the late 1990s urban (re)development projects became increasingly important. 
The majority of new Belgian houses is still developed like in the early 1990s: serried 
plots of land are bought as cheaply as possible, a geometer draws building plots 
(verkaveling) and then a concept developer tries to get permits for rezoning, often 
making use of local political contacts. Finally, individuals, in the case of owner-
construction, or real estate developers design and build the houses. Residential 
developers are usually part of a familial construction firm using a large portion of their 
own capital, often in the form of land possessions, which makes them rather 
conservative. This attitude is reflected by the focus on well-known regions, familiar 
building techniques, and profit maximization by minimizing costs (especially through 
rational designs and cheaper materials) and by maximizing revenue through “always 
building the maximum surface that the building permit allows” (interview). This practice 
is not capital intensive as plots are relatively small, and external capital is mostly 
obtained for construction, which only starts after most units have been sold. 
 Financialization is an unlikely outcome in this context. The case of Matexi, the 
largest residential developer in the country, illustrates a likely case for 
financialization: it had considerable revenue growth (from €25 million in the early  
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Figure 4.2 Indicators for loans to real estate developers (in mln Euro) 
 
 
 
Sources: NBB (2015); CBS (2015); Property NL (2007-2015) 
 
Table 4.2 Indication for relative market share of residential real estate developers: commissioners of new 
construction projects 
     
Belgium 
  1995 2001 2007 2014 
Corporations 22% 32% 37% 42% 
Private commisions 73% 62% 59% 49% 
State agencies and social housing providers 6% 6% 3% 9% 
The Netherlands 
  1995 2001 2007 2014 
Construction firms, institutional investors, banks, developers 47% 65% 61% 70% 
Private commissions 16% 16% 10% 12% 
State agencies and social housing providers 37% 18% 29% 18% 
     
Sources: Statistics Belgium (2015), CBS (2015)     
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1990s to €250 million in the 2010s); the shareholders, the family Vande Vyvere were 
open to financial innovation; and it owned considerable plots that increased in value 
(Luysterman, 2010a). Matexi was started in 1945 by the three Vande Vyvere brothers, 
and by the early 1990s grew into a major construction firm. Its business model was a 
good example of the verkaveling model described above, and, for the corporation good 
relationships with employees and business partners was more important than 
efficiency and growth. However, with the appointment of Gaetan Hannecart, husband 
of Bénédicte Vande Vyvere, as CEO, Matexi set off on a path of professionalization. 
But, growth is still not the main goal, the focus is on “the realisation of high quality 
projects at the right locations” (Luysterman, 2010a, p. 0). With the take-over of Wilma 
Belgium in 2000, Matexi revised its business strategy to also include urban 
redevelopment projects. 
There was strong pressure from Belgian banks, but also from peers, to spur 
growth by increasing leverage: “I have felt myself pretty dumb when I explained to 
American friends that we leverage 50 percent. They said, ‘why don’t you optimize? 
Much higher return on equity!’’ (interview). Also, Matexi did not apply for project loans 
that have the advantage of transferring risks to banks. As the reputation as reliable 
partner is extremely important, Matexi preferred taking a loss to bad publicity from 
bankrupt projects.  
Since the late 1990, new residential units are increasing being developed in 
urban built environments, creating more complexity and increasing the need for 
professional developers (Table 4.2). This trend coincided with a wave of 
overproduction in office space, hence, many commercial real estate developers 
switched to other segments of real estate. During the 1990s, these new commercial 
real estate developers started to replace family construction firms—who built in central, 
urban areas in assignment of the end-users and in sizeable volumes—as main 
producers of offices and retail. These new developers often sold the properties to 
investors instead of end-users. Also, they built smaller properties in more peripheral 
areas, usually specializing in a certain segment. Their growth was spurred by the 
entrance of Swedish investors who had ‘so much [investment] money and pressure to 
invest that they bought everything, even when there was no tenant’ (interview). In the 
2000s another wave of opportunistic Anglo-American investors was again very 
profitable for Belgian developers as they were able to transfer development risks to 
these investors. Most production took place in Brussels where developers, closely 
cooperating with local politicians, ignored local legislation and developed modernistic 
skyscrapers without taking into account the surrounding built environment (Beule, 
2010). In the words of one of the most productive architects, Jaspers, it is not about 
design: “It is always about obtaining building permits, that is the job of the architect” 
(Vermeersch and van Garsse, 2015, p. 0). 
When the crisis hit, finance to real estate developers decreased but not that 
dramatically as banks had strict requirements for loan provision such as pre-letting, 
and an intense screening of the feasibility of the real estate project itself: “even for our 
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best clients we still strictly scan every project” (interview). Profitable interest margins 
are the sole source of income from these loans. Thus, despite the collapse of the 
banking sector, the “Belgian brick sparkles as always, thanks to its stability” (BVS, 
2013, p. 8). 
The recent history of Atenor illustrates general practices also observed at other 
Belgian commercial developers. Cominière, once the second largest corporation in the 
Belgian Congo, almost faced bankruptcy in the early 1990s. With its Brussels 
headquarters as the only remaining valuable asset, Séphan Sonneville, not 
experienced in real estate, successfully redeveloped this office building, and Cominière 
became Atenor. With Sonneville as CEO, Atenor specialized itself in the construction 
of modern offices in central locations in a booming Brussels market. During the 2000s 
Atenor’s sold its non-real estate activities, mostly equity in non-listed industrial 
corporations. 
The familial shareholders who own most listed shares of Atenor have a long-
term approach based on constant dividends through stable growth. They “are not 
willing to act recklessly. They are only willing to invest in high quality projects, with 
foreign architects who design the most sustainable properties on the best locations” 
(Sonneville, company website). Risk management prevails over boosting the 
corporation’s (fictitious) share value. Atenor was also flexible and adaptable. Once the 
first signs of saturation in the Brussels office market were observed, it expanded 
abroad and started with residential projects. Another important element of the business 
model is going against the grain. In Luxembourg this strategy worked out very well: 
Atenor purchased a lot of land very cheaply just after the internet bubble collapsed. 
When the properties were sold, Atenor tripled its profits to almost €45 million in 2008 
(Atenor, 2015, p. 0). 
 
Table 4.3 Building permits for the (re)development of offices in Brussels (5 year average)   
       
  1997-2001 2003-2007 2009-2013    
Belgian state agencies/European Union 16% 5% 12%    
Banks and insurers 37% 34% 39%    
Corporations and individuals 47% 61% 50%    
       
Sources: Gewestelijke Overheidsdienst Brussel and Brussel Stedelijke Ontwikkeling (available since 1997) 
 
The modus operandi of Belgian real estate developers demonstrates how 
patient capital, in the form of family capital, acted as an important barrier to changing 
the developer business models towards short-termism. As families strive for moderate, 
low-risk growth of their multigenerational wealth and want to stay in control, they are 
very averse to high levels of external capital. As a result of their long history, they have 
a vivid memory of important historic events, such as the real estate crisis in the late 
1970s. Patient capital fits well with Belgian real estate, with its long turnover times, it 
matches “the mental duration of capital with the mental duration of real estate projects” 
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(interview). To remain into control, families are averse to mergers and acquisitions, 
maintaining a landscape of many small, locally oriented real estate developers, and 
thus hindering financial innovation. 
Business models remain relatively simple including straightforward strategies 
as trying to sell land cheap and to start developing once markets rise again. Local 
political ties and reputation management are paramount, as ‘trust’ makes for a 
smoother business process. Still, non-financialization does not mean a stronger focus 
on the quality of the production process and end product. Developers still seek to 
increase profits through traditional methods, like cutting construction costs. Profit 
maximization seems to be more fundamental than designing sustainable properties 
that satisfy the needs of individuals and society. 
 
4.4.3 The financialization of Dutch developers 
After the Second World War the Netherlands faced a dire real estate shortage. The 
answer was mass construction of real estate whereby the central state provided 
generous funding to large-scale developers (mostly owned by municipalities, housing 
associations and private/institutional investors) for building large-scale, mixed income 
housing projects in close cooperation with local planning authorities. 
A Dutch wave of privatization in the 1990s set in motion the merging of many 
municipal developers with housing associations that became semi-public owners of 
large real estate portfolios and were operating in an opaque institutional setting. The 
booming housing market made housing associations asset rich. As Table 4.2 
illustrates, much of this societal capital was used to expand their real estate 
development activities ranging from luxurious housing to projects improving liveability. 
Despite having cheap and easy access to loans from state banks through a state 
guaranteed system, many housing associations bought derivatives related to their real 
estate development activities. Some used derivatives conservatively, but, the largest 
housing association Vestia first used derivatives to gear financial profitability, and, later 
to gamble on global capital markets, losing at least €3 billion (Aalbers et al., 2017). 
Thus, whereas in the 1980s the societal capital of housing associations was, through 
stringent state-regulation, “ring-fenced” (Allen and Pryke, 2013) from predatory 
finance, now finance captured some housing associations. 
Construction firms had already adopted real estate development during the 
1990s (Table 4.4) as the higher profit margins, in particular when leveraged, boosted 
their financial results. To secure future development projects and to profit from 
increasing land values, construction firms bought large tracks of land, but, problems 
arose in 2008 when construction activity and land values decreased. The largest 
developing construction firm, BAM, had to write off €594 million between 2009 and 
2012 of its market valued assets, mostly land. Project losses were smaller, as 
construction only starts after a considerable portion of the units are sold, and all larger 
developing construction firms survived the crisis.  
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Table 4.4 Estimated relative market share of commercial real estate developers, the Netherlands 
      
  2001 2007 2014   
Construction firm 26% 28% 23%   
Finance 39% 39% 17%   
Developer 32% 24% 38%   
Developer investor 3% 9% 22%   
      
Source: top 49 developers of the annual top101 list published by Property NL (available since 2001) 
      
Note 1 As data on ownership of commercial Belgian real estate developers is not available this table 
gives a, very rough, indication for who is involved in (re)development activities of offices in Brussels 
 (i.e. by far the largest market for commercial real estate in Belgium) 
Note 2 Table 4.4 uses a five year average as the permission of permits, in contrast to the ownership of 
Dutch developers, fluctuates a lot 
 
Institutional investors have always been both major investors and developers of 
Dutch residential real estate. In the 1980s the pension fund for public servants, ABP, 
was by far the largest developer of affordable housing, generating a stable, but low, 
rate of return. As institutional investors adopt a pure financial investment perspective, 
their development activities are shaped by financial models and calculations. ABP is 
now primarily interested in those areas where luxurious housing can generate the 
highest and most volatile rates of return (van Loon and Aalbers, 2017). 
Since the 1990s, Dutch banks became increasingly more active in residential 
development. The example of Bouwfonds/MAB, originally owned by municipalities and 
taken over by ABN in 2005, is illustrative. ABN transformed this domestic developer of 
affordable housing into a large international developer of residential projects and also 
prestigious commercial projects (after the takeover of MAB). However, after 2007 
many projects proved to be too optimistic and, after writing off most of the fictitious 
project values, the new owner Rabo decided to exclusively proceed with residential 
development activities (van Loon and de Graaf, 2015). In general, developers owned 
by Dutch banks followed opportunistic strategies: international expansion, usually 
through leveraged growth, was often more important than actual real estate demand. 
During the 1990s a new model of real estate development arose in the 
Netherlands, with municipalities playing a pivotal role: they granted zoning/building 
permits and earned profits from leveraged land speculation, hence creating “over-
optimistic over-zoning” (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012, p. 2). A substantial part of these 
profits was used to subsidize nonprofitable investments such as affordable housing, 
but a significant share—€3.2 billion between 2004 and 2008—was embraced by 
aldermen to build prestige projects (e.g. city halls, theatres), as land profits is the only 
source of income that municipalities can spend freely (ASRE and PBL, 2013). 
Developers were known to seduce municipalities in order to create larger, more 
prestigious plans: “it’s like flirting with a women: you have to overwhelm them, you 
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have to show off” (interview). Once seduced, developers were clever enough to 
transfer most of the development risks to municipalities. 
This over-optimistic planning model was furthered by the wide availability of 
money, both from investors (i.e. home buyers, institutional/private investors) and from 
banks. As part of their growth seeking strategy, the banks’ real estate finance 
departments were forced to increase production (Figure 4.2), even when heads of 
department doubted the sustainability: “I preferred an exit from financing new offices, 
but, to realise your growth targets you had to finance offices” (interview). Consequently, 
borrowing conditions were relaxed to new lows: “if you proposed a new project for 
above €2.5 million SNS would give you a loan directly, showing a building permit was 
not required” (interview). Loan-to-value ratios of 100% were common, and there was 
no control on how the borrowed money was spent: “Development was not driven by 
demand, it was driven by capital” (interview). 
Debt was also used for international expansion. Financial real estate developers 
such as ING Real Estate, Bouwfonds MAB and Multi became major European actors. 
However, the foundation of the system—ever increasing real estate values providing 
sound collateral for excessive lending—proved fragile once Lehman Brothers fell in 
2008. Figure 4.2 illustrates that, in 2008, banks stopped new lending to commercial 
developers, and decreasing real estate values devaluated the collateral. Highly 
leveraged developers went bankrupt, leaving hundreds of millions in debt and setting 
in motion the nationalization of the fourth largest Dutch bank, SNS Reaal. Also, banks 
started to scale or shut down their development activities, evaporating billions in 
fictitious value. In addition, decreasing land values created €3.3 billion in losses 
between 2009 and 2013 for municipalities leading to several municipal bankruptcies. 
Surviving developers now work with other sources such as forward funding by the end 
user or investor. Therefore, trust between actors has become quintessential, thus 
increasing project complexity, making new projects much smaller and focused on 
urban redevelopments (Mackaaij and Nozeman, 2014). 
Although an extreme case, the recent history of Multi is illustrative for both the 
internationalization and financialization of Dutch real estate developers. Started by Van 
Veggel in 1982, Multi expanded into Portugal in the late 1990s when the brother of one 
of the major shareholders informed them about the booming Portuguese economy. 
More sophisticated studies and analyses, combined with the growing appetite of Dutch 
institutional investors, provided the basis for further international expansion. In 2006 
Multi is bought by a real estate investment fund of Morgan Stanley, which followed an 
opportunistic business model to boost profits with relaxed pre-letting requirements, 
exclusive developments for the fund of Morgan Stanley REF V, and a 3-year, €950 
million loan from 11 banks. This loan could be used as equity and thus as collateral for 
new loans on projects, creating “an eternal multiplier for infinite money production” 
(interview). The loan is based on the expectation that rising capital values of realized 
projects will allow the generation of new loans that can be used to repay the original 
loan. The loan was negotiated during the peak of bullish European real estate markets 
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and loose finance. Shortly later, a couple of the banks faced dire financial conditions, 
and Multi struggled to realize the expected value-increases on completed projects in 
the then depressed real estate markets. Consequently, between 2008 and 2010, it 
accumulated losses totaling €400 million.  
In 2010, the loan was renegotiated, but, the 11 banks now had rather different 
visions. Crucially, a new clause allowing the resell of loans and transforming the loans 
into claims on equity was added. After the refinancing, Multi continued its business and 
was repaying the debt. In 2012, Blackstone started to buy up loans and started to build 
up voting power that it used to frustrate Multi’s activities to motivate the other banks to 
sell their loans including the claims on equity. In late 2013, Blackstone obtained 
ownership of €3 to €5 billion in real estate projects by buying loans with a value of €850 
million for about €500 million. Multi is now used by Blackstone as an entity to build a 
large European retail real estate fund. It has become a financial development investor.  
In the Netherlands, impatient capital pressured different types of developers to 
refocus their activities around short-term (financial) profit maximization. For some, in 
particular housing associations but also financial developers such as Vesteda, this was 
illustrated by the adoption of complex financial products, such as derivatives and 
CMBS. Leverage, happily provided by growth seeking banks, was adopted even by 
municipalities to buy land or fuel foreign growth, usually through mergers or 
acquisitions, thus creating large, internationally oriented developers. But, also 
households and investors increased leverage to buy real estate further inflating the 
bubbles of fictitious capital (Harvey, 2006; Haiven, 2011). As the buyers of real estate 
were strongly focused on exchange value, the demands of end users became 
increasingly irrelevant, now producing “spread sheets transformed into concrete” 
(interview).  
Strategies were often structured by one or two ambitious entrepreneurs, or 
heavily influenced by the growth motives of its financial owner. In both occasions, 
impatience led to opportunism and sophisticated but risky strategies. As many actors 
were relatively new to real estate development, a collective memory of the popped 
bubbles in the past was missing. Once the bubble bust the winners of impatient real 
estate development became the losers, and resorted to begging the state to save them 
through nationalization and state aid, transferring the cost of their bad performing real 
estate loans and projects to the public.  
 
4.5. Conclusions 
In this article, the financialization of real estate developers is seen as a qualitative 
transformation whereby the adoption of impatient debt and/or equity makes short-term 
(financial) profit maximization the leading focus. 
Where patient capital in Belgium was resilient to financialization pressures, all 
three formulated indicators of financialization were clearly observable in the business 
models of Dutch residential and commercial real estate developers. First, within all 
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different types of developers complex financial instruments or leveraged growth came 
to dominate many business strategies. Second, institutional investors already owned 
developers in the 1980s, but during the 1990s also the large Dutch banks considerably 
increased their real estate development activities and used their development 
corporations to spur growth. Third, this welcoming of impatient capital created an 
enormous fictitious bubble, with real estate debt generation as an important engine for 
economic growth (Engelen, 2015). This vision was based on the idea that “you can 
boost economic growth through real estate development. However, real estate follows 
economic growth: when real estate is not used it has no value whatsoever” (interview). 
Consequently, while all actors thought that future revenues would allow the debtors to 
repay, in reality, once the volatile, highly leveraged real estate markets fell many 
developers went bankrupt not able to repay the outstanding debts. Their overleveraged 
business models heavily amplify the up and downs of global capital markets, thus 
increasing extremes within domestic accumulation cycles (Harvey, 2006). Put 
differently, real estate actors’ willingness to take up both impatient debt and equity from 
large, internationalizing Dutch banks directly tied the Dutch real estate market to global, 
financialized capitalism. 
On the other hand, the dominance of patient capital, in the form of risk-averse 
family capital aiming to grow sustainably, maintained a different business model for 
Belgian developers, making it possible to resist financialization, despite facing the 
similar bank pressures as in the Netherlands. Although Belgian developers did start 
using more sophisticated financial instruments, such as bonds, financial sector actors 
and ideas did not capture their business models. As regulation is increasingly 
regionalized, local customs, local knowledge and in particular local networks become 
crucial for understanding the developers’ actions. To remain in control, familial 
shareholders resisted rapid growth through acquisitions and/or high indebtedness. 
Instead, Belgian developers opted for debt and equity constructions that guarantee a 
long-term focus on profitability including non-financial considerations such as socio-
emotional wealth elements (Lehrer and Celo, 2016; Deeg and Hardie, 2016). Their 
actions seem to have moderated domestic accumulation cycles by moderating 
influences during the rise of financialized capitalism, suggesting that high levels of 
patient capital can also contribute to shielding domestic economic sectors from 
financialization processes. Other important elements of this protection within the 
Belgian political economy seem to be the regionalization of public policy, the strong 
position of labour unions in Belgium, weak state agencies that lack power to reform, 
opaque governance structures and the lax implementation of European legislation. 
Within the Belgian political economy real estate is conceptualized as individual 
investment that needs protection; financializing it to spur economic growth at the 
national level is not a priority. Still, the workings of these non-financialized firms should 
not be romanticized—profit maximization remains central in their operations, often at 
the cost of the wishes of end-users and built environment quality. 
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In conclusion, the practices of developers indicate how a financialized Dutch 
political economy accelerates cycles of accumulation with extreme mania and more 
devastating periods of devaluation while in Belgium patient capital is a strong barrier 
against financialized capitalism’s volatility. Therefore, real estate development seems 
to be a crucial sector to study financialization as its capital intensity and connection to 
the global capital market heavily influences domestic waves of accumulation. Still, 
much remains unknown about how these findings translate to other layers of political 
economies, for instance, banks in both countries ‘financialized’ in similar ways. Also, a 
more fine-grained analysis at the level of the individual firm or subsector (i.e. offices, 
retail, residential, etc.) including a wider geographical scope is needed to develop more 
nuanced insights into the process of financialization and the working of patient capital 
as barrier. Such comparative studies are also crucial for analysing how the rise of 
financialized capitalism influences national political economies.  
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Chapter 5 Capital provision and the (non-)financialization of real estate 
development: the cases of Immobel and TCN 
 
This chapter could be transformed into a single-authored paper as it is solely my own 
work. 
5.1 Introduction 
A wide range of studies on the financialization of the built environment shows how 
finance and real estate have become both increasingly dominant within political 
economies and increasingly interconnected with each other (Weber, 2010; Rutland, 
2010; Pacewicz, 2013; Coq-Huelva, 2013; Healey, 1994; Merrifield, 1993; O’Neill, 
2013; Ashton et al., 2016; Aalbers, 2012; Lizieri and Pain, 2014). Recent contributions 
have put real estate developers central as they translate the wishes of global financial 
actors for financial assets into the local production of the built environment thereby 
engaging with complex urban political economies (Weber, 2015; Halbert and Attuyer, 
2016; Halbert et al., 2014). A wealth of recent case studies about the realization of 
urban projects shows how global finance has, through the work of real estate 
developers, varying degrees of success in putting financial investment criteria central 
to the production of the built environment (Guironnet et al., 2016; Savini and Aalbers, 
2016; Rutland, 2010; Theurillat and Crevoisier, 2013; Pacewicz, 2013; David and 
Halbert, 2013; Theurillat et al., 2016; Mosciaro, n.d.; Hebb and Sharma, 2014). This 
focus on single urban projects underestimates the dynamics within real estate 
developers themselves. Consequently, the effects of real estate developers being 
captured by finance through financialization processes on the production of the built 
environment has been understudied (see Aalbers et al., 2017; Sanfelici and Halbert, 
2015 Chapter 4; for exceptions).   
This chapter answers to the call for empirical studies “in order to fully grasp the 
depth and breadth of the financialization of urban production” (Halbert and Attuyer, 
2016, p. 1348). But, instead of analyzing the realization of urban projects this chapter 
puts the recent history of two developers that primarily produce offices and retail (i.e., 
commercial real estate) central. Accordingly, and in line with Sanfelici and Halbert 
(2015), it thus widens the scope by not focusing on how “financial circuits” influence 
the production of the built environment (cf. Halbert et al., 2014), but, on how “financial 
circuits” (i.e., the rise of financialization processes) shape the corporate strategies of 
crucial producers of the built environment, i.e., commercial real estate developers. 
Focusing on a Dutch and Belgian commercial developer shows that they have 
experienced similar trends observed in many other Western cities such as regular 
economic and building cycles (Leitner, 1994) leading to over-building (Weber, 2015), 
the internationalization of clients both tenants and investors (Magalhaes, 2001; 
Moulaert et al., 2001), the professionalization of the real estate sector (Bitterer and 
Heeg, 2012), rise of market oriented banking (Chang and Jones, 2013) and local 
governments adopting market oriented policy instruments or financialization tools 
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(Kirkpatrick, 2016). As such, this chapter builds on previous work, especially Chapter 
4 of this dissertation, that demonstrates how, despite experiencing these similar trends, 
within the sector of real estate development, Dutch developers opened up to a great 
extent for financialization processes while in Belgium persistent barriers existed in the 
form of patient capital primarily multi-generational wealth looking for sustainable 
growth through equity holdings (see also van Loon, 2017; van Loon and de Graaf, 
2015). Investigating how two commercial real estate developers—that experienced 
similar market trends but had different mixtures of patient and impatient capital 
providers—formulated different corporate strategies (understood as the “overall plan” 
of a corporation (Porter, 1989, p. 234)) creates a more detailed understanding of the 
geographical variegation of financialization processes related to real estate. 
Through investigating changes in corporate strategies and their financial and 
spatial manifestation this chapter aims to show in more detail how financialization took 
place within the typical Dutch commercial real estate developer TCN. Rudy Stroink, 
the owner of TCN rigidly implemented an opportunistic corporate strategy of rapid 
corporate value growth based on leverage. As such, the typical case of TCN illustrates 
that the financialization of a non-financial corporation (hereafter NFC) not necessarily 
relates to financial actors taking over, entrepreneurs internalizing financial 
metrics/financial asset management or financial shareholders pushing for short-
termism as dominant explanations suggest (cf. Aglietta, 2000; Pike and Pollard, 2009; 
Froud et al., 2014; Kaika and Ruggiero, 2016). Instead, the case of TCN illustrates how 
abundant capital of which the owners did not pose critical questions over its use set in 
motion the opportunistic use of a myriad of financialization tools making finance 
dominant.  
The Belgian case investigates how patient capital influences a specific 
corporate strategy. Chapter 4 focuses on the reproduction of multi-generational wealth 
as a form of patient capital: the most patient form of capital provision (Deeg and Hardie, 
2016). This chapter adopts a broader perspective by looking at patient capital as a 
continuum of equity and debt providers. In this respect, the most patient providers—
such as passive funds and relationship banks—have a long-term perspective that 
usually also includes the fulfilment of non-financial benefits (Colli, 2013; Lehrer and 
Schmid, 2015; Chrisman et al., 2011). In the typical Belgian commercial real estate 
developer Immobel, patient capital exists through powerful, concessive blockholders 
(Generale Maatschappij; Suez/Group de Waele; Eastbridge; Galle). The case of 
Immobel shows how a substantial level of patient capital did not prevent the adoption 
of financialization tools. However, once this accumulation of financialization tools was 
deemed problematic by 2001 concessive patient capital providers started a process of 
‘de-financialization’ clearing Immobel’s balance sheet from financialization tools and 
refocusing its strategy on the regular production process, i.e., real estate development. 
Therefore, this chapter takes the work of Deeg and Hardie (2016) a step further 
through empirically investigating how different mixtures of patient and impatient capital 
provision set in motion different corporate strategies. It illustrates how the mixture of 
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capital providers changes over time and how different providers can become dominant 
thus strongly influencing a corporation’s strategy. This chapter starts out with a brief 
discussion on the similar trends commercial developers in the Low Countries 
encountered. Section 5.2.2 subsequently discusses financialization processes at the 
level of the non-financial corporation and how patient capital can form a barrier allowing 
to present research methods in Section 5.2.3 The case studies of Immobel and TCN 
in sections 5.3 and 5.4 show these commercial real estate developers respectively de-
financialized and fully financialized. Section 5.5 subsequently analyses the role of 
different mixtures of patient and impatient capital led on Immobel’s and TCN’s 
corporate strategies. Section 5.6, finally, reflects on how the cases create a better 
understanding of both political economies and how processes of financialization relate 
to the continuum of patient/impatient capital. 
 
5.2. Studying commercial real estate developers 
This section first discusses some general trends related to commercial real estate 
practices that show remarkable similarities in the Low Countries. Section 5.2.2 
subsequently presents a further conceptualization on how financialization processes 
interact with differing degrees of patience of the capital provision towards NFCs. 
Section 5.2.3 discusses the methods used to develop a more in-depth understanding 
on how different forms of capital provision have influenced the corporate strategies of 
Immobel and TCN differently. 
5.2.1 Common trends in commercial real estate, different corporate histories 
Previous studies show some significant commonalities in the recent history of 
commercial real estate development in the Low Countries (Van Loon, 2017 Chapter 
4). Since the late 1980s clients of developers, both investors and tenants, 
internationalized and the real estate sector itself professionalized and internationalized 
accordingly. This is exemplified through the entrance of foreign 
consultancies/intermediaries, adoption of international real estate standards and 
origination of knowledge institutes and think thanks. However, this process of 
professionalization was more pronounced in the Netherlands which is labelled by JLL 
as ‘highly transparent’ while Belgium is labelled as ‘transparent’ (JLL, 2016; Taşan-
Kok, 2010). Moreover, the shift towards a service and consumption led economy 
increased demand for commercial real estate strongly (Beule, 2010; Martens, 2009; 
Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016; Moulaert et al., 2001). However, stimulated by (foreign) 
investors eager to buy investment properties, both countries experienced intense 
periods of over-building in the years before the bust of the Dotcom-bubble (2001) and 
credit crunch (2008) (see Figure 5.1). As a result, by 2014 in the Netherlands on 
average 17,5% of all office space was vacant and in more peripheral Belgian areas 
20%, but, also rent-levels have, since 2001, not increased in many areas (JLL, 2015, 
p. 6; ASRE and PBL, 2013, p. 47). However, whereas the credit crunch caused a 
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standstill of commercial real estate development in the Netherlands, production in 
Belgium only moderately decreased (see Figure 5.1). 
In the Netherlands over-building was not only combined with a sizeable in- and 
outflow of debt (see Figure 5.1), it was also combined with an entrepreneurial turn in 
urban governance in which municipalities adopted aggressive pro-growth planning 
policies to profit—through municipal land banking—from increasing real estate prices 
(Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). Flemish municipalities 
also adopted more market oriented policy instruments to steer urban development (i.e., 
municipal real estate corporations, PPPs), but, municipal investments into real estate 
projects and land remained relatively small compared to the Netherlands (Taşan-Kok, 
2010 chapter 6). Nevertheless, this shift in urban governance has increased the 
possibilities for commercial real estate developers and in Belgium many commercial 
developers shifted to residential projects often through PPPs once the (Brussels) office 
market showed signs of saturation, or internationalized (primarily to Luxembourg and 
some Eastern European countries).  
Crucially, in both countries banks adopted more market oriented business 
models shifting the focus from interest margins and long-term relationships with 
borrowers and depositors towards fees, commissions, investment banking and 
activities on global financial markets leading to domestic consolidation and rapid 
expansion (Chang and Jones, 2013). Accordingly, by the 2000s, the three largest 
Dutch banks owned commercial developers and provided equity-loans to developers 
whereby the banks thus participated in development projects. In general, loan 
provision was relaxed enabling developers not only to work with high leverage ratios 
but also to expand through acquisitions and land purchases (abroad). However, as 
(project)loans had short durations corporate strategies focused on short-term 
profitability whereby pro-growth Dutch municipalities were willing to speed up planning 
processes and increase the profitability of development projects. As a consequence, 
the willingness of real estate actors to take up impatient capital in the form of both debt 
and equity from large, internationalizing Dutch banks tied the Dutch real estate market 
to developments on global financial markets (see Chapter 4). Hence, once global 
finance halted financialized capital stopped flowing around removing the crucial 
conditions to realise development projects resulting in many bankruptcies.  
Belgian developers, in contrast, grew relatively steadily based on corporate 
strategies seeking to reproduce (often familial) investment capital in a stable manner. 
This form of patient capital put emphasis on non-financial considerations such as pride, 
identification and commitment and reputation (Lehrer and Celo, 2016; Colli, 2013), but 
it also relates to a longer term perspective on profitability putting stable dividend pay 
outs and risk management central. This enables strategies whereby land is bought 
cheaply, e.g., after a bust, and developed properties sold dearly during the next boom, 
but also practical considerations around costs: e.g., to save on costs many commercial 
developers house construction firms and have preferred partnerships. Partnerships are 
also common in larger development projects to share risks, but familial blockholders  
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are averse for obtaining high levels of debt to spur growth or to merge as both decrease 
their control over the firm’s long-term strategy. 
Chapter 4 discusses these different trajectories for the entire development 
sector. But, a more fine grained analysis is needed to grasp how different mixtures of 
impatient and patient capital made different strategies dominant within individual 
developers. This would be in particular helpful as comparative data at the level of the 
entire sector is of poor quality hindering to show in detail how financialization processes 
can or cannot take over a corporation’s strategy. For doing so, the next section 
presents some further conceptualization of financialization processes and patient 
capital.  
 
5.2.2 Patience of capital provision and the financialization of firms 
Throughout this PhD thesis financialization is conceptualized as multi-layered and 
multi-scaled processes. At the level of the NFC in Chapter 4 financialization is defined, 
in line with (Orhangazi, 2008; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015), as “a qualitative shift 
whereby the adoption of financial logics prioritizes a focus on short-term (financial) 
profit maximization over productive investments and long-term growth” (Chapter 4). 
The financialization literature predominantly focuses on the following interrelated 
mechanisms that cause this shift within a NFC’s orientation: financial actors taking over 
through external capital provision (e.g., excessive debt production or by providing 
complex financial instruments) (Hardie and Howarth, 2013), 
entrepreneurs/corporations internalizing financial metrics, turning towards global 
capital markets (i.e., bonds), putting financial assets/instruments central or prioritizing 
capital value growth through leveraged growth and share buy-back programmes 
(Froud et al., 2006; Kaika and Ruggiero, 2016; Muellerleile, 2009; Krippner, 2005; 
Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013) or financial shareholders pushing for short-termism and 
financial alchemy (Aglietta, 2000; Allen and Pryke, 2013). Consequently, 
financialization processes are observable through the stretching/widening of a 
corporation’s balance sheet implying that the greater the amount of financial assets 
and liabilities the greater the possibilities for financialization processes to occur 
(Andersson et al., 2014; Erturk et al., 2005). 
In the past developers straightforwardly bought land/existing properties; created 
a plan; applied for re-zoning, finance and searched for tenants and after or during (re-
)development sold the property to an investor (e.g., Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975). 
However, since the late 1980s developers can increasingly adopt, besides making use 
of all the financialization tools presented directly above, some financialization tools that 
are specific to real estate. Of particular importance are, first, revaluating land from a 
cost to capital value enabling debt production (Kaika and Ruggiero, 2016) and trading 
land as a financial asset (see Chapter 3). Second, the rise of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (hereafter REITs, both for private and institutional investors, both listed and 
unlisted) transforming property investments into tradeable financial assets (Lizieri, 
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2009 Chapter 3). Third, the increased willingness of financial actors to accept land and 
real estate projects as reliable collateral for borrowing (Savini and Aalbers, 2016; 
Theurillat et al., 2016). 
Therefore, to study commercial real estate developers, the process of 
financialization of a NFC is conceptualized as the adoption of a myriad of both regular 
and real estate related financialization tools. Full financialization is observed once the 
accumulation of financialization tools becomes so prominent that finance starts to 
dominate a corporate strategy, for instance through excessively leveraging risks. This 
conceptualization acknowledges that there could be waves of ‘de’ and ‘re’ 
financialization but also that financialization relates to a continuum observable through 
the amount of financialization tools on a corporation’s balance sheet. Both for 
researchers and corporate-leaders it is hard to observe the tipping point, i.e., the 
moment finance becomes dominant, but a rapid increase of financial assets and 
liabilities on a corporate balance sheet is a proper indicator. According to this line of 
reasoning it is possible that firms fed by patient capital adopt financialization tools 
without necessarily becoming financialized.  
A number of recent contributions puts patient capital—both equity and debt 
provided by actors with a long-term perspective (Colli, 2013; Lehrer and Schmid, 2015; 
Chrisman et al., 2011)—central to the financialization debate (Deeg et al., 2016). It is 
claimed that patient capital protects firms “from obsessive concern with short-term 
market indicators” (Culpepper, 2005, p. 175) and therefore from financialization 
processes. In this line of reasoning financial capital providers can be put on a 
continuum of patience. However, Deeg and Hardie also acknowledge that for many 
NFCs the mixture of capital providers has become more diverse creating “a complex 
set of pressures on NFC management to pursue short- or long-term objectives” (Deeg 
and Hardie, 2016, p. 1478). Whereas Deeg and Hardie push for a broad, conceptual 
framework discussing the “potential influence of capital”  this chapter tries to 1) unravel 
the mixture of various impatient and patient capital providers within two NFCs and 2) 
how these different mixtures make different strategies dominant within NFCs located 
in two different countries that, despite experiencing similar trends sought different 
solutions (i.e., de-financialization in the case of Immobel and financialization in the 
case of TCN). Before discussing these cases separately, the next section discusses 
the methods and data used in this chapter.  
 
 
5.2.3 Methods 
To better understand how a Dutch developer financialized and how a Belgian 
developer’s patient capital prevented full financialization TCN and Immobel have been 
selected as “typical cases” (Gerring, 2007). The cases are typical as they reflect sector-
wide dominant domestic trends and comparable in the way that they have experienced 
similar trends (discussed in Section 5.2.1).  
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Chapter 4 (Table 4.4) shows that the dominant types of developers between 
2001—2014 were construction firms, developers owned by financial actors (primarily 
banks) and independent developers. TCN belongs to the last category and shares 
many characteristics with other large Dutch developers of commercial real estate in all 
categories (e.g., Multi, IMCA, BAM, MAB, Lips Capital, Eurocommerce, ING RED) 
such as independently operating CEO’s, rapid (international) expansion, origination in 
the late 1980s/early 1990s, use of high loan-to-values and short-term project finance. 
Also, the dominant trend followed by Dutch developers (including residential) was that 
debt-driven growth and complex financial instruments became central while lacking 
financial risk management combined with a belief in continuously increasing real estate 
prices creating large financial problems once real estate markets crashed (Chapter 4). 
TCN differed from many other Dutch developers of commercial real estate as it had an 
open organization structure, diverse projects, and was one of the few Dutch promoters 
of a “evolution within the real estate industry towards maximum transparency“ (TCN, 
2006, p. 65). The latter is relevant as TCN’s Annual Reports combined with bankruptcy 
reports (van der Schee and Westerhof, 2012), TCN’s website (www.tcnpp.com), media 
reports and an interview with its  former owner, Rudy Stroink, enabled to triangulate 
the data for the financial and geographical analyses presented in Section 5.4. This data 
is less accessible for other Dutch developers. 
As will be argued below, with respect to ownership Immobel falls into the 
category of corporations and individuals usually fed by patient capital (Chapter 4; Table 
4.3). These patient developers produce the largest part of new Belgian commercial 
real estate: primarily offices in Brussels (JLL, 2015). As such, Immobel shares many 
characteristics with other Belgian commercial developers as Atenor, Allfin, and BPI 
such as stable growth and diversification both in real estate segments and new 
markets, close ties with construction firms, powerful blockholders that actively push 
CEOs to follow long-term strategies that often include non-financial considerations, 
and hesitation towards risk taking (Chapter 4). In contrast with other Belgian 
developers the French blockholder Suez (1988—2007), an utilities and engineering 
conglomerate, also employed Immobel for more strategic goals such as obtaining a 
dominant position within the Belgian utility market. Immobel is the oldest listed Belgian 
firm and has been selected as there is a wealth of financial and geographical data 
available through its annual reports.  
Around 2000, for both cases the conditions to adopt financialization tools are 
favorable. By then, Suez had just become full owner of Generale Maatschappij 
(Société Générale, hereafter GM) and thus the main blockholder in Immobel and 
decided to sell its full stake. Consequently, financialization tools could, according to 
the financialization literature, be extremely usefull to increase short-term shareholder’s 
value enabling to sell Suez’s share in Immobel at a higher price. Around 2000, TCN 
had gathered a substantial amount of properties and projects that it can leverage to re-
inforce its original growth strategy aiming to increase corporate value to €1 billion and 
cash in through an Initial Public Offering. Consequently, the financial analyses start in 
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1999. Due to data availability, the geographical analyses take 2001 (Immobel) and 
2003 (TCN) as starting point. 
The aim is to investigate how different mixtures of capital providers influence 
corporate strategies (not) setting in motion (full) financialization. The main data to trace 
the strategies formulated in the corporations’ annual reports exists of financial and 
geographical data that allows to show the corporation’s financial and geographical 
footprint. This data, from TCN’s and Immobel’s annual reports, is enriched by reports 
especially from the financial newspapers and a couple of interviews with key actors5. 
The financial data presented in Figures 5.3 to 5.5 shows the net result, 
growth/decline and in particular debt levels of both corporations for the period under 
study. As both firms use comparable accounting techniques the data can be displayed 
in one figure and compared. Unfortunately, annual reports for TCN before 2002 are 
not available, however, the assets and liabilities were much lower (interview, media 
reports). 
The maps presented in Figures 5.2, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 give a comparative 
overview of the international expansion of both corporations by displaying the size (i.e., 
the larger the circle the more (potential) square meters in a city) and type (i.e., pre-
development, development, asset, sold property) of their projects. The earliest data for 
TCN is from 2003 and the latest from 2011, the year of its bankruptcy. As TCN did not 
give detailed overviews of its projects the maps are partly based on the bankruptcy 
reports, on information from TCN’s website (www.tcnpp.com), and information from 
annual reports. Approximately 10% of the data is based on estimations and the maps 
give a good indication of the size and spatial distribution of TCN’s projects. As the 
recent history of Immobel is too important to neglect it has been chosen to show a map 
with the most recent data, 2015. Also, as Immobel’s annual reports cover detailed 
descriptions of all its projects this data is a pretty accurate representation of them.  
After investigating the cases through the financial and geographical dimensions of 
their corporate histories, Section 5.5 analyses, based on a heuristic device proposed 
by Deeg and Hardie (2016), the degree of patience of the capital provision towards 
TCN and Immobel during the research period. Their approach is based on a set of 
three questions that should be posed ex ante, i.e., at the moment the decision to 
provide capital is made: 
(1) Is the investment (loan) intended to be for a short or long period of time?  
(2) Is the investor engaged with management in pursuit of short-term share price 
performance or creditworthiness? 
(3) What is the likelihood of the long-term investor/ lender that does not engage in 
pursuit of short-term performance then exiting because of concerns regarding short-
term performance? (Deeg and Hardie, 2016, pp. 631–632) 
                                            
5 As the annual reports are the main source of sections 5.4 and 5.5 there are only references made 
to these reports when a direct quote is used. The section on Immobel is also based on its 150 year 
jubilee book (Immobel, 2013) 
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 If the answers on the first two questions are respectively long and yes the third 
question estimates the degree of patience. Estimating the likelihood on high, medium, 
unlikely or almost results into scores of respectively low, medium, high, or very high 
patience. Unfortunately, as Deeg and Hardie focus on explaining the behaviour of 
collective groups of capital providers they do not deliver clear guidelines on how to 
estimate this likelihood ex ante at the level of an individual firm. At most, the authors 
put forward that conscience loyalty, i.e., a capital provider that is aware of poor-short 
term performance and not restricted in retaining the capital provided but still remains 
loyal in line with its long-term goals, should be leading in this estimation. Deeg and 
Hardie also discuss a wide variety of different capital providers and their “potential- and 
propensity- for PC [patient capital] provision” (2016, p.637). 
  However, the approach of Deeg and Hardie is not designed for small, historical 
N-studies. In case studies there is much ex post, i.e., after the initial investment 
decision has been made, data available that helps to better estimate the patience of 
capital provision towards TCN and Immobel. In other words, more information is 
available to analyze the behaviour of capital providers over a longer period enabling a 
better estimation of their degree of patience. Therefore, Section 5.5 combines the 
heuristic device, i.e., the three questions above, with ex post data and Deeg and 
Hardie’s s typology of capital providers. 
Also, Deeg and Hardie only offer an hypothesis on the “potential influence of 
capital” on corporate strategies, namely, the higher the degree of patience the more 
long-term and considered about non-financial aims the corporate strategy. To 
investigate this “potential influence” the subsequent two sections offer in-depth case 
studies on Immobel’s and TCN’s recent history to signal changes in their corporate 
strategies and the possible influence of the degree of patience of capital providers on 
these changes. 
 
5.3 Immobel 
Immobel, established in 1863, is the oldest listed Belgian corporation. In 1867 
Generale Maatschappij (Société Générale, hereafter GM) became the main 
shareholder. GM was the royal investment corporation with close corporate and 
political connections and as an active investor in many Belgian corporations a crucial 
actor in the Belgian political economy (Oosterlynck, 2007; Cottenier et al., 1989; Wee 
and Verbreyt, 1997). After the Second World War Immobel became a key player 
facilitating the large-scale suburbanization of Belgium especially through active land 
banking, but, the core of its activities has been office development in Brussels. By the 
late 1980s GM still has a large portfolio of Belgian and international investments but 
has become a passive investor, and, after a highly political intervention the French 
energy-corporation Suez acquired almost 60% of its shares in 1988 and became full 
owner of GM in 1999 (Oosterlynck, 2007; Cottenier et al., 1989; Wee and Verbreyt, 
1997).  
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In the 1990s GM/Suez’s used its 30% stake in Immobel to strengthen its position 
on the Belgian utilities market especially as privileged partner of municipalities and 
inter-municipal organisations through development projects (De Tijd, 1994a). But, as 
the gap between development projects and investment properties and total assets in 
Figure 5.3 suggests, Immobel was at the start of this research period in 1999 more 
than a developer. In line with GM’s role as investor, Immobel had been used as 
platform to invest in real estate whereby internationalization was sought to offer 
protection for downturns of the Brussels office market (De Tijd, 1994b). As a result, 
Immobel’s financial balance sheet was extended including investment properties (e.g., 
partly owner of office buildings in Montreal and Berlin, see Figure 5.2) and financial 
assets that were used strategically. For instance, to wait on the right time to buy land 
for new projects. But, also to invest in real estate for instance through a large stake in 
the listed REIT Wereldhave and through creating the listed REIT Cibix to open up 
Immobel’s investment portfolio for other investors. The latter can be seen as a, in the 
1990s, rather innovative ‘financialization of real estate tool’ as it opens up commercial 
real estate investing for individual households (Lizieri, 2009; cf. Gotham, 2006). In 
other words, although steered by patient capital (i.e., Suez, see Section 5.5) Immobel 
was at the forefront of financial innovation and real estate. Also, Immobel owned a 
couple of medium-sized construction firms that were especially interesting for Suez as 
a bridge towards its engineering/service activities. At the liabilities side Immobel used 
considerable layers of debt including more complex products. As such, although its 
shareholder’s equity remained stable the stretched balance sheet created high finance 
costs and unstable dividend pay outs (that stopped between 1995-1997). 
Shortly after Suez had become full owner of GM it decided that Immobel’s 
expanded real estate activities were not part of Suez’s core business anymore. 
However, with an unfavourable climate on the stock exchange and Immobel being a 
small entity within Suez’s conglomerate it “waited for the best opportunity to sell” 
(Delicour in De Tijd, 2007, p. 0). However, with high finance costs and an unclear 
corporate profile Suez developed with investment bank Petercam a new long-term 
strategy in 2001: to reduce debt and sell participations in other (construction)firms, 
investment properties and REITs enabling to solely concentrate on “the core business 
of real estate development” (Immobel, 2002, p. 4). Accordingly, as Figure 5.2 
illustrates, already in 2001 many assets/completed projects in Brussels were sold and 
new projects (i.e., pre-developments/developments) were predominantly concentrated 
in Brussels (149.000 m2), but, also in Liege (22.000 m2), Luxembourg (11.500 m2), 
Charleroi (6.000 m2) and Mons (5.000 m2). Selling assets indeed decreased 
investment properties from 22% (average 1992—2000) to 13% (average 2001—2007) 
and development projects increased from 40% to 52%, and liabilities were reduced 
strongly while shareholder’s equity remained stable (see Figure 5.4). 
Booming real estate investors markets combined with this reduction of the 
balance sheet through selling financial assets and debt-reduction created the highest 
net result in this period (Figure 5.5). But, Suez’s stake in Immobel is marginal  
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Figure 5.3 Important and total assets of TCN and Immobel  (in mln Euro) 
 
Sources: Annual Reports TCN and Immobel 
 
compared to Suez’s other activities (i.e., €47.8 million versus a profit of €3.6 billion) 
and a lawsuit announced in 2007 in which Immobel’s CEO Jean Thomas is accused 
of fraud stimulates Suez to sell its shares directly and for a relatively low price (De Tijd, 
2007). 
In 2007 JER Partners, a British real estate investment manager, added the 30% 
stake in Immobel to its new JER Europe Fund III that contained €809 million in  
European real estate investments replacing almost the entire board (De Tijd, 2008). 
Suez’s strategy concentrating on real estate development was further specified namely 
by focusing on larger, “ ‘flagship’ office and residential development-projects in 
Belgium and Luxembourg, usually in partnership” (Immobel, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, 
debt and also management-costs were further reduced (see Figure 5.4 Luysterman, 
2010). Also, the considerable residential land-banking activities—the legacy of 
Immobel’s leading role in Belgian suburbanization—were maintained as they provided 
a stable cash flow. This allowed to cover costs as income generated through office 
development was more volatile as it depended upon the lease and sale of several large 
properties (De Rijcke, 2009). The small gap between the grey dotted and straight line 
on Figure 5.3 illustrates that from 2008 onwards development activities became the 
main core activity of Immobel. Moreover, the diverse development-portfolio is used to  
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Figure 5.4 Various liabilities and total liabilities of TCN and Immobel (in mln Euro) 
 
Sources: Annual Reports TCN and Immobel 
analyse “new opportunities without haste and maintaining rigorous investment criteria” 
(Immobel, 2010, p. 3). However, through a strong increase in its share price Immobel 
has been one of the few successful investments of JER Partners: losses on other, 
often highly leveraged real estate investments, forced them after the credit crunch to 
sell their stake in Immobel (Luysterman, 2010b). 
In 2010, Eastbridge, the investment corporation of the Belgian/Israeli family 
Bruckner that has a portfolio containing a wide range of activities including 
considerable activities on East European real estate markets, became Immobel’s new 
blockholder through buying 25% of the shares directly from JER Partners and the 
possibility to buy another 4,9% late 2013 through a put and call option (Eastbridge, 
2016; JER Partners, 2010). Eastbridge immediately made Poland the second key 
market for Immobel. Polish cities were seen as attractive because there was a shortage 
in high quality office space and residential towers and there were also other Belgian 
real estate corporations present smoothening cooperation in larger projects. To finance 
this expansion bond programmes were set up in 2011 and 2013 and Immobel bought 
two large Polish development-projects for €100 million from Eastbridge itself 
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(Luysterman, 2011). Consequently, and as Figures 5.3 and 5.4 suggest, this growth 
strategy spurred the development activities of Immobel but was facilitated by strongly 
increasing debt levels.   
When the paterfamilias, Ronny Bruckner, unexpectedly died the Bruckner family 
decided to sell its position in Immobel. After five months of tough negotiations the family 
opted for Marnix Galle, the owner of Allfin, that had become an important competitor 
but was unsuccessful in international expansion (cf. van Loon, 2017). In 2016 Allfin 
became the majority shareholder though buying another 29% of the shares merging 
Allfin and Immobel into the largest Belgian real estate developer. Among other things, 
this merger creates more diversification as Allfin adds many residential projects and 
further reduces debt as Allfin has very low debt levels (KBC Securities, 2016). As Galle 
is in strong favour of family businesses implementing similar aims as enduring 
relationships with employers and hopes that one of his children will replace him in the 
future it could be that Allfin/Immobel has opened a new phase in the rich history of 
familial Belgian developers (van Loon, 2017; Brockmans, 2012; Luysterman, 2014).  
 
Figure 5.5 Net result Immobel and TCN (in mln Euro) 
 
Sources: Annual Reports TCN and Immobel 
 
As Galle primarily bought Immobel to grow and diversify (to Luxembourg and Poland) 
Immobel’s main strategy of being a leading developer in large, complex urban projects 
while managing risks responsibly did not change (see Figure 5.6). 
In conclusion, despite different blockholders, the main strategy developed in 
2001 has only received minor adjustments through new geographical foci. 
Nonetheless, comparing Figure 5.5 with Figure 5.1 points out that Immobel’s results  
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remained still very much in line with activity on the Brussels office market. And, as 
Section 5.5 will show, through the reduction of financialization tools Immobel’s balance 
sheet has become much smaller.  
 
5.4 TCN 
A real estate corporation is like a shark, if you don’t move you lack oxygen so you 
got to get new projects. (Gualtherie van Weezel, 2012) 
 
This section illustrates how TCN adopted from its start in 1994 an opportunistic strategy 
that was aimed at creating high shareholder value through debt driven growth. In the 
1980s Rudy Stroink worked as a real estate developer with Oas Investors in Los 
Angeles. In 1994 he started the real estate developer TCN together with the Crow 
family from Dallas that functioned as a proto-type of angel investor sharing their 
expertise and networks aiming to conquer the Dutch real estate market through 
American practices. The main strategy was straightforward: reinvest profits instead of 
paying out dividends to create a corporate value of €1 billion and monetize through an 
Initial Public Offering. A crucial tactic for doing so was to focus on (re-)developing 
existing properties and retain 80% ownership of completed developments to show 
commitment and profit from rising property prices. This also enabled to offer additional 
services to tenants such as cleaning, catering, events, parking and security. Some of 
these services were loss generating. But, the stable cash-flow these services and 
rental income provided combined with the collateral potential created an attractive 
proposition for banks enabling TCN to borrow at favourable conditions. Especially from 
1998 onwards TCN expanded rapidly with innovative real estate projects such as trade 
marts and convention centres.  
Rudy Stroink had a good sense for opportunities that arose around privatisations 
during the 1990s and state agencies that started to act more entrepreneurially adopting 
a bright perspective on the future: 
 Everybody created new plans for large real estate projects, but, nobody calculated 
the demand for all these square meters …, but, once you made that calculation it 
was clear, it could not happen, it could not happen everywhere. (Interview) 
Stroink found many ways to profit from over-optimism and entrepreneurial (semi)state 
agencies. Explanatory, and determining TCN’s future, was the purchase of the large 
(re-)development project Media Park in Hilversum from the semi-public Dutch 
Broadcasting Company (NOB, Nederlands Omroepproduktie Bedrijf) that was in 
financial difficulties in 2002. TCN convinced NOB through proposing to offer many 
additional services to the tenants and by presenting a more realistic estimation for 
future property developments. TCN paid €110 million while existing tenants already 
produced a cash flow of €12 million annually (FD, 2003). TCN now had sizeable assets 
to leverage and—as an expanding organization with 169 employers—implemented an 
organizational structure in which managers operated in great autonomy and were 
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remunerated partly in TCN-shares (Tegenlicht, 2009). The developer formulated a 
“growth strategy to acquire and reposition large projects formerly owned by public 
agencies” (TCN, 2004, p. 3) resulting in the purchase of Kema Business Park in 
Arnhem from a state energy firm (€100 million in 2004), and offices/business parks 
from the municipality of Groningen (€114 million in 2005).  
With these acquisitions and the trade mart activities Figure 5.7 suggests that 
TCN’s portfolio started to cover extensive parts of the Netherlands and expanded 
strongly between 2002 and 2007 (see Figure 5.4). Crucial to finance this growth was 
getting debt—especially mortgages (Figure 5.4)—that increased from €97 million in 
2002 to €518 million in 2007. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate TCN’s expansion both 
geographically, but, also through a diversification of projects. The category “other” 
(Figure 5.8) included in 2011 projects in education, residential care, data hotels etc. 
When the Crow family decided that the corporate strategy of TCN had become too 
risky the new blockholder, NPM (part of the familial holding of van Vlissingen), raised 
the bar aiming to grow towards a project-portfolio of €5 billion in five years in particular 
through international expansion: business-to-business trade malls/conference centres 
in Germany and Austria, retail-malls in Spain and Portugal, and in the United Kingdom 
through the acquisition of the developer Express Park. Accordingly, TCN’s strategy 
became increasingly riskier. 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 also visualize the core of TCN’s strategy: projects were only 
partly sold and therefore many projects launched in 2003 are by 2011 still on TCN’s 
balance sheet now often as completed properties: between 2002 and 2012 TCN only 
sold about 30% of all completed projects. Important assets, such as Mediapark in 
Hilversum and trade marts through the country were even extended explaining their 
rise in (potential) square meters between 2003 and 2011.  
Nevertheless TCN’s strategy was fragile as the net result from the €700 million 
of real estate (development) projects delivered in 2007 a net result of only €13.6 million 
(see Figures 5.3 and 5.5): as “all my money went to the services we offered and the 
interest and debt repayments” (Interview). Therefore, it remained crucial to sell 20% of 
every developed property making TCN’s financial health very dependent on increasing 
real estate prices. Although, there was some diversification in real estate segments 
and countries, from 2008 in the most important countries values started to decrease in 
all segments. Moreover, not only did Dutch banks (especially TCN’s main financier, 
SNS Property Finance) experience heavy losses and stopped (re-)financing 
commercial real estate projects and loans. But, also activity on real estate investment 
markets halted. Consequently, projects stagnated and TCN’s pipeline is devalued with 
€600 million to €1.3 billion in 2008. But, also disinvestments halved to 10% requiring 
“the shift from value creation, which has been the main focus of TCN over the last 15 
years, to the protection and the sustainability of the projects in portfolio and intensifying 
the relationship with our customers” (TCN, 2009, p. 4). But, also through reducing costs 
through firing employees.  
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Nonetheless, TCN experienced major losses in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 5.5) making it 
impossible to repay its full obligations to creditors of outstanding debt of €473 million 
(Figure 5.4) by 2010. Moreover, due to the collapse of real estate prices, the collateral 
for this debt, i.e., the book value of properties and development projects, had become 
lower than the outstanding loans. As the major creditors hesitated to become owners 
of (undeveloped) commercial real estate an agreement was made whereby 
repayments on loans were halted until April 2013 creating time to solve TCN’s 
problems. Confident with this solution Rudy Stroink stepped down as CEO but retained 
his roughly half of the shares. 
In November 2012 a private real estate fund won a law suit against TCN’s 
Brandboxx entity in Almere. Brandboxx had to pay a tenant-guarantee of a couple of 
million euro, but was unable to do so resulting into a bankruptcy. As Brandboxx was 
closely interwoven with other entities of TCN this caused the bankruptcy of 45 other 
entities within three months including the bankruptcy of TCN’s mother firm, TCN 
UROP. This was the largest bankruptcy of a Dutch developer ever and about €70 
million of the outstanding debt will probably never be repaid. The mother firm (SNS  
bank) of the largest creditor, SNS Property Finance with €186 million, was nationalized 
in 2013 as the result of bad-performing loans to developers. And, in 2016 the state sold 
SNS’ loan/property portfolio to Lone Star.  
In conclusion, as other capital providers did not temper the growth ambitions of 
TCN’s founder and major shareholder Rudy Stroink, fuelling his growth ambitions 
started to demand the continuous influx of new impatient capital in the form of debt and 
increasing real estate prices to pay back this debt. Basically, this business model relied 
on “speculative finance” in which “the income of the debtor is large enough to meet the 
interest but not the principle payments” (Minsky, 1991, p. 14). After 2007, when 
decreasing real estate prices hit TCN’s income, the model evolved into “Ponzi finance” 
whereby “not enough is earned to meet the interest due on debts” (Minsky, 1991, p. 
14). Consequently, TCN’s results displayed in Figure 5.5 became very volatile and its 
bankruptcy contributed to the massive real estate problems of Dutch banks. 
5.5 The patience of Immobel’s and TCN’s capital providers  
Based on the approach of Deeg and Hardie discussed in Section 5.2.3, Table 5.1 
provides an indication for the degree of patience for both equity and debt providers of 
Immobel and TCN. Table 5.1 shows that the blockholders in both corporations should 
be categorized as primarily patient. However, while Immobel was fed by patient debt 
provided by relationship banks TCN relied on impatient debt providers including 
American Private Equity. Capital provision to both firms is discussed in more detail 
below.  
Immobel, equity: in the research period 47—65% of Immobel’s internal capital 
consisted of free-float shares, less than 5% was owned by various minority 
shareholders (investment funds of Fidea, Capfi Delen and KBC), and between 1991 
and 2005 10—15% of the shares was held by the family holding Group de Waele.  
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Crucially, (except in 2016) roughly 30% of the shares in Immobel was owned by 
concessive blockholders: Suez; JER Europe III; Eastbridge; Allfin/Marnix Galle. 
Section 5.3 shows that as these blockholders delivered the key board members and 
their decisions were not successfully contested, these blockholders were the primary 
actors deciding on Immobel’s long-term strategy. As summarized in Table 5.1 all 
blockholders intended to hold their stake in Immobel for a “multiyear” period (question  
1 discussed in section 5.2.3) (Deeg and Hardie, 2016). Also, all blockholders were 
actively engaged through delivering important actors for the board of directors/CEO 
whereby Suez, Group de Waele and Galle did not prioritize short-term objectives 
making their level of patience (very) high (questions 2 and 3 discussed in section 
5.2.3).  
For both JER and Eastbridge the degree of patience is more difficult to estimate. 
According to Deeg and Hardie’s (2016, p. 9) continuum of investor patience JER, as 
an active fund, should be between low and medium patience and Eastbridge between 
high and very high patience. The three questions help to make the more specific 
estimation presented in Table 5.1. For both capital providers the main purpose of 
buying the 30% stock—that was in itself a long, time-consuming procedure as it 
required negotiations with the former blockholder—was a long-term goal (1) (see Table 
5.1). Whereas JER did push for measurements to increase short-term performance, 
especially through cost-reduction by lowering management costs and policies to 
increase dividend pay outs, Eastbridge mostly pushed for measurements to expand in 
Eastern Europe real estate markets such as a bond programme financing this growth 
(2). Also, JER EU Fund III and Eastbridge exited relatively rapidly. However, their main 
reason related to external events instead of concerns about short-term performance 
(3): respectively the need for cash to compensate for loss generating investments 
elsewhere and the unexpected death of the paterfamilias.  
Immobel, debt: as shown on Figure 5.4, at the firm level Immobel has, in 
particular in comparison with TCN, relatively low levels of debt (striped grey line) and 
high levels of shareholder’s equity (dotted grey line). In its annual reports Immobel 
does not specify from which credit institutions it obtains financial debt. The header 
“financial services” that most likely includes credit provision shows that during the 
entire research period, KBC Bank, Banque Degroof, BNP Paribas Fortis and ING 
Belgique are the main financial service providers suggesting enduring relationships 
between credit providers and Immobel. This endurance is shown by the fact that, 
despite two real estate crises causing low net results, Immobel was able to obtain 
continuous new credit (2). This seems to be in line with the proto-type of relational 
banking whereby banks don’t base their decision solely on short term performance and 
creditworthiness (3). 
Compared to the credit provided by financial institutions that has a maturation 
of on average roughly two years, Immobel’s three bond programs have a duration of 
five or six years and are held to maturity. As such, these medium-term bonds “differ  
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Table 5.1 The degree of patience of the main equity and debt providers 
debt providers 
period debt providers patient capital   
Immobel, 
1999-2006 
KBC; Degroof; Fortis; 
ING (100%) high   
Immobel, 
2007-2009 
KBC; Degroof; Fortis; 
ING (100%) high   
Immobel, 
2010-2013 
KBC; Degroof; BNP 
Paribas Fortis; 
ING(60%); long-term 
bonds (40%) high; high   
Immobel, 
2014-now 
KBC; Degroof; BNP 
ParibasFortis; ING 
(50%); long-term 
bonds (50%) high; high   
TCN, 1994-
2005 
Dutch banks; 
American PE low   
TCN, 2005-
2012 
Dutch banks; 
American PE low   
 equity-providers 
period block-holders patient capital reason to invest 
Immobel, 
1999-2006 
Suez (30%); de Wael 
(10-15%) high; high 
to dominate Belgian utilities market/part of 
investment portfolio; merger of developers 
Immobel, 
2007-2009 JER EU III (30%) medium 
creating diverse European real estate 
investment portfolio of 809 million 
Immobel, 
2010-2013 Eastbridge (25-30%) high 
expanding a large, diverse familial  
investment portfolio that included real 
estate activities in Eastern Europe 
Immobel, 
2014-
present 
Galle (30%, 58,8% 
since 2016) very high to grow 'multi-generational wealth' 
TCN, 1994-
2004 
Stroink (50-65%); 
Crow (25-50%)  high/very high 
prospect of high future shareholdervalue; 
introduce American RED in NL/expanding a 
large familial real estate activities portfolio  
TCN, 2005-
2012 Stroink (55%) high 
prospect of high shareholdervalue in 
nearby future; expanding a large, diverse 
familial  investment portfolio  
 
little from a long-term bank loan kept on the bank’s books” (Deeg and Hardie, 2016, p. 
1481) and are therefore looked at as patient capital.  
TCN, equity: in the entire research period one of the originators of TCN, Rudy 
Stroink, held 50—65% of the shares. Until 2004 also the other originator, the Crow 
Family from Texas, held 25—50% of the shares. During the 1990s, managers who 
gradually received shares in TCN as part of their remuneration became a minority 
shareholder with approximately 20% of the shares during the 2000s. An investment 
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entity of the Vlissingen family became another minority shareholder in 2004 (21%). As 
section 5.4 demonstrates whereas the Crow Family had considerable influence during 
the 1990s the latter two minority shareholders had no impact on TCN’s corporate 
strategy during the 2000s. 
In 1994 the Crow Family and Stroink shared the goal of bringing American 
development practices towards the Netherlands including the rapid increase of 
corporate value to €1 billion to be able to cash out through an Initial Public Offering. 
From the start, the investors knew that in real estate development this takes time, but, 
as Section 5.4 illustrates, they used all instruments available to speed up the process. 
Therefore, taking into account the particularities of the real estate development sector 
with the long duration of projects, it is difficult to label the intended investment term as 
long (1) in particular as both capital providers prioritize short-term shareholders’ value 
increase (2). Nonetheless, Section 5.4 makes clear that when in 2003 short-term 
performance was not in line with the expectations the Crow Family raised voice to 
stimulate the adoption of a more long-term, less risky approach. The main shareholder, 
Stroink, ignored this and Crow sold its stake suggesting a high commitment to long-
term goals/high level of patience (3). Also, despite valuating “the potential market 
value” (TCN, 2007, p. 15) of TCN on €2.3 billion, Stroink himself never prepared an 
Initial Public Offering. Moreover, there is no evidence that Stroink attempted to sell his 
stake in 2003 and 2007-2009 when short-term performance was poor. This indicates 
that he was also focused on long-term performance (2,3). In conclusion, the observed 
behaviour of the Crow Family and Stroink indicate a considerable level of patience (see 
Table 5.1). 
TCN, debt: TCN’s annual reports do not identify its debtors. Additional data 
(interview, media-reports, website) indicate that for new projects TCN mostly used 
equity-loans in which—primarily the main Dutch banks and various Anglo-American 
private equity firms—both financed a project (usually against a high loan-to-value) and 
got equity into the project. After completion these loans were usually transferred into a 
mortgage of relative short duration. As such, TCN had a continuous changing group of 
debt-providers and for every new project TCN’s creditworthiness was evaluated (2). 
As such, and as shown from 2008 to 2010, a negative perspective on TCN’s 
creditworthiness (i.e., a perceived poor short-term performance) would mean that this 
group of debt providers collectively would stop extracting new loans making them thus 
impatient capital providers (3). 
As shown on Figure 5.4, at the firm level TCN’s shareholders’ equity (dotted 
black line) has been a small element of the total liabilities (straight black line); 
financialized capital provided (striped black lines) by impatient banks and Anglo-
American private equity investors have been crucial in facilitating TCN’s rapid growth. 
As such, once real estate markets went down these impatient capital providers became 
crucial in deciding over TCN’s future.  
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5.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Table 5.2 summarizes the main findings discussed in the empirical sections above.  In 
both cases the equity providers were during the research period predominantly patient. 
In the case of Immobel, patient block holders had much power in the executive board: 
they controlled Immobel’s corporate strategy. Until 2001, operating as one of the many 
entities of Generale Maatschappij/Suez, this strategy was broad including functioning 
as investment platform and medium to improve relationships with local governments. 
As a result, the financial balance sheet included many financial assets and liabilities 
that are not directly needed for the regular production process (i.e., real estate 
development) listed under financliazation tools in Table 5.2. So, during the 1990s 
Immobel was a NFC in which patient capital was dominant but that still adopted 
financialization (of real estate) tools and financial innovation. In 2001, briefly after Suez 
fully took over GM it decided to sell Immobel. Whereas the financialization literature 
would predict the adoption of more financialization tools to increase short-term 
shareholders value Suez decided to reduce the balance sheet (i.e., de-financialization) 
and re-focus on complex real estate development projects using both a sophisticated 
risk management system and Immobel’s reputation. While since 2007 concessive 
blockholders made adjustments to the geographical focus, the core of this strategy 
remained in place. Consequently, Immobel’s financial balance sheet was reduced 
considerably. Hence, the case of Immobel shows how patient capital works as a barrier 
to the accumulation of financialization tools in a way that finance does not become 
dominant within a corporate strategy. 
Financed through impatient external capital-providers and with a main equity-
providers, Rudy Stroink, that is harder to see as ‘patient’ TCN still developed a long-
term strategy that was only changed in 2008 during a severe real estate crisis. The 
core of this strategy existed of rapid shareholder value creation whereby TCN adopted 
a wide range of financialization tools (see Table 5.2). These tools, combined with a 
bright perspective on the future, strong entrepreneurial ambitions, and debt providers 
that did not pose much restrictions on the use of their capital indeed enabled rapid 
domestic and international growth and the creation of a diverse real estate portfolio. 
But, except the Crow family, all actors involved neglected the risks related to such an 
opportunistic corporate strategy in which the CEO and higher management have much 
freedom to operate. TCN illustrates the financialization of a NFC in the sense that 
entrepreneurial ambitions were fuelled through external capital not posing critical 
questions. In other words, a visionary or short sighted (?) entrepreneur surfing the 
waves of abundant capital. Consequently, the downturn on real estate and financial 
markets from 2008 onwards made clear that the accumulation of a myriad of 
financialization tools had made finance dominant within TCN. 
As such, the case of Immobel shows, in line with Chapter 4 that patient capital 
not necessarily excludes the use of more complex financial instruments. These 
instruments were especially prevalent in the period under GM/Suez (1990s), but also 
between 2010—2013 when the Bruckner family financed expansion in Poland through  
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Table 5.2 Corporate strategies and adoption of financialization tools. 
period corporate strategy 
PC-
provision   observed financialization tools 
    equity debt   
Immobel, 
1999/2000 
diversification:  
internationalisation, 
developing, investing and 
constructing high high 
financial assets (i.e., REITs, shares);  
high debt-levels; some complex 
debt products; unstable dividend 
pay outs 
Immobel, 
2001-2006 
development of complex 
urban real estate projects in 
Belgium high high 
decrease: debt reduction; sell of 
financial assets 
Immobel, 
2007-2009 
…. in Belgium and 
Luxembourg medium high 
further decrease: educe debt; sell of 
financial assets 
Immobel, 
2010-2013 …. in Belgium and Poland high high 
incrase: bonds (2011; 2013) for for 
foreign expansion 
Immobel, 
2014-now 
…. in Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Poland high high 
decrease: Allfin's low debt further 
decreases Immobel's debt level 
TCN, 1994-
2005 
value creation through rapid 
growth and then IPO high low 
leveraging assets ; projects financed 
with high LTVs and equity-loans; 
leveraged take-overs of (foreign) 
developers 
TCN, 2005-
2012 
change in '08: protect 
portfolio, intensify relation 
with customizers high low 
leveraging assets ; projects financed 
with high LTVs and equity-loans; 
leveraged take-overs of (foreign) 
developers 
 
bond programmes. However, in contrast with TCN, financialization tools never became 
dominant in such a way that finance (i.e., financial actors, markets practices, 
measurements and/or narratives (cf. Aalbers, 2017a) became dominant within the 
corporate strategy. Put differently, although TCN and Immobel experienced similar 
waves of over-building, building cycles, economic downturns and internationalisation 
of both investors and clients, TCN fully financialized during the 2000s while Immobel 
successfully adopted a strategy of de-financialization. The case of Immobel further 
exemplifies how patient capital forms a protective layer towards financialization 
processes, and, how even in the 2000s new familial holdings originate (i.e., Marnix 
Galle). In this regard, patient capital was anchored within Immobel by the governance 
power of a blockholder as, with a 30% stake, the blockholder can control crucial 
positions within a corporation thereby being much more powerful than the other 
shareholders.    
Another crucial difference between the corporations is that TCN solely focused 
on shareholder’s value increase while for Immobel a stable dividend pay-out was the 
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primary goal. In line with the findings from Chapter 4 the business strategy of TCN 
became much more focused on fictitious capital value creation whereas the focus of 
Immobel was on the regular production process, i.e., real estate development. 
Moreover, TCN’s widely stretched financial balance sheet amplified developments 
within real estate markets magnificently and closely connected its corporate activities 
to volatility on financial markets. This was enabled by domestic banks and foreign 
private equity who provided debt without putting much restrictions on its use.  
Therefore, a financialized real estate development corporation operating in 
financialized real estate markets is heavily dependent on “fictitious capital formation” 
(AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016). This requires a continuous influx of new debt to keep 
real estate prices rising and to facilitate the growth of the NFC’s production 
process/development activities (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012; Nesvetailova and 
Palan, 2013). However, as debt provision has the tendency towards first “speculative 
and then “Ponzi” types of finance such a model proves to be unsustainable once a 
“Minsky-moment” turns attention to the fictitiousness character of real estate and 
corporate values (Minsky, 1991; Jessop, 2015). As a result, a financialized corporate 
strategy makes a corporation heavily dependent on financial markets to the extent that 
a corporation’s results, especially when it operates in a capital intensive sector, starts 
to reflect booms and busts on financial markets. 
The domestic banks with whom Immobel had a long-term, stable relationship, 
in contrast, did pose much more restrictions on the use of their debt. Accordingly, 
Immobel with its shrunken financial balance sheet was much less vulnerable for 
downturns in real estate and financial markets, to the contrary, its sound financial 
position allowed to borrow cheaply from 2010 to finance new expansion (see Figures 
5.3 and 5.4). As typical cases, and in line with Chapter 4, this suggests that the 
production of the built environment in the Netherlands is much more volatile. 
Through adopting the conceptual framework of Deeg and Hardie (2016) on two 
case studies this chapter contributes to the recent debate on patient capital provision 
towards NFCs in ‘financialized times’ (Deeg et al., 2016). As small N-studies enable to 
analyse “ex post” instead of “ex ante” as proposed by Deeg and Hardie (2016) it 
becomes possible to show how mixtures of patient/impatient capital provision variegate 
over time and, more crucially, to analyse which actors become dominant setting a 
corporate strategy and why. This also helps to better understand how a firm in which 
impatient capital was dominant (TCN) enabled full financialization through the adoption 
of a myriad of financialization tools while a firm in which patient capital was dominant 
(Immobel) moved towards de-financialization strategies once finance was perceived to 
become too dominant. Nevertheless, the case of TCN also illustrated that a sizeable 
patient blockholder that raised its voice could not prevent financialization to take place. 
Accordingly, future studies could build on this through future scrutinizing how different 
forms of capital interact with each other within NFCs and what is finally crucial in 
shaping corporate strategies. But, also how the dynamics within capital providers 
themselves can change and how this influences corporate strategies. In this regard, 
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this chapter indicates that, for instance, the well described rise of market oriented 
banking, in which banks became providers of impatient instead of patient capital 
(Hardie et al., 2013b) had profound different effects on Dutch and Belgian real estate 
development corporations. 
Another element this chapter has pointed out is that waves of privatization and 
neoliberalization seems to have been more manifest in the Netherlands, or, at least 
there seems a sharper contrast between the Fordist, state-led political economy of the 
1980s and current practices. For urban development this implies, among other things, 
the rise of semi-public organizations on real estate markets and increased real estate 
price volatility. The next chapter will further investigate this through analysis of the 
changes around urban governance and how these changes have affected urban 
development. 
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Chapter 6 Urban governance in the Low Countries; from managerial urban 
development towards entrepreneurial and financialized forms? 
 
Together with Stijn Oosterlynck and Manuel Aalbers I am currently working on a shorter 
version of this chapter that is suitable for publication in a journal. However, this full 
chapter is fully my own writing/study.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous two chapters have demonstrated important differences between 
the real estate development sectors in the Low Countries this chapter focuses on 
municipalities to analyse to which extent the financialization of urban development is 
observable. Since the early 1990s urban government related to urban development in 
the Netherlands and Flanders6 has changed considerably. To better understand these 
changes the literatures on both the financialization and neoliberalization of urban 
governance are crucial. In this regard, financialization processes are conceptualized 
as underpinning the current dominant mode of capitalism in most countries, that is 
neoliberal capitalism, as financialization, for instance, facilitates the continuous 
commodification of activities into financial assets (Fine, 2013; Peck et al., 2009). 
However, in some especially Anglo-American countries, financialization processes, 
including the spread of financialized conventions (Chiapello, 2015), are so dominant 
that financialized capitalism seems to be a more appropriate label for contemporary 
capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2009; Moreno, 2014). 
This rise of financialized capitalism is exemplified by the “increasing dominance 
of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various 
scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial 
institutions), states and households” (Aalbers, 2017a, p. 3). Crucially, cities have arisen 
as important centres that command and control financialized capitalism (Bassens and 
van Meeteren, 2014; Moulaert and Scott, 1997; Sassen, 2001; Stanback and Noyelle, 
1982). Not only are financial actors increasingly concentrated within specific areas of 
major financial centres, investments in real estate and infrastructure are also 
increasingly concentrated there (Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Torrance, 2009), and, in the 
development of some new urban districts a financial investment logic has become 
dominant (Theurillat et al., 2016; Halbert et al., 2014). Likewise, whereas Western 
states during the Fordist era tried to spread economic activities and wealth equably 
and geographically even, states now increasingly ‘bet on their strong horses’ trying to 
channel investments towards those areas, regularly cities, that seem to have the most 
prosperous future (Brenner, 2004; Hebb and Sharma, 2014; Crouch and Le Galès, 
2012). Consequently, inequalities are reproduced geographically in a much more 
                                            
6Since the 1970s Belgium has experienced concessive waves of regionalizing government 
responsibilities creating three distinctive political economies (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia). For 
reasons explained in chapter 1 this chapter focuses on Flanders. 
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pronounced way, and “The periodic resetting of the [economic] cycle now excludes 
large segments of society—including entire cities” (Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 48). 
Operating within this changing global context urban government tends to 
refocus from managing broadly accessible urban services that were redistributive and 
supported the general rise in economic productivity of the population towards a more 
selective focus on inter-urban-competition at the international level for investments, 
tourists and the wealthy sections of the population (Harvey, 1989; Haughton et al., 
2013). In regard to urban development, the Anglo-American literature suggests a 
trajectory of neoliberalization followed by first the adoption of an entrepreneurial policy 
toolkit and subsequently financialization (Kirkpatrick, 2016; Kirkpatrick and Smith, 
2011; Peck and Whiteside, 2016). This also relates to the transformation of local 
‘public’ government into ‘urban governance’ in which loosely organized groups of 
private and (semi-)public actors cooperate to make pro-growth policies dominant 
(Stoker, 1998; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Bassett, 1996; Stone, 2006). The more 
European oriented Regulation Approach (see also chapter 1) enriches this perspective 
by placing the rise of these ‘growth machines’ into local regulation dynamics: how local 
politics, economic conditions and context interact both with a (new) national mode of 
regulation and transformations within capitalism enabling, among other things, to 
conceptualize about contestation and historical pathways (Martinelli et al., 2013; 
Terhorst and Van De Ven, 1997; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Such an approach is 
extremely interesting in particular as it has not yet been applied to study the 
financialization of urban government/development.  
However, this chapter primarily aims to full another theoretical gap. Namely, 
although there are plenty of case studies on the neoliberalization of urban projects in 
non-Anglo-American cities both in ‘financialized’ form (Halbert and Rouanet, 2014; 
Theurillat et al., 2016; Mosciaro, n.d.; Guironnet et al., 2016) and in ‘entrepreneurial’ 
form (Doucet, 2013; Taşan-Kok, 2010; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Büdenbender and 
Zupan, 2016), there are surprisingly little studies that analyse if there are general 
tendencies towards financialization or entrepreneuralization within municipalities within 
a specific country/region and historical comparisons are limited (cf. Aalbers, 2017b). In 
line with recent criticism (cf. Le Galès, 2016), this chapter will demonstrate that general 
municipal expenditure in the Netherlands and Flanders is still largely contributing to 
the provision of public goods and services. Nonetheless, around urban development a 
more entrepreneurial stance is clearly observable especially through the use of 
municipal instruments that increase connections between local government and 
(financialized) real estate markets.  
Municipalities in the Netherlands and Belgium are useful cases to analyse if and 
how theoretical concepts around urban governance have travelled to the continental 
European context. Urban governance is embedded in open economies with a highly 
educated work force, relatively strong economic performance, large banking sectors, 
and the highest net household wealth in the Euro zone. Both small countries have 
strong global connections whereby economic activity is concentrated within closely 
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connected cities that are in the Netherlands concentrated and in Belgium sprawled but 
in both countries densely populated (de Vries, 2015; van Meeteren et al., 2016). But, 
local municipal autonomy is considerable higher in Flanders and state agencies are 
weaker than in the Netherlands especially in relation to urban development (Halleux et 
al., 2012; de Vries, 2015). Moreover, although the countries experienced a similar 
internationalisation and collapse of banking (Chang and Jones, 2013) the Flemish 
political economy seems to contain important barriers towards financialization, while 
financialization is omnipresent in the Netherlands (van Loon, 2016). 
Consequently, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, Dutch municipalities seem 
to have experienced similar pressures and seductions as American municipalities such 
as real estate bubbles; low economic growth; rise of predatory finance (Peck and 
Whiteside, 2016; Kirkpatrick, 2016). Accordingly, many municipalities adopted an 
urban growth model in which they tried to profit from increasing land values through 
land banking that connected local public finances to increasingly volatile, local real 
estate markets (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012) (see Section 6.6). But, (financial) 
analyses of the extreme but not exceptional case of Apeldoorn presented in Section 
6.6.2 also show how “ring-fencing” (Allen and Pryke, 2013) municipalities from financial 
markets and inter-municipal financial solidarity creates a very specific, continental 
European processes of financialization. In this regard, despite losses on land holdings 
of close to €200 million the debtors of Apeldoorn did not take over urban government 
making a case for an European variegation of financialization in which calculative 
practices of municipalities and the creative use of state-instruments—i.e., municipal 
land banks—are central (Coq-Huelva, 2013; Lagna, 2015b).  
Flemish municipalities, in contrast, have shifted from a model of ‘laissez-faire’ 
(sub-)urban development towards entrepreneurial growth regimes in which public and 
private actors have gotten more resources to create larger, more prestigious real estate 
projects showing great similarities with American entrepreneurial modes of the 1980s 
including comparable ‘growth-machines’ (Block et al., 2012). Importantly, public funds 
are increasingly used to attract the (higher) middle class instead of supporting 
disadvantaged households and neighbourhoods (Loopmans, 2007; van Hamme et al., 
2011). As Section 6.7.1 will illustrate, for doing so, municipal instruments (especially 
autonomous municipal real estate organizations) were developed through which 
municipalities became active on local real estate markets mostly through land banking, 
real estate investing and development thus connecting municipal finance to local real 
estate markets. Still, although transferring public policy tasks to autonomous municipal 
real estate organizations distances the decision making process from the City Council 
(Gemeenteraad), the Municipal Executive Board (College van Burgermeester & 
Wethouders) remains firmly in control. This is illustrated by the case of Antwerp, 
discussed in Section 6.7.2, were a new political regime started to use Antwerp’s 
municipal real estate organization to smoothen deals with private developers instead 
of a previous form of entrepreneurialism that, besides attracting higher income-groups, 
also enhanced spatial quality and social goals. 
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The cases of the Dutch and Flemish municipalities presented in this chapter 
demonstrate how elements of neoliberalization are systematically re-produced but in 
variegated, both geographically and temporarily (Martinelli et al., 2013; Brenner et al., 
2010) forms and that it is crucial to analyse (the financial dimensions of) municipal 
instruments around urban development to better understand this variegated 
neoliberalization or, in the Dutch case, variegated financialization. 
The chapter starts out with a theoretical discussion on different modes of urban 
government/governance (Section 6.2) summarizing the key elements of each form in 
Table 6.1 and presenting the methodology used in this chapter (Section 6.3) enabling 
to operationalize these different modes in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 then contains the 
first important contribution of this paper, namely a screening if steering forces for 
entrepreneuralization and financialization are also present in Flanders and the 
Netherlands. However, a discussion on the empirical literature on urban governance 
in the Low Countries related to urban development - Section 6.6.1 on the Netherlands, 
Section 6.7.1 on Flanders—shows that processes of entrepeneuralism (Flanders) and 
financialization (the Netherlands) are clearly observable. This allows to make a second 
important empirical contribution, namely to show how processes of financialization (in 
Apeldoorn, Section 6.6.2) and entrepreneuralization (in Antwerp, Section 6.7.2) not 
only change the dynamics of local urban development, but, the cases also help, 
building on (Robinson, 2015; Robinson, 2011; Brenner and Theodore, 2002), to trace 
back the genesis of processes of financialization and entrepreneuralization themselves 
to analyse how they morph into a unique variegation. This enables to make third, 
theoretical, contribution, namely to present in the conclusion some thoughts on 
variegated, European forms of financialized and entrepreneurial urban governance 
around urban development.  
 
6.2 Variegated neoliberalization at the urban level 
Neoliberalism as an “explicit political-economic project” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 
384) has been established during the 1980s by a “rolling back” of previously dominant 
welfare arrangements. In the 1990s Neoliberalism has been “rolled out” through re-
scaling and re-configuring state agencies and institutions prioritizing commodification, 
marketization, and privatisation (Peck, 2004), a process intensifying during the Great 
Financial Crisis (Coq-Huelva, 2013; Springer, 2012; Aalbers, 2013b). The 
neoliberalization of both European and Anglo-American urban government has 
received wide scholarly attention (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Swyngedouw et al., 
2002; Harvey, 1989; Martinelli et al., 2013). The general, and barely contested, claim 
(cf. Cox, 2009) is that national states have shifted from a focus on service provision 
and welfare distribution towards neoliberal modes prioritizing welfare creation through 
competition on multiple scales for investment, economic activity, tourists and the 
economic sustainable population thereby betting on their ‘strong horses’, their 
‘champion cities’ (Harvey, 1989; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012; Brenner, 2004). Related 
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processes of re-scaling government responsibilities, re-structuring government funding 
and waves of privatisation have opened up local government for more market oriented 
practices and ideologies. Likewise, on all levels of scale, the dominant paradigm has 
changed from welfare regimes delivering both social protection for the middle class 
and support for the economic vulnerable population and areas, towards a revanchist 
neoliberal state punishing vulnerability through processes of othering and social-
economic segregation (Aalbers, 2017b).  
Accordingly, it is claimed that neoliberalization first made urban government 
more entrepreneurial introducing more loose forms of ‘governance’ and later, in 
particular contexts, financialized as in American cities “entrepreneurial strategies are 
increasingly realized through financially mediated means and in conjunction with credit 
market actors, agencies, and intermediaries” (Peck and Whiteside, 2016, p. 240). As 
all three processes interact with existing urban political economies, they are inherently 
uneven and variegated processes. Although the processes are systematically 
reproduced complex socio-economic historical-geographies create profound 
geographical and temporal variegation (Brenner et al., 2010; Gonzalez and 
Oosterlynck, 2014). Neoliberalism, as a dominant discourse, has to be actively 
constructed in the urban context through existing and older (local) institutions, 
practices and ideas (Aalbers, 2017b). This acknowledges “multiplicity, complexity, 
variegation, and contextual specificity” (Springer, 2012, p. 135) and enables to 
conceptualize urban governance as internationally connected and able to adopt similar 
globalisation processes (Robinson, 2015; Brenner et al., 2010). Hence, 
transformations within urban governance are conceptualized as open, contingent and 
contextually variegated process of many interacting structures and mechanisms 
creating messy, often path dependent, incremental change (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002). Still, it is also acknowledged that there could be structural transformations that 
reflect dominant tendencies within contemporary capitalism, such as the rise of 
financialized capitalism, that (partly) re-order urban societies (Moulaert et al., 2016; 
Martinelli et al., 2013). Consequently, the concepts of financialization and 
neoliberalization can bring various localities into conversation with each other as they 
describe shared experiences in which respectively the increased dominance of 
financial logics and practices (financialization) and market-like logics and efficient 
solutions (neoliberalization) are put central into urban development (Robinson, 2015; 
Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Peck and Whiteside, 2016; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). 
 
6.3 Methodology 
It is expected that processes of neoliberalization have stimulated first a more 
entrepreneurial stance towards urban development and later opened it up for 
financialization practices. This is observable at the municipal level were local budgets 
are managed that can introduce financialization and decisions are made that shape 
urban development. However, dealing with a complex, messy, urban reality many 
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studies illustrate a large degree of “looseness” or “under specification” making it hard 
to assess the neoliberalization of urban (re-)development (Gerring, 2007; Le Galès, 
2016).  
Therefore, the next sections will operationalize the neoliberalization of urban 
government, i.e., the steering forces that could set in motion processes of 
entrepreneurialism or financialization, through dimensions 1—4 in Table 6.1 that help 
to answer the main research questions: what does the existence of the 
financialization/entrepreneuralization of urban government related to urban 
development presuppose? What kind of wider processes and changes could set in 
motion the financialization/entrepreneuralization of urban government? A second step 
is to analyse data on municipal finance in the Low Countries to find quantitative 
indications for the rise of steering forces of financialization/entrepreneuralism. These 
analyses, presented in Section 6.5.2 are primarily based on government statistics that 
are difficult to compare or not available before 2005.  
Hence, in sections 6.6.1 and 6.7.1 these quantitative indicators are confronted 
with empirical studies on urban governance related to urban (re-)development in 
respectively the Netherlands and Flanders. These studies often downplay the financial 
dimension and indicate that the precise role of new municipal instruments to participate 
on land/real estate markets needs further investigation. Therefore, sections 6.6.2 to 
6.6.3 and 6.7.2 to 6.7.3 respectively focusing on Apeldoorn and Antwerp aim to trace 
back the genesis of processes of financialization and entrepreneuralization by 
scrutinizing how municipal tools to steer urban development connect municipal finance 
with local (financialized) real estate markets (Robinson, 2015; Robinson, 2011). 
Selecting Apeldoorn and Antwerp is in line with theorizing in comparative urban 
studies (Robinson, 2015; Flyvbjerg, 2006) that prioritizes not the comparability of cities 
in search for “the symptoms of a problem” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229), but to research 
“how a specific urban outcome emerges, and through this engagement with its 
production, or genesis, alongside many other interrelated phenomena, to draw it into 
conceptualization” (Robinson, 2015, p. 18). Consequently, Apeldoorn and Antwerp 
were selected because, after a first screening of possible cases, they came to the fore 
as likely cases for showing the characteristic mode of governance for their country, 
respectively financialization processes and entrepreneurialism. In this respect, 
analyses of their instruments to steer local urban development, respectively through 
land banking and an autonomous real estate corporation, are crucial to show how 
municipal finance has become connected to local real estate markets. As the use of 
these instruments is wide spread in the Low Countries, it is expected that the findings 
are useful for cities that use comparable entities. But it also offers insights on the 
variegated reproduction of more market oriented municipal instruments to steer urban 
development. 
This perspective enables to study variegation—with various methods as each 
context demands its own research tactics (Sassen, 2013)—through “theoretically 
informed, historically and geographically embedded ‘story-telling’” (Novy et al., 2013, 
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p. 58), and by bringing the cases into “creative conversation” (Robinson, 2011; 
Springer, 2012) with the wider (Anglo-American) literature (Moulaert et al., 2003). 
Structured, open interviews (six interviews with six people on Antwerp, three interviews 
with seven people on Apeldoorn, see Appendix I), annual reports (including archival 
research), policy documents (including many documents around urban planning), 
media reports and internal and external research reports provide the data for these 
urban case studies of which only a small part can be shared in this chapter. This 
standard urban studies toolbox is enriched with extensive financial analyses on the 
connections between the municipal instruments to steer urban development and 
general municipal finance. As both cases are analysed through similar methodological 
anchors (i.e., the elements in Table 6.1) they can be compared through reflecting on 
the found similarities and differences (cf. Novy et al., 2013). These case studies help 
to answer the second set of research questions, namely: If, and if so how, do 
financialized and entrepreneurial modes of urban governance pre-structure the 
practices and actions of important actors around urban development? Which 
mechanisms are at work simultaneously and how can their respective effects be 
distinguished? 
 
6.4 Different modes of urban government/governance 
Table 6.1, closely following Peck and Whiteside (2016) attempts to show both the 
factors and processes that enabled the three modus operandi related to urban 
development and its distinctive characteristics according to the urban studies literature. 
This enables to research the different modes of local governance/government in a 
more structural manner throughout this chapter within the European context.  
 
6.4.1 Managerial urban government 
The rise of managerial urban government took place within a context of relative strong, 
centrally led states that adopted in the post Second World War period policies of spatial 
Keynesianism that aimed to spread wealth—that grew steadily within Fordist 
economies (dimension 1)—geographically equally based on strong, sectoral policies 
formulated by central governments that often included re-distributive grand-systems 
(dimension 2) and clear urban planning policies (dimension 3) combined with 
national legislation that was developed in a top-down technocratic manner (dimension 
4) (Brenner, 2004; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). As a result, collective consumption 
controlled by central governments defined, following scholars such as Castells (1977) 
urban trajectories, or, at least, it created thick layers of foundational urban economy 
(Engelen et al., 2016). Consequently, the local managers (i.e., civil servants) of these 
extensive welfare arrangements were powerful actors controlling access to public 
services such as social housing. This made municipalities to a large extent managerial 
in the sense that they primarily focused on the local provision of services with the aim 
to redistribute incomes within stable local political coalitions (dimensions 5—7)  
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Table 6.1 Crucial dimensions of managerial, entrepreneurial and financialized modes of urban 
governance related to urban development in Europe 
 
  
Managerial Urban 
Government 
Entrepreneurial Urban 
Governance 
Financialized Urban 
Governance 
1)Domestic 
political 
economy 
Fordist; steady 
economic and 
income growth; 
politics of income 
redistribution   
“After-Fordistflexibilization and 
internationalization; weak and 
uneven growth; deflating 
downtown property markets” 
(P&W) 
“Speculative and predatory 
finance; credit market 
instability; low growth and 
precarity; real estate 
bubbles” (P&W) 
2)Inter-
govern-
mental: 
financial 
Comprehensive 
federal/central state 
redistributive grand-
systems to provide 
local public services; 
large bureaucracies 
increased financial and fiscal 
municipal autonomy; 
restructuring of subsidies towards 
‘competitive’ projects; less 
countercyclical budgeting 
“procyclical budgeting; 
systemic public sector 
austerity” (P&W)   
3)Inter-
govern-
mental: 
planning 
urban policy 
Strong role 
federal/central state 
agencies; social 
housing; planning for 
‘public goods’ and 
sectoral (economic) 
goals 
Prioritizing entrepreneurial 
activities; reregulating to facilitate  
more market oriented ‘soft’ or 
‘flexible’ planning and 
empowering local private 
actors/(semi-) public agencies 
More market oriented, 
opening the built 
environment up for 
financialization processes 
4)Regulation 
Clear national 
legislation 
“After the fact, by interurban 
competition” (P&W): EU ‘free 
market’ rules 
Increasingly in favour of 
wishes financial actors (i.e. 
borrowers and investors)? 
5)Governing 
Rationalities 
Social reproduction 
and protection for 
(lower)middle class 
“‘Growth machine’ consensus; 
task-focused; development 
coalitions;  exchange-value driven; 
publicly subsidized development 
with risk-averse partners; 
speculative construction of place” 
(P&W) 
Increased municipal financial 
creativity/risk taking?; 
Reregulation opening 
municipalities up for 
financialisation processes? 
6)Techniques 
State develops real 
estate for public 
good provision; state 
funding for 
properties housing 
economic activity 
“Corporate subsidization and 
place marketing; experimental 
privatization; enterprise zoning 
and deregulation” (P&W); PPP 
Creative ways to adopt 
financialisation tools?; 
(in)directly connected to 
financialisation through close 
corporation with 
financialized actors/real 
estate markets? 
7)Political 
dynamics 
Stable political 
coalitions; ‘machine’ 
politics 
“growth coalitions, democratic 
deficits” (P&W) 
“Postdemocratic 
technocracy: emergency 
management, budgetary fiat, 
fiscal balkanization” (P&W)? 
  Sources: primarily based on Peck and Whiteside (2016, p.6) (P&W), and chapter 6 
Grey (1-4): Factors/processes that can give rise to managerial/entrepreneurial/financialized urban 
governance; Non-grey (5-7): main characteristics of managerial/entrepreneurial/financialized 
urban governance 
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(Harvey, 1989; Lauermann, 2016). As such, managerial urban government relates to 
a local state managing “the city through bureaucratic means” (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, 
p. 154) aiming to support the re-production of labour through social expenditures 
(Harvey, 1978; Harvey, 1989). 
 
6.4.2 Entrepreneurial urban governance 
In regard to urban development, entrepreneurialism is now conceptualized as the 
central goal of many cities (Molotch, 1993; Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; 
Lauermann, 2016), and the crucial dimensions of this turn for the United States have 
been recently synthesised by Peck and Whiteside (2016, p. 6). Table 6.1 presents an 
attempt to translate their synthesis into researching the European context whereby 
dimensions 1—4 relate to structural transformations of political economies that gave 
municipalities both more responsibility and autonomy to act more competitive. Whilst 
general trends in the macro-economy seem to be comparable between Europe and 
the United States (dimension 1), Peck and Whiteside’s (2016, p. 241) synthesis of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations as “Rollback of Keynesian redistribution, automatic 
stabilizers, fiscal transfers, countercyclical budgeting; entrepreneurial leverage of 
inherited assets and infrastructures” contrast with Europe where there is no over-
arching fiscal regime creating a wide variety of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
(Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Overall, structural austerity policies towards local 
governments seem to have been less dramatic. Moreover, there are still funds in place 
to support vulnerable regions. Nevertheless, European countries did experience 
globalisation, re-scaling, de-industrialization, and a decrease of welfare regimes 
(Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw et al., 2002) increasing the financial and fiscal autonomy 
of municipalities (dimension 2). Consequently local governments moved “towards an 
increased emphasis on development activities and away from being a relay for the 
welfare state” (Cox, 2009, p. 10).   
In contrast with the territorialized political representation in the USA, in many 
European countries centralized party systems have created powerful central state 
agencies (Cox, 2009). Accordingly, as central state agencies play an important role 
through urban planning and the formulation of urban policies dimension 3 has been 
added (Savitch and Kantor, 2002). It is expected that through the neoliberalization of 
state agencies planning can become increasingly aimed at welfare creation instead of 
welfare distribution enabling closer co-operation with private actors and prioritizing 
market oriented solutions. To smoothen the realisation of urban projects regulation 
becomes more flexible and increasingly takes place ‘after the fact’ (dimension 4) 
(Haughton et al., 2013), or consists of European legislation that promotes market-
oriented approaches (Warner and Clifton, 2014). 
Dimensions 5-7 describe the main characteristics of entrepreneurial urban 
governance. Dimension 5 indicates how local managerial government has blurred into 
“an aggregation of different agencies, dominated by different interests and social 
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groups” (Coq-Huelva, 2013, p. 1216) making new governing rationalities dominant. 
Technically (dimension 6), actors around urban governance answer their own 
perceived increase of intra-urban competition with a pro-growth agenda that prioritizes 
prestigious real estate projects to put a city on the map often in close cooperation with 
private actors projects structured through a Public Private Partnership (hereafter PPP) 
(Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Molotch, 1993), making (semi-public)state 
agencies both regulators and promotors of urban development (Jessop, 2002). As a 
result, not only hierarchies of place are introduced ignoring sizeable areas that are 
perceived as not contributing to urban competiveness (Aalbers, 2017b; Engelen et al., 
2016), but these activities also heavily increase municipal risk taking as well as a 
tendency to protect municipal investments (Lauermann, 2016). Politically (dimension 
7), decision making processes have moved largely into “the ‘in-between’ spaces of 
governance that exist outside, alongside or in-between the formal statutory scales of 
government, from area masterplans to multiregional growth strategies” (Haughton et 
al., 2013, p. 220) where private and public technocrats operate outside democratic 
control (Swyngedouw, 2009; Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010). Sections 6.6 and 
6.7 present analyses on the extent to which Flemish and Dutch urban governance 
shows similarities to this modus operandi.  
 
6.4.3 Financialized urban governance 
The literature on the financialization of American urban governance offers a 
straightforward narrative. Structural supra-municipal budget cuts have further 
increased the urge for urban entrepreneurialism, but, also reliance on both local taxes 
and external finance that has become increasingly speculative and predatory (Peck 
and Whiteside, 2016; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011). Municipal 
budgets increasingly rely on urban growth making urban governance a keen promotor 
of cities as sites of investment (Lizieri and Pain, 2014), but also a creative financial 
engineer, for instance by monetizing on future tax-income from urban re-development 
and infrastructure (Weber, 2010; Pacewicz, 2013). Consequently, as cities financialize 
their public assets the provision of urban services including infrastructure has become 
increasingly entangled with financial capital through various opaque institutional 
arrangements (Ashton et al., 2016). In addition, conservative external finance started 
to morph into increasingly complex forms of municipal debt financing through opaque 
vehicles putting municipal finance to a large extent outside democratic control 
(Kirkpatrick, 2016). This “process of systematic financial intensification” (Peck and 
Whiteside, 2016, p. 262) has made financial logics dominant in American urban 
governance by closely interweaving urban futures and current policy possibilities with 
financial markets’ volatility and financial orthodoxies without any protective layers of 
government, i.e., to a certain extent, finance now governs American cities (Kirkpatrick, 
2016; Peck and Whiteside, 2016; Ashton et al., 2016), and seems to take over British 
cities (Benjamin, 2015). 
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The synthesis of Peck and Whiteside on the financialization of urban 
governance (2016, p. 6) needs to be critically interrogated within the European context. 
However, at the level of domestic political economies (dimensions 1 and 2) many 
European countries experienced similar trends as the rise of (predatory) finance and 
real estate bubbles (Jordà et al., 2014) and, in particular after the European debt crisis, 
structural public sector austerity. Moreover, there is an extensive literature describing 
how urban planning (dimension 3) has transformed from public good provision 
towards enabling ‘markets’ (including financial markets) to take the lead in producing 
the built environment (Haila, 1988; Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000; Haughton et al., 2013; 
Theurillat et al., 2016). Accordingly, there is a booming literature illustrating how the 
European urban planning of single urban (re-)development projects increasingly aims 
to satisfy the desires of financial investors (Guironnet et al., 2016; Theurillat and 
Crevoisier, 2013; Charnock et al., 2014; Theurillat et al., 2016). Financial investors 
conceptualize real estate investments as ‘just another asset class’ and thus cities have 
to offer an attractive expected ‘risk adjusted rate of return’ compared to other financial 
assets as shares and bonds (van Loon and Aalbers, 2017). In extreme cases, the 
development of real estate is even unnecessary as land itself can be traded as a 
financial asset, i.e., “ ‘real’ capital and value proved nothing but pretexts for the 
reproduction of financial capital” (Theurillat et al., 2016, p. 1517; see also Savini and 
Aalbers, 2015). Still, in contrast with the Anglo-American context it is questionable if 
this tendency is embedded in new legislation facilitating the wishes of financial actors 
(dimension 4). Instead, it seems that derivative-debacles of semi-public organisations 
have led to reregulation constraining the influence of financial actors (Aalbers et al., 
2017; Lagna, 2015b; Pani and Holman, 2014).  
The discussion below will make clear that financialization in the American way 
is unlikely in the context of the Low Countries especially due to different relations 
between municipalities and central state agencies and due to regulation around 
municipal finance. Accordingly, the dimensions of financialized urban governance 
(dimension 5—7) are re-conceptualized into research questions that are answered in 
the remainder of this chapter. 
 
 
6.5 Transformation of urban government: steering forces  
To indicate to which extent there are similar steering forces observable towards first 
entrepreneurial and subsequently financialized forms of urban governance the 
following three sub-sections investigate the extent to which the most important steering 
forces (dimensions 1—3, Table 6.1) are observable in the Low Countries. 
 
6.5.1 Dimension 1: transformations within a domestic political economy 
The previous chapters have made clear that important developments within domestic 
political economies that preluded, first, the entrepreneuralization and, subsequently, 
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the financialization of urban governance in the United States are also observable in 
the Low Countries. The general transition to a post-Fordist economy that is more 
internationally oriented and characterised by weak and uneven growth is observable 
in both countries. Nevertheless, a deflation of downtown property markets was not 
observed: to the contrary, the highest property values are within urban centres in both 
countries. The second phase, preluding the financialization of urban governance, is in 
particular observable in the Netherlands with its debt fuelled real estate bubbles and 
related credit market instability that masks its low growth environment. Also, in both 
countries speculative and predatory finance are clearly observable both through the 
financialization of banking and massive mis-selling practices (e.g., derivatives to small 
and medium-sized corporations and semi-public organisations, complex investment 
products to households with high masked costs, and so forth). 
 
Figure 6.1 Outstanding long-term (> 1 year) municipal debt (in billion Euro). 
 
Sources: CBS (2016); Lokale Statistieken (2016); Dexia (2016) 
 
However, in regard to municipalities, there seem to be fewer possibilities for 
finance to be predatory and speculative. As Figure 6.1 indicates, absolute debt levels 
of Dutch municipalities have decreased considerably while those of Flemish 
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municipalities remained stable. Also, municipal bond markets and (complex) municipal 
financial products7 are rather small in the Low Countries 
In the Netherlands borrowing has decreased mostly as the result of privatization 
that transferred municipal responsibilities in particular related to housing, health care, 
and utilities towards (semi)-private organizations (Vos and Westerhuis, 2014, p. 233). 
But, since 2007 municipal debt has increased steadily from €39 billion in 2007 to €53 
billion in 2013. Roughly three-quarters of the loans are obtained from a single domestic 
bank, primarily the bank of Dutch municipalities (Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten, 
hereafter BNG bank), that is half owned by local state agencies (primarily 
municipalities) and half owned by the central state (BNG Bank, 2016). Many 
municipalities adopt debt levels far below the by supervisors required thresholds (Allers 
and Merkus, 2013). However, municipalities have been creative in avoiding these 
restrictions, sometimes by just ignoring them as the rules are not legally binding, or by 
creative interpretations of accountancy principles (Allers and Merkus, 2013, p. 13).  
Outstanding debt of Flemish municipalities has been on a moderate and stable 
level and the debt to the total municipal budget has decreased. Despite the possibility 
to initiate public loans, debt was until 2007 usually provided through long-term simple 
bank-loans: first, mainly by ‘Municipal Credit’ (Gemeentekrediet)8 but later also by the 
other large banks. After the credit crunch the conditions for municipal loans became 
less attractive as banks became hesitant to write out the long loans—often with a 
duration of 20 years—the Flemish municipalities were accustomed to motivating a 
couple of dozen municipalities to initiate bond offerings, and around 7% of the 
outstanding debt currently consists of bonds (Leroy, 2015). Flemish supervision 
requires a realistic budget for the full 6-year governing period whereby cash-flows are 
in balance and there is enough surplus to pay back debt plus interest. To calculate this 
balanced budget, only regular debt repayments are taken into account thereby 
neglecting large, incidental repayments that many municipal bonds require. Also, 
separate municipal entities are excluded from this budget supervision creating room 
for municipalities to become more creative with their finance (Leroy, 2015). 
 
6.5.2 Dimension 2: intergovernmental support, financial 
As the result of the inaccessibility and unavailability of historical data it would be very 
time-consuming to gather comparative statistic on long-term changes within municipal 
finance. It is possible, however, to analyse municipal expenditure and income for a 
more recent period (2005—2012). Hence, Figure 6.2 presents the aggregated income 
and expenditure of Flemish and Dutch municipalities for the first and last year the data 
was available for both countries. To construct the Figure, based on the discussion in  
                                            
7 In various interviews it came to the fore that municipalities use derivatives in both countries but 
claim to do so in very conservative, risk averse ways. There is no aggregated data on this making 
this an interesting venue for further research.  
8 that was owned by the municipalities themselves but later merged into Dexia, became listed and 
after the crisis was nationalized and turned into Belfius, 
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Figure 6.2 Municipal income and expenditure (-) in Flanders/the Netherlands (in billion Euro). 
 
Sources: CBS (2016); www.lokalestatistieken.be; Agentschap Binnenlands bestuur (2016) 
 
the previous section (i.e., Table 6.1), both income and expenditure were categorized 
into primarily managerial, entrepreneurial and finance/financial bureaucracy. 
Nonetheless, the existing statistical categories of government agencies makes this an 
extremely hard and complex exercise. Below, this categorization is further discussed 
showing the many limitations of Figure 6.2 but also enabling to better understand some 
mechanisms that lay behind municipal finance in the Low Countries. 
Managerial income is operationalized as supra-local income that is provided to 
municipalities in a non-competitive way and is labelled for the provision of public 
services. In both countries a considerable part of municipal income exists of a 
municipal fund monitored by supra-local state agencies that can primarily be spend on 
the provision of local public services and goods. However, as the discussion of Figure 
6.2 below will illustrate, recent reforms in both countries allow municipalities to spend 
income from the general municipal funds in more freedom. The Dutch category 
managerial income also includes income from local (real estate) taxes as this income 
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cannot be spent freely, it should be spent on specific public services such as garbage 
collection.  
 
Managerial expenditure is operationalized as expenditures for the provision of public 
services and goods. The Dutch CBS-data is categorized rather precisely. 
Consequently, the following expenditure categories were categorized as managerial: 
bureaucratic costs related to local government, infrastructure and mobility; police, 
education; culture and leisure; social amenities and social work; health care. 
Subsequent analyses on the case of Apeldoorn show that these types of spending are 
primarily related to services for the local population, i.e., general expenses on the 
maintenance of local roads, sport amenities, neighbourhood centres etcetera. The 
Flemish data is less detailed, but, subsequent research on the case of Antwerp—a 
thorough analysis of Antwerp’s expenditures and income since the early 1980s—
shows that the category allowed subsidies (toegestane werkingsubsidies) contains 
many similar activities as in the Netherlands including subsidies for social amenities 
(OCMW).  
 
Entrepreneurial income is operationalized as those sources of income for which 
municipalities have to compete. In the Netherlands, this relates to all local taxes that a 
municipality can establish in autonomy and which can subsequently be spent in relative 
freedom. These are primarily relatively low taxes related to advertising, corporations 
and tourism. For Flanders all local taxes are categorized as entrepreneurial, as 
juridical, they could be adjusted and spend in great freedom. Consequently, there is a 
wide array of local taxes with subsequent differences, but, in general property and 
income related taxes are the largest part of local tax income (Geys and Revelli, 2011). 
As a result of the available data this indicator thus emphasizes the local autonomy 
element of entrepreneurialism and does not take into account that, due to general 
political consensus, much of this entrepreneurial income is, in Flanders, spend in 
managerial ways. 
 
Entrepreneurial expenditure is operationalized as expenditure that is used to attract 
people and businesses to a municipality. This puts an emphasis on investment and 
public/private cooperation. In the Dutch data this is difficult to distinguish. For instance, 
the category ‘cultural and leisure’ could contain both expenditure on a regular 
swimming pool for the local population and an investment in a large swimming pool to 
attract a more regional population. Only the categories urban planning and economics 
have been labelled as entrepreneurial because these are often primarily used to attract 
corporations or people to a municipality. Also, as Section 6.6 will illustrate, the category 
land activity relates primarily to entrepreneurial activities on local land markets and 
could thus be added to the category entrepreneurial. In the Flemish data, 
entrepreneurial expenditures exist of investments, investment subsidies and the sale 
  
130 
 
of assets that are usually participations in semi-public corporations such as utility 
corporations. 
 
Financialization processes/Finance and financial bureaucracy: the discussion above 
already indicates that it is probably hard to speak of financialization within municipal 
finance in the Low Countries. Both in the Dutch and Flemish data income and 
expenditure that could not be labelled as entrepreneurial or managerial primarily 
relates to financial bureaucracy and probably less to financialization processes. In the 
Flemish case this data consists of loans and leases and debt repayments. In the Dutch 
case this data consists of loans and leases, other financial means, and categories that 
relate to bureaucratic accountancy practices (Lastenverlichting Rijk; Saldo van 
kostenplaatsen; Saldo van de rekening baten en lasten). 
 
It is acknowledged that the operationalization above is far from watertight. For 
example, a ‘managerial’ activity such as culture and leisure could also be used to a 
certain extent for an entrepreneurial strategy. Moreover, with the available 
national/regional data it is impossible to establish whether a certain expenditure is 
aimed at attracting certain preferred groups and thus entrepreneurial or whether a 
certain expenditure is aimed at distributing public services that are accessible for all 
groups. Therefore, more thorough analyses are needed to really grasp how budgets 
are spend. For doing so, an important goal of this chapter is to analyse the relation 
between municipal budgets and urban development.  
By doing so this chapter will show, for in particular the Flemish case, how certain 
supra-local funds (werkingssubsidies) around urban development that are labelled in 
Figure 6.2 as managerial can also have rather entrepreneurial effects. However, such 
a conclusion could only be reached after a detailed case study of Antwerp including 
archival research on municipal finance from the early 1980s onwards. As a result, 
future studies should scrutinize the data in Figure 6.2 aiming to create a more dynamic 
understanding of municipal income and expenditure. This is an important task as the 
urban studies literature lacks thorough quantitative evidence for the transmission from 
managerialism towards entrepreneurial and financialized forms  (Pinson and Morel 
Journel, 2016; Le Galès, 2016). 
Nonetheless, Figure 6.2 also gives an indication for the amount of a municipal 
budget that could be decided over locally. In this sense, the larger the category 
managerial the less the local state has to say about adjusting municipal income and 
spending budgets. The larger the category entrepreneurial the greater the autonomy 
of municipalities over their financial affairs. The financialized category would then 
indicate the part of budgets over which financial actors have considerable influence.  
In the period 2005—2012 the provision of public services was in both countries 
the largest municipal expenditure. As Figure 6.2 indicates, Dutch municipalities have 
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a low degree of autonomy around local taxes, by large their budgets9 are pre-structured 
through a sophisticated, formula-based, equalizing grant system controlled by the 
central government for the provision of specific public services and urban policies: 
municipalities are mainly financed by the central government to act in a managerial 
way. This includes inter-municipal financial solidarity and fiscal discipline monitored by 
both the central state and provinces that makes municipal bankruptcies rare and 
functions as a geographical equalizer (Allers and Merkus, 2013; Aalbers and van 
Beckhoven, 2010). Nevertheless, whereas until recently continuous waves of 
decentralizing central government tasks combined with budget cuts were 
compensated by selling municipal assets (Vos and Westerhuis, 2014), more recent 
reforms since 2013 seem to have increased the autonomy of municipalities over their 
budgets. However, this development is not captured in Figure 6.2 as the latest 
comparative data is from 2012. Nevertheless, as Section 6.6 illustrates, since the mid-
1990s municipalities have found additional income streams, primarily through 
municipal land activities, but also through participation in semi-public corporations 
(ASRE and PBL, 2013). 
Flemish municipalities, in contrast, have a high degree of autonomy around 
local taxes creating room for entrepreneurial practices as tax competition. As Figure 
6.2 illustrates, and in line with historical levels, local income is on average 40% of the 
municipal income (Geys and Revelli, 2011). This income is mostly determined by the 
amount of taxable high-income residents and real estate prices thus stimulating 
municipalities to attract higher income groups. As from this tax-income municipalities 
also have to finance expenses related to economic activity–such as infrastructure–a 
discrepancy has arisen between urban areas with high economic activity (and often a 
relatively poor population) and more residential, usually suburban areas with a 
relatively wealthy population (Kesteloot and Saey, 2002; Terhorst and Van De Ven, 
1997; Maesschalck, 2011). Also, recently, supervision from the Flemish government 
has been relaxed demanding much less explanation of the spending of supra-local 
funding (interviews). Nevertheless, there is wide political consensus that also local tax 
revenues should be primarily used for the provision of public goods (Geys and Revelli, 
2011 interviews), therefore, the expenditures of Flemish municipalities still relate to a 
large extent to managerial activities.  
 
6.5.3 Dimension 3: intergovernmental support, urban planning and urban policy 
The discussion above makes clear that the relationship between municipalities and 
supra-local agencies still seems to be based on rather managerial practices 
(dimension 2 in Table 6.1). This section will show how in regard to urban planning and 
urban policy in both countries a transmission towards more entrepreneurial and 
                                            
9 There seems to be only fragmented data on different periods, e.g., (Allers, 2012) shows for 2011 
that 54% of municipal budget is provided by the central state and (Allers and Elhorst, 2005) 67% 
for 2002. 
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financialized forms of urban governance seems to be appearing (dimension 3 in Table 
6.1). This in particular relates to a wider transformation within state agencies in both 
countries in which more market oriented policy solutions are increasingly preferred.  
Both in the literature and in general government finance there are suggestions 
that supra-local funding increasingly prioritizes entrepreneurial goals and that 
municipalities have adopted instruments (in particular PPPs) to actively participate on 
real estate markets. In Flanders supra-local funding for urban policies was almost non-
existent until the early 1990s (De Decker et al., 2005). Then it became first available 
to stimulate social infrastructures and social innovation and from 2002 onwards 
increasingly aimed at promoting more entrepreneurial goals especially through state-
led gentrification projects (Loopmans, 2007; Loopmans, 2008). This is exemplified by 
the proliferation of PPPs for real estate projects that rose from 0 in the early 1990s to 
an estimated 48 projects in 2015 spread over 30 different municipalities relating to €70 
million of municipal investments (Vlaamse Overheid and PPS, 2009; Deloitte, 2009). 
Financial commitment to urban development is even higher because autonomous 
municipal corporations and inter-municipal corporations—in which Flemish 
municipalities participated for respectively €0.9 and €4.5 billion in 2014—usually 
dedicate a certain, but impossible to estimate, part of their activities to urban (re-
)development (Agentschap Binnenlands bestuur, 2016). 
The Dutch central government has been financially committed to urban policy. 
These funds (Sociale Vernieuwingsbeleid 1990—93; Grotestedenbeleid I-III 1994—
2009; Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing 2000—2014) still aim to support low 
income groups, but the policies themselves are increasingly aimed at improving urban 
economies or spurring gentrification (Hochstenbach, 2016; Aalbers, 2011b). 
Accordingly, in the late 1990s Dutch municipalities started to use PPPs to participate 
in urban (re-)development. However, data is fragmented: both the amount of and 
municipal investments in PPPs is probably much higher than respectively 14 and a 
couple of hundred million euro as listed on the government website on PPPs (PPS 
Netwerk, 2016). In sum, central/federal government since the late 1990s has become 
more supportive for entrepreneurial solutions. Accordingly, municipalities in both 
countries have adopted instruments to participate into urban (re-)development projects 
that usually aim to make their cities more competitive. 
In conclusion, on the one hand, municipalities in both countries experience 
dynamics that make the entrepreneurialisation and subsequently financialization of 
urban governance related to urban development more likely. On the other hand, 
legislation and monitoring by federal/central government agencies seems to—in line 
with other European municipalities—“ring-fence” (Allen and Pryke, 2013) municipalities 
from predatory finance. Nevertheless, in both countries supervision excludes finance 
related to land activities and it could be that the rise of entrepreneurialism seduces 
local governments to find new income streams. Hence, the next sections give a rich 
history on urban governance related to urban development in respectively the 
Netherlands and Flanders in order to analyse whether Peck and Whiteside’s 
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dimensions of financialized municipal governance (Table 6.1) are observable in the 
Low Countries. 
 
6.6 Connecting municipal finance to financialized real estate markets: the 
Netherlands 
Section 6.6.1, based on a thorough literature study, describes how Dutch local 
governments adopted pro-growth policies and connected themselves with financialized 
real estate market through active land banking. Section 6.6.2 tries to better understand 
the financial dimension of this connection through the study of the extreme, but not 
exceptional, case of Apeldoorn enabling to present a perspective on a European 
variegation of the financialization of urban governance in Section 6.6.3. 
 
6.6.1 The public land development model 
As discussed above, on the one hand, Dutch municipal budgets are still largely 
contributed to the provision of public services and the rise of predatory municipal 
finance has not been empirically observed yet. On the other hand, other factors that 
underpin the neoliberalization of urban governance related to urban development such 
as financializing real estate markets and supra-local funds prioritizing entrepreneurial 
goals are clearly observable. By analysing the changing role of municipalities within 
urban development this section illustrates how municipal land banking has become the 
crucial instrument that connects Dutch municipal finance with financialized real estate 
markets. 
As a densely populated, small country that has a long history with the creation 
of collective water protection systems the Netherlands has a long and enduring support 
for urban planning. Strong fiscal centralisation and a central state providing local 
services has created strong “interdependencies between cities and the central state” 
(Uitermark, 2005, p. 155) making urban policy a national priority. In the 1980s this 
policy aimed for compact cities through restrictive planning and urban renewal projects 
with co-government between municipality, province and central state as underlying 
principle. But, also through public investments to spread wealth equally and a massive 
system to subsidize (the development of) affordable housing by large developers, 
mainly owned by municipalities, housing associations and private/institutional investors 
(Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000; Taşan-Kok and Korthals Altes, 2012). 
In the Public Land Development model (hereafter PLD) planners from the 
central state decided where and what to build whilst the municipality bought and re-
zoned the land, readjusted parcels and sold them (Halleux et al., 2012). For doing so, 
municipalities were financed by state banks and held eminent domain power to obtain 
land. Through municipal land banks (grondbedrijf, hereafter land bank)10 land was 
                                            
10 A municipal land bank is an administrative entity and/or an organizational entity that contains the land 
activities of a municipality (Enquetecommissie Grondbedrijf, 2012, p. 71)  
 
  
134 
 
acquired for relatively low prices, and, as the difference between cost price and market 
value of building sites was usually small private developers did not challenge this 
model: profits were made in construction (van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013; Louw et 
al., 2003; Needham et al., 2011). As long as projects were profitable municipalities 
recovered the cost for public works (including social housing), and, sometimes also 
realised other policy goals (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). Municipalities were both a 
planning agency deciding about rezoning and investor in land through their land banks 
increasingly shifting the focus towards the profitability of plans (Segeren et al., 2005; 
van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013).  
During the 1990s the central Dutch state transferred some of its responsibilities 
around urban planning towards provinces, institutions (e.g., PBL) and semi-public 
institutions as housing associations. But, more importantly, the Dutch planning 
paradigm shifted—in line with a neoliberal turn in national politics—whereby enhancing 
competitiveness became a main objective and state agencies opened up for market 
oriented solutions (Zonneveld and Evers, 2014; Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000; Gielen 
and Taşan-Kok, 2010). Economic and population growth, waves of privatisation and 
reregulation set in motion, among other things, a debt fuelled real estate boom 
(Engelen, 2015; van Loon, 2016) and PLD morphed into a model that increasingly 
facilitated the interests of real estate developers, financial actors, and, municipal pro 
growth policies (van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013; Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; 
Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016).  
To finance pro-growth ambitions that were usually based on (prestigious) real 
estate and infrastructure projects municipalities tried to increase revenue streams that 
they could spend autonomously. The most sizeable, and easiest to manipulate, 
revenue stream is land banking: at the highest point all municipalities owned in 2010 
in total for €12.7 billion in land to be developed (see Figure 6.2). Land had become 
increasingly lucrative as continuously rising real estate prices widened development 
margins (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). In the 1990s 
private developers started to contest the eminent domain power of municipalities that, 
legally, is only valid when the landowner him/her self is not able to develop a plan. New 
national planning policy (VINEX) not only intentionally restricted new developments to 
specific areas enabling municipalities to extract higher land gains that could be used 
to develop better infrastructure. It also stimulated large scale urban development 
projects, the so called “area developments” (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016; Louw et 
al., 2003). However, to the surprise of government agencies, developers started to buy 
large plots of, usually rural, land obtaining a powerful position. Developers allowed the 
municipality to buy the land from them “against a price more or less similar to their 
costs in acquiring it. The municipalities continued with their role as public land 
developers and sold, after servicing the land, building sites against full market value to 
the same commercial developers” (van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013, p. 780). Thus, 
this re-newed way of developing not only required the need for local authorities and 
developers to develop long-term relationships, it also created large profits for 
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developers as there was a wide gap between the ‘full market value’ developers paid to 
municipalities and the profits developers realised on selling completed properties. 
Embedded within a strong corporatist tradition these ties became so close that some 
municipalities started informing favoured developers so they could buy land in future 
development areas to protect it “from being snapped up by ‘hostile invaders’” (Taşan-
Kok and Korthals Altes, 2012, p. 1275).  
In urban development municipalities play a pivotal role: they grant 
zoning/building permits through the urban planning process and speculate–through 
their land acquisitions—on land value increases. To spur development municipalities 
and provinces used very bright future scenarios thus creating a model of “over-
optimistic over-zoning” (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012, p. 2). As long as real estate 
prices increased the optimistically calculated profits were realised. Also, under close 
supervision of central and local state agencies the development of large projects 
usually went relatively efficient producing a high quality built environment and sharing 
the profits between public and private actors involved (Taşan-Kok, 2010; Doucet, 
2013). A substantial part of the municipal development gains was used to subsidize 
non-profitable investments such as affordable housing, and another share–€3.2 billion 
between 2004 and 2008–was used for prestigious new buildings such as city halls and 
theatres (RFV, 2015).  
Excessive debt generation masked that real population and economic growth 
was not strong enough to sustain the–to a certain degree–fictitious real estate prices 
(Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; van Loon, 2016). With property values decreasing 
municipalities discovered an important caveat within their building claim contracts with 
developers which did not enforce a time-limit on the re-transferring of the to-be-
developed land to developers. As developers decided to wait municipalities had to pay 
finance costs for land that could remain un-developed creating €3.3 billion in losses for 
municipalities between 2009 and 2013 putting some of them under special supervision 
and leading to severe austerities on public good provision (RFV, 2015; Dijken et al., 
2011). The general government reaction was not to restrict municipal involvement into 
land markets but to make development profitable again (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; 
e.g., Dijken et al., 2011). The creation of high real estate investment value remains a 
central goal and the central state supports “other state agencies with knowledge and 
experimentation and the development of alternative forms of financing and new 
revenue models” (Het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Konikrijksrelaties et al., 
2011, p. 3).  
 This section has illustrated how Dutch municipalities have adopted a pro-
growth, entrepreneurial stance to profit from widening margins in urban development. 
For doing so, PPPs were introduced, but, more crucially, municipalities became active 
actors on financialized real estate markets through large land purchases through their 
land banks. Municipalities became both the regulator of real estate markets and profit 
seeking actors thereby adopting a bright perspective on the future. Urban planning 
started to revolve around investment logics (cf. Chiapello, 2015). Still, as municipal 
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finance itself was too a large degree ring-fenced from predatory finance it remains 
unclear how urban governance could open up for financialization processes. The next 
section sheds light on this by presenting (financial) analyses on the case of Apeldoorn 
demonstrating how land banking can connect municipal finance with financialized real 
estate markets 
 
6.6.2 Apeldoorn’s municipal land bank 
The core of the problem is a too ambitious municipal growth-target that was 
translated into large municipal land purchases. The possible profits from these land 
activities were estimated unrealistically high and never adjusted properly. 
(Enquetecommissie Grondbedrijf, 2012, p. 44 translated by author) 
 
Apeldoorn the 11th largest city of the Netherlands (population approximately 160,000) 
is an extreme—at least concerning the financial consequences and disregard of 
risks—but not exceptional case as many other municipalities used their land banks in  
 
Figure 6.3 Important developments on Apeldoorn's financial balance sheet (in mln Euro)
 
Source: Annual reports City of Apeldoorn; CBS (2016) 
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similar ways to get involved in ‘active land use policies’ adopting aggressive pro-growth 
policies (cf. Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012). At the dawn of the 21st century the muni- 
cipality of Apeldoorn formulated strong pro-growth ambitions adopting a bright 
perspective on the future stipulated in the vision “Apeldoorn 2020” that set out to 
improve Apeldoorn’s green areas, conditions for living, working and leisure thereby 
emphasizing Apeldoorn’s green urbanity and centrality within a ‘triangle’ with Deventer 
and Zutphen (City of Apeldoorn, 2016a; City of Apeldoorn, 2001). Based on an 
optimistic future scenario Apeldoorn calculated a high demand for business 
parks/semi-industrial real estate, offices (320,000 m2) and residential units, see Table 
6.2A.1/6A.3 (City of Apeldoorn, 2001).  
 The municipal land bank became the crucial element to realize these growth-
ambitions and capture land value increases. To take control over spatial 
development—including dividing its costs and benefits—Apeldoorn’s  urban planning 
department had, in line with practices in many other Dutch municipalities (Dijken et al., 
2011; Segeren et al., 2005), a double-function. Namely, to advise the City Council and 
Municipal Executive Board on urban planning affairs and to be responsible to achieve 
land gains through buying land or using existing holdings, prepare them for (re-
)development, and then (re-)sell them to developers. Within this scheme the land bank 
is the organizational and administrative entity through which the land activity gains and 
losses of the municipality of Apeldoorn are administrated. Organizationally, it is a loose 
gathering of different project administrations: civil servants did not work directly for the 
land bank. Below, it is argued that this loose organizational structure combined with 
bureaucratic calculative practices functioning as “a commercial entity within a public 
house” (Interview), “that became increasingly dis-embedded from the regular 
bureaucratic organization” (Interview) enabled over-optimistic growth ambitions to 
grow into excessive risk taking through large municipal investments into land. 
 
Unprofessional land acquisition. As poorly coordinated entity civil servants related to 
the land bank made unprofessional decisions that raised land acquisition costs and 
risks related to land holdings. As civil servants did, for instance, not make use of 
external valuation advice or realtors they bought land for high prices. But, also, the 
prognoses of Apeldoorn itself—that were already rather optimistic (compare lines 
Table 6.2A.1 with 6A.2 and 6A.3 with 6A.4)—were ignored: by 2006 Apeldoorn owned 
218 hectares for business parks, enough to sustain the calculated demand for far 
beyond 2020 (Enquetecommissie Grondbedrijf, 2012, pp. 225–239). Interaction of civil 
servants with private developers was also rather naïve. For instance, in 1993, civil 
servants started to buy as many disconnected plots of land as possible for the project 
Zuidbroek aiming to exclude land speculators by getting control over the entire area. 
However, a private developer held a building claim over the largest part of the 
Zuidbroek plan area. The land bank bought the developer’s land still respecting the 
developer’s building claim but not negotiating a term to start construction.  
 
  
138 
 
Table 6.2A Over-optimistic planning. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1. Residential units needed following "Apeldoorn 2020"*   850 730 730 730 1100 
2. Residential units constructed 539 746 392 487 714 325 
3. Hectares of business park needed following 
"Apeldoorn 2020"* 
<2005 only prognoses for '98-'20:  160  
  
4. Hectares of business park constructed   4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 
5. Payments ('gain-sharing') of municipal landbank to 
muncipal budget   7 12,5 7 10 8 
 
continuation 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1. Residenti.. 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600   540 300 460 640 
2. Residenti.. 559 415 869 947 453 527 431 250 322 566 
3. Hectares.. 13 16 21 6 11   6 1,5 6 6,5 
4. Hectares.. 2 12 10 1 8   6,4 2 1 5 
5. Payments.. 8,75 6,25 10,3 8,3 **0 0 0 0 0 2,6 
 
Table 6.2B The financial dimension of over-optimistic planning: cummulative costs and 
revenues of Apeldoorn's municipal land bank. 
Costs 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.1 Land purchases 204 230 261 280 304 321 346 376 
1.2 Land preperation costs  65 78 87 106 136 153 183 202 
1.3 Costs for planning bureaucracy  33 38 44 54 62 72 83 91 
1.4 Finance costs 16 20 25 32 38 46 54 64 
1.5 Realised land gains ('winstnemingen') 61 72 89 96 98 105 108 58 
1.6 total costs  379 438 506 568 638 697 774 791 
Revenues                 
2.1 Residential land sold to developers   112 130 151 157 187 199 229 239 
2.2 Industrial and office  land sold to 
developers  80 81 83 86 94 109 111 122 
2.3 Sold, other 19 20 29 31 32 34 40 44 
2.4 Contribution to reserve 39 48 53 66 69 76 92 94 
2.5 Subsidies  16 18 18 23 26 30 32 45 
2.6 Divers income  25 26 37 36 41 43 37 42 
2.7 Totaal project revenue -291  -321  -371  -399  -449  -491  -540  -587  
3. book value municipal land bank 88  115  134  167  187  205  235  206  
 
In these years the realised gains from land activities are lower than the  obligatory-contribution' 
towards the general municipal budget thus decreasing the financial reserve 
* >2011 based on meerjarenperspectief grondexploitatie 2013 that is based on market research 
by an external consultancy firm 
** two incidential payments, numbers unkwown 
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Consequently, the developer could decide when they would re-buy the land for 
construction. In this period the municipality would hold the land combined with the 
finance and bureaucratic costs related to the land purchase (i.e., lines 1.1—1.4 in Table 
6.2). 
 
Unrealistic accounting. In 2000, Apeldoorn, in line with new central government policy, 
started to prioritize urban (re-)development projects to become more attractive to 
younger households. To increase the success of these projects Apeldoorn delayed 
projects at the urban edge as Zuidbroek in which it had already invested much. 
Moreover, the higher costs of urban (re-)development resulted in lower land gains for 
the municipality thus contributing less to a sound financial condition for the land bank. 
In Apeldoorn’s own accounting these costs—between 2003—2010 €172 million for 
land purchases; €127 million for land preparation costs and €58 million for planning 
bureaucracy (Table 6.2B1.1-1.3)—were calculated as contributing to the book value of 
the land bank. This method of calculation whereby the book value is calculated by 
subtracting the revenues from the costs (see Table 6.2AB) introduced the oddity that 
increasing costs increased the book value. An oddity that could remain in place as long 
as a substantial amount of ‘prepared’ land was sold to developers (which was the case 
until 2006, see Table 6.2B1.5). Finance costs (Table 6.2B1.4) were calculated by 
Apeldoorn’s municipal treasury through taking the general interest rate the municipality 
paid itself plus a margin. This interest rate—between 2003-2010 on average around 
4%, see Table 6.2B1.4—was then multiplied by the total book value of the landbank. 
Consequently, this margin created an additional profit stream from the land bank 
towards the general municipal budget: “that stirred discussion within the City Council, 
the question arose whether the municipality was not earning money from the municipal 
land bank solely through borrowing money to it” (Interview). 
 
Neglecting of risks. A land bank has to hold a financial reserve that forms the buffer 
between risks of land activities and general municipal finance. Apeldoorn calculated 
this reserve in 1999 on €11.3 million. But, despite increasing its landownership from 
€88 million to €235 million in book value (Table 6.2B3), never increased its reserve. 
Until 2006 this revolved without problems as the realized land gains (Table 6.2B1.5) 
were higher than the (obligatory) transfers towards the general municipal budget 
(Table 6.2A.5). However, in 2006 the Municipal executive board started to demand a 
minimum annual income from the land bank to fund its entrepreneurial ambitions for 
its political programme 2006—2010 (see Table 6.2A.5), while land gains were 
considerably lower than expected as demand for new properties was much lower than 
the municipality had calculated. Although various actors warned several times, the City 
Council did not probe the land activities critically as it shared the Municipal Executive 
Board’s planning optimism. 
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As the result of the above, and in particular the neglect of the over-planning, the 
municipality of Apeldoorn blew its own bubble, expressed in a very high book value of 
land (€235 million in 2009, Table 6.2B.3) that did not express developers’ willingness 
to buy land. But rather expressed municipal calculative practices that presented land 
acquired overly expensively and planning costs too high as ‘investments’ increasing 
land value but ignoring related risks. As the obligatory contribution from the land bank 
towards the general municipal budget and high internal finance costs had eaten away 
its financial reserve moderately decreasing the ‘planning ambitions’ to deflate fictitious 
values had become impossible by 2009. In addition, between 2005 and 2009 
Apeldoorn invested in multiple, large real estate projects related to health care (Omni 
sport/health), culture (CODA museum) and education (several schools) raising its total 
debt considerably (see Figure 6.3) putting pressure on the general budget through 
higher finance costs.  
In 2010 the Province of Gelderland announced new norms on regional planning 
capacities that put a cap on Apeldoorn’s residential ambitions forcing the Municipal 
Executive Board to formulate more realistic growth ambitions. Severely lowering the 
planning capacity meant that estimated future profits became losses and Apeldoorn 
took “almost €200 million in losses. We took the losses at once and have been very 
open about the losses and their consequences” (alderman of urban planning Stukker 
in van Meteren, 2015, p. 0 translation by author). This devaluation is clearly observable 
in Figure 6.3: from €293 million municipal land holdings and non-developed land in 
2009 to €115 million in 2011. Consequently, the general reserve (see Figure 6.3) 
became negative requiring an intervention of the province of Gelderland11 that saw the 
problems relatively late as it relied primarily on Apeldoorn’s external accountant who 
approved annual accounts/budgets and detailed analyses of land bank activities were 
not part of the supervision (Interview). To solve the financial problems, the municipality 
had to implement structural austerities of about €8 to €10 million annually to be able to 
solve its deficit by 2022. For doing so, among other things, municipal staff was reduced 
considerably, budgets were cut in particular related to culture, education and urban 
planning (i.e., decrease of money labelled for specific expenses in Figure 6.3) and local 
taxes were also severely increased (City of Apeldoorn, 2016b). Financial prudency is 
still the most important issue: there is no funding yet for ‘new policy initiatives’ (City of 
Apeldoorn, 2016b). The City Council also completed a local enquiry 
(Enquetecommissie Grondbedrijf, 2012) leading to the resignation of the Municipal 
Executive Board. Another measurement was to appoint a strong financial controller 
and increasing transparency to establish “trust so unrealistic prognoses would become 
something from the past” (Interview). Also, Apeldoorn decided to take a passive role 
in urban development putting a halt to its active land banking (City of Apeldoorn, 2013). 
                                            
11The province is the first supra-local supervisory authority related to municipal finance, but, in case 
of severe problems different supra-provincial agencies are activated and ultimately the department 
of domestic affairs. A province has also other tasks that intervene with municipal affairs such as 
regional planning and the redistribution of subsidies.  
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However, as Apeldoorn only devaluated and not sold its land holdings the shift towards 
passive land policy is slow and the seduction to start profiting from recovering real 
estate markets high:  
it is not unrealistic to think that when better times arrive, in the sense that Apeldoorn 
attracts more people and becomes more attractive for corporations, and local 
politicians see the real estate developers arriving in their Maseratis again, that we 
all are seduced to start active land banking again. (Interview) 
I think about that differently, because after everything we have been through in 
Apeldoorn the decision to start active land banking again would be a very hard 
decision for the City Council. I don’t see that happening soon. (Interview) 
 
6.6.3 European style financialization?  
The sections above aimed to bring the Dutch case in conversation with the American 
literature through studying the genesis of financialization processes in urban 
governance related to urban development. This demonstrated how most wider 
processes and changes that caused the financializing of American urban governance 
are clearly observable in particular financialized real estate markets and the systematic 
reproduction of more market oriented attitudes and policy instruments in regard to 
urban development. However, although financial liberalization has led to the rise of 
predatory finance in other domains, an extensive inter-municipal financial solidarity 
system supervised by central state agencies and financed by the (local) state-owned 
BNG Bank have ring-fenced municipalities from direct interaction with financial actors. 
As the case of Apeldoorn illustrates, after large financial losses not financial actors 
took over but the supervisor, the province of Gelderland, while BNG Bank continued 
borrowing at the same interest rates as to other municipalities (Vos and Westerhuis, 
2014 interviews). Consequently, in the case of all Dutch municipalities, despite large 
losses on land holdings finance has not taken over and general municipal budgets are 
still largely contributed towards managerial tasks (see Figure 6.3). 
However, what is clearly observable is how municipal finance became, through 
municipal land banks, connected to highly leveraged and volatile real estate markets 
creating substantial public profits during booms and considerable loses during the 
downturn. By neglecting risk-management, through unprofessional land acquisition 
that led to high land purchase costs and calculative practices that presented 
bureaucratic costs as increasing land values risks of these real estate markets became 
closely connected to municipal finance. It also shifted the focus form urban planning 
as the provision of public good towards a search for models to extract profits from 
increasing real estate prices. In contrast with the USA, this dominant governing 
rationality (Table 6.1.5) does not relate to financial actors (that do profit through 
increased possibilities for debt production or property investment opportunities) but to 
the interplay between local politicians/civil servants with land owners and private 
developers thereby introducing excessive municipal risk taking. Crucial techniques 
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(Table 6.1.6) are the municipal land banks combined with urban planning capacities 
especially re-zoning and the building permit application system connecting municipal 
finance closely to financialized real estate markets. These land banks are primarily 
steered by the Municipal Executive Board (especially the alderman of spatial planning) 
and some highly placed civil servants within the land bank possibly moving political 
dynamics (Table 6.1.7) beyond local control through the City Council. Consequently, 
usually active municipal land banking prioritizes profitability over public good provisions 
through urban planning. In contrast with the USA, these processes did not set in motion 
intense intra-urban competitions leading to fiscal balkanization as supervisory bodies, 
in particular provinces, still put the sharp edges of urban competition. 
The next section presents the Flemish experience with transformations in urban 
governance related to urban development exemplified through the case of Antwerp. 
This enables to present some thoughts on similarities and differences in the use of 
municipal instruments to steer urban development in section 6.8.  
6.7 The entrepreneuralization of Flemish (sub-)urban (re-)development 
Section 6.7.1 first shows how in the laissez-faire mode of (sub-)urban development 
Flemish municipalities only played a facilitating role. During the 1990s, however, the 
mode of urban development morphed towards a more entrepreneurial mode in which 
state agencies started playing a more prominent role. Section 6.7.2 analyses the 
genesis of Flemish urban entrepreneurialism through the case of Antwerp arguing that 
there was first a mode of social entrepreneurialism focused on spatial quality, but, since 
2012 a mode in which private interest of developers prevail showing remarkable 
resembles with American entrepreneurialism.  
 
6.7.1 An entrepreneurial stance towards urban (re-)development 
Section 6.5 indicates that during the 1990s the Flemish and Belgian government has 
invented urban policies and related funding that, in the 2000s increasingly became 
labelled for entrepreneurial projects especially observable through the mushrooming 
of PPPs. PPPs are now a common tool in urban (re-)development. Municipalities, for 
example, often bring old municipally owned properties into a deal with developers that 
allow them to negotiate terms around spatial quality that reach further than the regular 
planning tools but also introduce real estate risks for the municipality. Still, this section 
will show that autonomous municipal real estate organizations play a crucial role to 
understand how Flemish municipalities adopted a more market oriented attitude 
towards urban development, and, also, started to actively operate on real estate 
markets.  
A long and rich history of policies promoting both home ownership and self-
provision established a deep need for both home ownership and self-building of 
preferable detached houses among Flemish households (cf. De Decker et al., 2005; 
De Decker, 2011). Also, small, private landowners have been dominant over urban 
planning allowing the continuous growth of urban sprawl. Land was seen as “an 
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abundant consumable commodity” (Franzen and Halleux, 2004, p. 53), a legitimate 
source of profit and the institutional framework allowed households (i.e., small, private 
landlords) and construction firms to build real estate to their likening. House prices 
followed an economic model based on a vast supply of land: the further away from the 
urban centre the cheaper the land became, resulting into a lot of ‘spatial waste’, 
inefficiency, and congestion (De Decker, 2011, Halleux et al., 2012). The non-
development of urban policy led to persistent urban problems and created “an 
astonishing indifference to or ignorance of what happens in the cities of one of the most 
urbanized areas of the world” (De Decker et al., 2005, p. 159) resulting in high levels 
of socio-economic segregation (van Hamme et al., 2011; Kesteloot and Saey, 2002). 
Whereas in the late 1980s urban planning related to housing was minimal, central state 
agencies did have planning policies mostly related to investment policies especially 
around industrial activities. As economic policy became a regional responsibility, 
attention shifted to policies aiming to modernize Flanders economy especially trough 
innovation and cluster policies opening up for neoliberal ideologies (Oosterlynck, 
2010). This created opportunities for state agencies to influence urban development 
and, in addition to the old, laissez-faire mode of suburban development, since the late 
1990s more urban forms of residential real estate started to outpace the production of 
traditional suburban developments (Ruimte Vlaanderen, 2016).  
The election victories of the extreme-right-wing party Vlaams Blok starting in the 
late 1980s did set in motion the creation of urban policy. Vlaams Blok’s voters were 
predominantly located in poor, urban neighbourhoods creating a feeling of urge within 
the traditional anti-urban political parties to start paying attention towards urban policy 
to improve conditions of the poor (De Decker et al., 2005; Christiaens et al., 2007). 
This resulted into the development of planning instruments and funding for local 
governments aiming to improve social and urban conditions through urban projects 
enabling social-innovative forms of urban (re-)development that aim to put the quality 
of social relationships central (Moulaert and Nussbaumer, 2005; Debruyne et al., 
2008). 
Since the late1990s both central and local state agencies started to shift towards 
“a more pro-urban and entrepreneurial approach” (Loopmans, 2007, p. 215). Public 
funding is redirected less towards supporting the poor, and more towards (re-
)development projects that aim to attract higher income groups (Verdonck and van 
Droogenbroeck, 2011). New legislation not only allowed municipalities to become 
active in PPPs, it also created the opportunity to set up autonomous municipal 
corporations (Autonome Gemeentebedrijven, hereafter AG) that were first used to 
develop infrastructure and public buildings in an optimal way fiscally (Taşan-Kok, 
2010). Soon, primarily larger cities used these corporations as an entity to become 
active in real estate investing/development. Smaller municipalities often opted for a 
different construction, namely to work together through inter-municipal cooperation-
entities (intercommunales) in often more suburban development projects.  
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The AGs are separate entities giving them more flexibility and less 
accountability to City Councils while the municipality is the sole shareholder. Usually, 
they play a key role in larger urban real estate (re-)developments, as (advisor to the) 
planning agency and real estate developer by actively buying land/properties and (re-
)developing new properties, or by participating, often with various other semi-state 
agencies in PPPs (Loopmans, 2008; Taşan-Kok, 2010). The entity of an AG allows to 
“react in a more flexible way on opportunities than existing bureaucratic structures 
allowed” (Interview). And, although there is supra-local supervision over the annual 
accounts of AGs their consolidated balance sheets are excluded from calculating the 
balanced budget so crucial for supra-local supervision thereby creating a realm for 
municipalities to become creative with finance (Leroy, 2015). 
Both the origination of PPPs and municipal real estate corporations has moved 
the decision-making process around urban development into a new, multi-actor and 
multi-scalar, institutional setting giving a selective group of (semi-)private actors 
(primarily developers, investors, AGs and landowners) and individuals within state 
agencies (primarily mayors, aldermen, engineers, ministers) considerable power. This 
room to manoeuvre for individuals is increased by the fragmented governance system 
in Flanders that consists of a complex web of institutions that relies on ad hoc 
organisation of relationships (Taşan-Kok, 2010). Moreover, as planning laws can still 
be interpreted rather differently depending on place and local political forces projects 
sometimes have unexpected, contested outcomes (de Vries, 2015). Although power-
constellations differ from project to project, in general, it means that urban development 
is managed by a technocratic elite that is primarily concerned with the profitability of 
projects and their prestige: a project’s ability to put a city on the map (Block et al., 
2012). Put differently, the decision making process around urban development seems 
to take increasingly place in a post political realm of public and private planning-
technocrats forming local growth coalitions (Haughton et al., 2013; Oosterlynck, 2010). 
However, this process is geographically variegated, as in larger Flemish cities, with a 
more profound history of social innovation, these type of projects still have meaningful 
social components (Loopmans, 2007). 
 This section indicates that in particular in larger Flemish cities a wide range of 
entrepreneurial tools has become/is available for local politicians to steer urban (re-
)development. The crucial instrument is the autonomous real estate corporation (AG) 
within larger cities and inter-municipal cooperation-entities (intercommunales) within 
smaller municipalities12. But, it is unclear how these entities connect municipal finance 
with local real estate markets. The next section tries to shed light on these connections 
by analysing one of the largest real estate AGs, AG Vespa in Antwerp.  
 
                                            
12 Intercomunales are extremely interesting entities to further research. However, within the scope 
of this project it was only possible to focus on one entity and as discussed in the introduction, the 
case of Antwerp was seen as most fruitful.  
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6.7.2 A municipal instrument to steer urban development: AG Vespa 
Antwerp, the second largest city of Belgium (population approximately 517,000) is, in 
contrast with most other Flemish cities, rather internationally oriented, has 
neighbourhoods were much poverty is concentrated and intense competition with 
surrounding suburbs created a more profound form of entrepreneurialism 
(Maesschalck, 2011). Moreover, Antwerp has a problematic history with debt creating 
a continuing conscience about the risks of opportunistic financial decisions. 
Nevertheless, the analyses are centred on Antwerp’s municipal real estate corporation 
AG Vespa that has become, in line with other larger Flemish municipalities, a popular 
instrument to steer urban development. Accordingly, it is expected that findings from 
the Antwerp case could be relevant for a better understanding of all real estate oriented 
AGs in Flanders. 
 The origination of urban policy and related supra-local funding was welcomed 
by Antwerp as it struggled with both persistent urban problems and high levels of debt 
that required continuous structural austerity programmes since the late 1980s 
onwards. The European Union fund Urban I starting in 1994 could be seen as a critical 
moment  as the EU not only required 83% of additional local/federal/national funding 
for the realisation of social urban projects (AG Stadsplanning, 2012; Christiaens et al., 
2007). But, more crucially, the requirements of Urban I forced state agencies into 
cooperation and professionalization as it demanded an integrated approach towards 
neighbourhood vitalization and realisation of projects within a relative brief time 
horizon. To realise these goals it was necessary to set up new municipal entities that 
would during the 2000s evolve into the crucial municipal instruments for urban (re-
)development: AG Vespa (2003) and between 2009—2014 also AG Stadsplanning 
(Van Den Broeck et al., 2015). 
Until 2003 “[public] money was the engine of large urban development projects. 
As most expertise was concentrated among civil servants who became urban planning 
professionals, they were more in power than the local government” (Interview). There 
was widespread consensus among both local government and the professionalizing 
planning entities that social goals should be central and funds primarily flew to 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. These social goals were combined with physical 
interventions that emphasized spatial quality: social innovative urban (re-)development 
(Christiaens et al., 2007; Van Den Broeck, 2011; Moulaert and Jessop, 2013). 
In 2003 the new social-democratic mayor Janssen installed a pragmatic 
approach centralizing the City’s authority and putting real estate projects central to 
attract the “more vital population” (Anciaux in Loopmans et al., 2010, p. 193). 
Supported by changes in supra-local urban policy, i.e., making PPPs possible in 2002 
(Taşan-Kok, 2010), and in supra-local funding, i.e., from SIF funding social projects 
towards City Fund and Big Cities Policy putting more emphasis on funding urban (re-
)development to attract higher income groups (Loopmans, 2007), from Urban I to 
Urban II that stimulates to realise more “spectacular projects for a wider audience” 
(Interview) such as the MAS-museum, Antwerp started to prioritize the improvement 
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of liveability through solving safety-issues, improving public space and prioritizing 
spatial quality. But, elements of the social-innovative approach remained in practice, 
and AG Stadsplanning had a powerful role whereby spatial quality considerations 
where often prioritize over the profitability of real estate projects (Van Den Broeck et 
al., 2015). 
The 2012 elections put, for the first time since long, a non-social-democratic 
mayor in power, de Wever of the Flemish nationalist party (NVA), who continues “to 
bring forward large-scale and ambitious projects” (Clark et al., 2016, p. 20). However, 
for doing so a new attitude is introduced that prioritizes close corporations with private 
developers whereby often developer’s interests become dominant (Cochez, 2016; 
Cochez and Timmermans, 2014 Interviews). Crucial are cutbacks and the closing of 
AG Stadsplanning–that guarded over spatial quality—into AG Vespa moving the 
decision making process around urban development into the ‘backrooms’: 
In the past, the private contribution to public space was first negotiated by AG 
Vespa/AG Stadsplanning and then accepted by politicians. Nowadays these 
negoitations take place between private developers and politicians in restaurants. So, 
that is a different procedure in which private interests are more powerful. On the other 
hand, private actors also help to bring back private capital to the city, it is another 
question whether the projects they finance are good for the city. (Interview) 
The discussion above shows that the municipal real estate corporation AG 
Vespa has been used differently, depending on the specific aims of the Municipal 
Executive Board. The remainder of this section tries to shed light on how AG Vespa is 
connected to municipal finance and Antwerp’s real estate market by discussing 
Vespa’s history and crucial financial elements displayed in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. 
The execution of the integrated approach the Urban I programme required, 
made clear that actively buying, (re-)developing and selling properties was extremely 
difficult within the regular City-administration (Interviews). As the new, national Big City 
Policy launched a revolving fund that enabled municipalities to buy, renovate and sell 
properties to improve neighbourhoods AG Vespa was set up in 2003 with the important 
task to actively (re-)develop residential units (398 between 2003-2013) and public 
buildings (17 in the same period) in deprived neighbourhoods: as the grey and black 
striped lines in Figure 6.4 indicate, much of the income and expenses of Vespa relates 
to this activity. The aim was to upgrade specific key properties—often corner 
buildings—through high quality architecture and selling them at a loss to higher income 
groups with the aim that their presence would put in motion processes that structurally 
upgrade these disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Loopmans, 2008), i.e., to practice 
“urban acupuncture” (de Ridder, 2015). The national Big City policy was regionalized 
in 2014 and halted, hence, the revolving fund—exemplified through the treasury on 
Vespa’s balance sheet—now slowly starts to dry out (i.e., Treasury in Figure 6.5 from 
€95 million in 2013 to €71 million in 2015). However, late 2016 the  
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Figure 6.4  Income and expenditure AG Vespa (in million Euro). 
 
Source: Annual reports AG Vespa 
 
Flemish government decided to re-activate this funding probably spurring AG Vespa’s 
urban acupuncture activity. 
With the creation of AG Vespa the municipal real estate expertise became 
concentrated within a professional organization to smoothen the urban planning 
process making it more attractive for private actors to participate (Taşan-Kok, 2010). 
The entity of an AG enabled to attract real estate and planning professionals as AGs 
don’t have to obey civil servants labour contracts allowing to offer “a flexible and 
competitive HR-management” (Stad Antwerpen, 2007, p. 61 translated by author). This 
decentralization also enabled to “act more in line with the ideas of the autonomous 
organization than to act completely in line with politics, with the operating programme: 
it offers the opportunity to run parallel” (Interview) partly transferring municipal 
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influence over urban (re-)development towards the civil servants within AG Vespa and 
AG Stadsplanning that guarded over spatial quality (AG Stadsplanning, 2012). In this 
respect, especially the transferring of municipal properties, the related loan and the 
valuation of these properties created a more powerful position for AG Vespa (see 
below) while the high spatial quality requirement increased AG Stadsplanning’s  
position vis-à-vis the Municipal Executive Board. Still, the Municipal Executive Board 
remained in control over both AGs (cf. Van Den Broeck et al., 2015).  
Also, the entity of an AG enables a municipality to become active on land 
markets, and, as the black striped/dotted line in Figure 6.4 indicates, in the period 
between 2008-2015 Vespa bought €25.5 million of land for (re-)development projects 
also participating in larger urban projects. Still, land holdings are relatively small 
compared to the large property portfolio for which Vespa became responsible in 2010 
(see Figure 6.5) when properties that had become abundant as the result of municipal 
re-organizations together with some let properties were transferred to AG Vespa with 
the specific aim “to activate and optimize the City’s real estate portfolio by improving 
letting conditions or improving sales revenues and speeding up both processes as the 
City needed money for its austerities” (Interview). The properties were valued at €129 
million by Vespa (AG VESPA, 2011), but as this had to be done in a short period: 
that took place on the basis of rough estimations: one estimation was more detailed 
than the other … but, for other properties, we have to conclude that they miss-
estimated the values. (Interview)  
The transfer included a special loan of €100 million that had to be repaid through 
income generated from the properties together with the requirement to transfer 
rental/sale-income whereby a minimal engagement was set on €8—€10 million 
annually between 2010—2014 and on €4.5 million from 2015 onwards (which is much 
lower than the realised income for rental/sale; grey striped/dotted line in Figure 6.5). 
However, unexpected tax costs of €2 million between 2010-2012 (Interview) stimulated 
actors to find more feasible constructions:  
to find a solution that minimizes the payable taxes a construction has been made 
that is a mixture of capital provision and a subordinated loan. The instrument of an 
AG enables this tax optimizing behaviour. (Interview)  
for example, to transfer rental income flows on an annual basis from the AG to the 
City so the City does not have to pay taxes over rental income. And, to compensate 
the income from property sales by paying back the subordinated loan partly. 
(Interview) 
 As Figure 6.5 illustrates, this transfer created a sizeable balance sheet 
increasing the power of AG Vespa vis-à-vis private real estate actors but also within 
the City of Antwerp. But, also the extensive balance sheet of AG Vespa now makes 
the City itself more vulnerable for downturns on Antwerp’s real estate market, for 
instance, when projected sale prices would be lower than expected. Still, almost all of 
the liabilities displayed on Figure 6.5 exist of internal loans/capital provision to optimize 
fiscal arrangements between Vespa and the City: since 2009 there is only one loan of 
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€4 million from an external provider, ING, used to purchase land for a project. On the 
asset side the treasury is invested in a mixture of deposits, bonds and saving accounts 
creating some financial risks.  
 Vespa’s large balance sheet combined with a new Municipal Executive Board 
that prefers to deal more directly with private developers and aims to realise larger 
projects could transform Vespa into an instrument to generate income from a 
continuously booming Antwerp real estate market. These rising real estate prices seem 
to mask that a sophisticated framework to protect Antwerp’s municipal finance from 
real estate market risks is missing, while also the efficiency and effectivity of the current 
mode of municipal real estate asset management could be questioned. Therefore, 
further analyses are needed, but, a major element lessening Vespa’s exposure to risks 
are its low levels of external debt.  
 
6.7.3 American style entrepreneuralism? 
Section 6.5 shows that wider processes and changes (i.e., elements 1—4 in Table 6.1) 
that caused financialization of American urban governance are not that clearly 
observable in the Flemish case as it still contains important barriers towards 
financialization processes. The balance sheets of Flemish municipalities are, in 
general, shorter and do not contain complex financial instruments and much lower 
debt-to-income levels. But, Section 6.5 also illustrates that in line with the United States 
in the 1980s Flanders experienced “after-Fordist flexibliziation and internationalization” 
combined with periods of “weak and uneven growth” (Table 6.1.1) processes 
stimulating state agencies to discover entrepreneurialism to enhance economic 
competiveness. However, strong labor unions protected several domains from 
neoliberal processes, and continuing and deepening regionalization created specific 
local pathways whereby the Flemish real estate markets, also in downtowns, did boom 
but without a debt explosion. In line with American urban governance (cf. Cox, 2009; 
Cox, 2010) Flemish municipalities have a long history with financial and fiscal 
autonomy that has increased since the 1990s whereby supra-local budgets for urban 
development were increasingly attributed towards entrepreneurial goals (Table 6.1.2). 
Furthermore, as Flemish bureaucracies are typically fragmented, politicized and 
overruled by well-developed political offices (Beaumont and Loopmans, 2008) 
(individual) politicians can become powerful actors allowing market oriented ‘soft’ or 
‘flexible’ planning and empowering private actors (Table 6.1.3). As central planning 
agencies are weak and rules are opaque with serious local differences creating much 
room to bargain between local politicians and real estate actors enabling regulation to 
take place “after the fact” (Table 6.1.4). 
 Section 6.7 indicates that dominant governing rationalities closely resemble 
American practices with elements such as “growth machine’ consensus .. corporate 
subsidization and place marketing” and “growth coalitions, democratic deficits” (Table 
6.1.5). Consequently, Antwerp’s current form of urban entrepreneuralism seems to be  
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Figure 6.5 AG Vespa's largest assets and liabilities (in million Euro) 
 
Source: Annual Reports AG Vespa 
 
much more in line with practices observed in other Flemish cities in which local 
connections are crucial: “that means that local governments have very close ties with 
certain private developers, personal connections are still very important” (Interview; 
see also Chapter 4) and public investments are increasingly allocated to make the 
projects of private actors possible within a context of inter-urban competition 
(especially between central cities and suburbs). For doing so, besides conventional 
PPPs, a crucial technique (Table 6.1.6) are municipal real estate corporations that 
connect municipal finance with local real estate markets. The case of 
Antwerpen/Vespa illustrate that municipal real estate corporations can serve different 
political goals: from instrument to make neighbourhoods more attractive for higher 
income groups through an integrated approach focusing on spatial quality and social 
elements (under mayor Janssens) to an instrument to smoothen the development 
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process for private real estate actors attracting more private investment (under mayor 
de Wever). Nonetheless, in both situations, the decision making process around urban 
(re-)development seems to take place within the realm of ad-hoc coalitions of influential 
individuals through various combinations of planning professionals, local politicians 
and real estate actors (Table 6.1.7). 
 
6.8 Discussion & conclusion  
Most of the urban government in the Low Countries still relates to the management of 
public services: maintaining the thick layers of urban economies such as employment 
around public good provision and protecting urban economies for downturns in global 
capitalism (Engelen et al., 2016; Verdonck and van Droogenbroeck, 2011). 
Nonetheless, maintaining spending on public services does not exclude the adoption 
of neoliberal policy tools and practices that changes the way in which these budgets 
are spend, and, consequently the effects on urban societies. Focusing on a policy 
domain in which municipalities in both countries have considerable influence, urban 
development, this chapter shows a paradox. While dominant paradigms on 
globalisation, European integration and financialization suggest that cities become 
increasingly dependent on global capitalism and penetrated by financialization 
processes, Flemish and Dutch cities mostly adopted pro-growth policies that aim at 
luring domestic flows of investments and the domestic economic sustainable 
population towards their territories. For doing so, real estate projects are often used. 
But as municipalities were ring-fenced through national regulation they were not 
allowed to finance their growing real estate ambitions trough global capital markets. 
Consequently, direct influence of financial actors on urban government, e.g., “the 
taking up of specific financial managerial practices and techniques” (Engelen et al., 
2014, p. 1075) is in both countries largely absent.  
Nevertheless, in line with ideas around the post political (Swyngedouw, 2009; 
Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010) crucial municipal instruments have been (re-
)invented that move the decision making process around urban development to a realm 
of (semi-)public and private actors prioritizing entrepreneurial goals over public good 
provision (see Table 6.3). The integration of these instruments, the Dutch municipal 
land banks and the Flemish municipal real estate corporations, can be seen as the 
systematic local re-production of neoliberal urban policy tools that prioritize more 
market oriented solutions. The active use of these neoliberal urban development policy 
instruments makes municipalities active players on local real estate markets thereby 
connecting risks of (financialized) real estate markets to municipal finance. As sizeable 
parts of municipal budgets have become allocated to investments in local real estate 
markets, real estate risks can become excessive because these organizations have a 
bureaucratic perspective that neglects essential features of real estate markets, for 
instance, lacking a sophisticated risk management strategy. In sum, in line with the 
expectation from the literature also urban government in the Low Countries  
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Table 6.3 Variegated municipal instruments to steer urban development 
  Antwerp Apeldoorn 
Municipal expertise around real 
estate markets/finance 
low low 
Name instrument AG Vespa 
Grondbedrijf (municipal land 
bank) 
Debt related to municipal RE 
activities 
(extremely) low high 
Supra-local supervision on 
instrument 
low low 
Power of Municipal executive board 
on instrument 
high high 
Democratic control through city 
council 
low low 
Openness to cooperate with private 
RE actors 
high high 
Forced contribution to general 
municipal finance 
Considerable lower than RE 
revenues; no pressure to 
increase profits 
First in line with RE revenue, 
later higher than revenues 
pressuring to increase profits 
Internal loans to entity Considerable 
Considerable with interest 
margin for general municipal 
budget 
Main activity 
Asset management/project 
management 
Land speculation/urban 
planning 
Risk management system Absent 
Only created after major 
losses in 2010. 
Local real estate values Continuously rising 
Rising until 2010, since then 
decreasing  
Shared outcomes 
Instruments connect municipal finance with local real 
estate markets and enable to profit from rising real estate 
values; 
instruments open up possibilities to more closer 
cooperation with private actors; 
instruments create a realm for bureaucratic calculative 
practices related to real estate finance  
 
experienced a wave of neoliberalization since the 1990s that made the introduction of 
entrepreneurial tools to steer urban development more feasible.  
Analysing the specificity of both cases enables to discuss two variegated, 
European versions of, to a certain degree, financialized and entrepreneurial urban 
governance around urban development. Dutch urban government around urban 
development has experienced some similar stimuli as the US to financialize especially 
heavily financializing domains of its political economy, debt-fuelled real estate bubbles 
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and a discourse emphasizing the exchange value of land. However, crucially, as Dutch 
municipalities are to a high degree ring-fenced from interaction with financial actors 
whole-sale American-style financialization of urban governance has been impossible. 
Also, enduring institutional frameworks based on inter-municipal financial solidarity still 
offer an “infrastructural baseline that mitigate[s] the sharpest edges of uneven 
development” (Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 48). Nevertheless, Dutch municipalities adopted 
an urban development model in which they used municipal land banks to purchase 
large land holdings and their planning authorities to re-zone especially agricultural land 
into more profitable uses. Consequently, instead of tempering euphoria within real 
estate markets state agencies have made increasing euphoria a policy priority. (Semi-
)private and public actors have collectively embraced an economic growth model 
based on excessive real estate debt creation in which the production of new real estate 
was a crucial element. Once the Dutch real estate bubble busted the most speculative 
municipalities experienced that they had taken excessive risks requiring rigid 
austerities to balance their budgets. But, cheap finance from a state bank and 
supervision from the provinces and in some cases the central state prevented 
municipalities for bankruptcy.  
As such, the Netherlands offers empirical evidence for an European variegation 
of the financialization of urban governance related to urban (re-)development. In line 
with the Spanish case (Coq-Huelva, 2013) financializing European urban governance 
is about close cooperation between (semi-)private real estate actors with pro-growth 
local governments (Molotch, 1993) actively adopting bureaucratic calculative practices 
and planning over optimism to profit from financialized real estate markets, and not, as 
in the United States, financial actors capturing urban governance. Consequently, the 
research agenda should not be as Peck and Whiteside (2016) suggest to research 
how financial actors through “intermediation, instrumentalization, institutionalization 
and intensification” (p. 239) capture urban governance. Instead, European studies on 
the financialization of urban government should revolve around the ways in which 
municipalities use specific instruments and related calculative practices that connect 
their finance to financialized real estate markets. 
Flemish municipalities have a long history of financial autonomy and financial 
experimentation has been much more pronounced in the past. Fragmented, 
uncooperative state agencies and a lax attitude towards urban planning made private 
land owners and construction firms the prime producers of ever expanding sprawl. 
Accordingly, the shift towards neoliberal entrepreneurialism is less pronounced as 
urban governance already contained elements of entrepreneurialism. Victories of a 
right wing party in the late 1980s set in motion some political efforts to create urban 
policies to improve the conditions of the right wing voters who lived in deprived urban 
neighbourhoods. Whereas the first wave of state supported urban (re-)development 
was distinctively social in nature with many social innovative projects (Christiaens et 
al., 2007; Moulaert et al., 2005; De Decker et al., 2005), from the late 1990s onwards 
entrepreneurial initiatives started to play a more dominant role (Loopmans, 2008; 
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Loopmans et al., 2010). Whereas autonomous municipal real estate corporations were 
first invented and massively used for tax purposes, in the early 2000s they became in 
larger cities often crucial vehicles to steer urban (re-)development. Combined with 
PPPs that are used also in smaller towns this not only connects municipal finance 
closely to local real estate markets, it also moves the decision making process away 
from City Councils towards the realm of public and private real estate ‘professionals’. 
As Flemish real estate prices have, since the early 1990s, been continuously rising 
and many municipal initiatives are loss generating, it is difficult to observe is excessive 
risk are token. However, elements as sophisticated risk management and basic 
information about valuation and market developments are largely absent within these 
bureaucratic entities.  
 As such, it is surprising how close Flemish entrepreneurialism resembles 
practices observed in the United States during the 1980s/1990s with similar growth 
coalitions and opaqueness around decision making procedures. This finding opens up 
future investigations into the temporality of dominant trends within urban governance 
elsewhere in Europe: why have the American model, and to a lesser extent the Dutch 
model, evolved from an entrepreneurial mode into financialized modes while in 
Flanders enterpreneuralism remains dominant? For doing so, a daunting next step in 
the analyses would be to place these changes in the wider studies of structural change 
within urban political economies: to also study urban economies and the extent to 
which financialization and entrepreneurialism are observable in local accumulation 
dynamics (Martinelli et al., 2013; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). In other words, to ‘update’ 
the seminal work of Terhorst and Van Den Ven (1997) by putting financialization in. 
Moreover, in line with for instance Kirkpatrick (2016), this would allow a richer 
conceptualization of the possibilities for contestation by, for example, conceptualizing 
about the realm for counter-hegemonies and ‘double movements’ (cf. Polanyi, 1957).  
 In conclusion, and summarized in Table 6.3, new municipal instruments to steer 
urban development have transferred activities that were formerly conducted by private 
actors, in the Dutch case land speculation, in the Flemish case primarily asset 
management and project management, to municipal organisations that operate 
relatively autonomously and are primarily steered by Municipal Executive Boards. As 
such, the debate how these instruments could be used for public good creation has 
become less relevant: urban projects are more steered towards the wishes of private 
actors, such as real estate buyers and developers, in order to make the municipal real 
estate organizations financial feasibly, or, sometimes, even profitable. Consequently, 
important risks related to these real estate activities are now connected to municipal 
finance whereby a sophisticated understanding of these risks, let alone management 
of it, is often lacking. In the case of Apeldoorn, where also much debt was adopted and 
the Municipal Executive Board demanded an unrealistically high revenue, this 
accumulated into losses of roughly €200 million at the costs of public service provision. 
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7. Conclusion 
As part of the larger REFCOM project this PhD thesis shared the broader aim to better 
understand the increased interconnections between finance, real estate and state 
agencies and how this structurally transform domestic and urban political economies, 
i.e., to better understand “the spatialities of contemporary capitalism” (Aalbers, 2013a, 
p. 1). It did so through putting the financialization of urban development, understood 
as financialization processes that structurally change the ways in which urban 
development takes place, central. At the onset of this dissertation, it was expected that, 
since their similar extensive financial balance sheets and Eurozone membership, the 
cases of Belgium/Flanders and the Netherlands would offer insights on two different, 
European, variegations of the financialization of urban development.  
Through answering the research questions that led this PhD thesis this 
conclusion argues that financialization processes are uneven and variegated, but not, 
omnipresent across the West. Accordingly, to understand the financialization of urban 
development it must be analyzed through a political economy perspective that is 
sensitive to context and scale, and includes a thorough understanding of planning 
traditions. This also requires a perspective that acknowledges both the multiple layers 
and scales of financialization processes and that its “penetration” (Engelen et al., 2014) 
in a certain domain or organization does not automatically mean that a political 
economy is fully financialized. 
Chapter 2 indicated that both finance and real estate have become important 
elements within both political economies of the Netherlands and Belgium, thus 
suggesting the rise of financialized capitalism. Then, chapters 3 through 6 showed that, 
in regard to urban development, different outcomes have been observed in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. As discussed in more detail in the following sections 7.1 and 
7.5, and in line with previous studies (Aalbers, 2008; Engelen et al., 2010; Engelen et 
al., 2014; Aalbers et al., 2011; Engelen, 2015; Bezemer and Muysken, 2015; Aalbers 
et al., 2017; Fernandez, 2011; McCarthy et al., 2016), the Dutch case proves to be a 
clear example of the manifold ways financialization can structurally change practices 
in non-financial realms. As such, the Dutch case demonstrates what happens when a 
system is almost fully incorporated into financialized capitalism. In this respect, the 
integration of real estate (production) into financial markets enlarges both the creation 
and evaporation of stocks of fictitious capital-making accumulation cycles more 
depend on financial markets and thus more volatile.  
There is some integration between finance and real estate in Belgium 
exemplified through the observation of financialization processes that are related to 
real estate (e.g., Immobel). Yet, financialization processes never accumulated to such 
an extent that financial actors, motives, practices or ideologies became dominant 
within the production of the built environment. As such, the Belgian case shows that 
financialization is not universal and ubiquitous across the West (cf. Christophers, 
2015): as sections 7.2 and 7.4 discuss, patient capital can function as an important 
barrier.  
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As section 7.4 also shows how, taken together, both cases shed light on 
elements of the variegated financialization of political economies. But, both cases also 
show that to understand urban development in financialized times we need a much 
more sophisticated framework on how finance morphs urban development. 
Accordingly, section 7.5 discusses how within financialized political economies urban 
development could be understood as a process of “fictitious capital formation” (cf. 
AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016). Section 7.6 presents a framework applicable to both 
non-financialized and financialized political economies that could be an opening for 
developing a more nuanced understanding on the mixtures of capital providers that 
finance urban development. In this respect crucial starting points are the work of both 
Jane Jacobs (1961) who distinguishes between “gradual” and “cataclysmic” money 
and Deeg and Hardie (2016) who argue to put the “patience” of capital providers 
central. 
 
7.1 The financialization of urban development 
 
 Research Question 1a) To what extent is the financialization of urban 
development observable in the Netherlands? And, how does it take place? 
 
As argued throughout this doctoral thesis, in the Netherlands urban development is 
highly financialized: the integration of financial and real estate markets has been so 
intense that, in tandem, they intensify economic cycles that highly depend on global 
(financial) markets. The open attitude of the Netherlands towards the financialization 
of the built environment primarily relates to a system in which urban planning, real 
estate investment and development is carried out by large (semi-) private corporations 
and public organisations (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). This cooperation rests on a 
long history with collective solutions that transformed a swamp that lays below sea 
level into a prosperous highly urbanized area (Halleux et al., 2012). Between the 
Second World War and the 1980s the Dutch political economy resembled many 
elements of Fordist economic development. This included urban planning led by 
central state agencies that aimed to equally redistribute wealth through geographically 
means and spur social housing production in order to solve the housing shortage, i.e., 
“spatial Keynesianism”. At this time urban development profit margins for private actors 
were relatively low with both local and central state agencies strongly in the lead 
(Needham et al., 2011; van der Krabben and Buitelaar, 2011).   
Since the early 1990s, a complex interplay of different factors started to change 
this model of urban development. A more general shift in which more market orientated 
policy solutions are prioritized is observable. In regard to urban development, 
European integration and the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty set in motion the 
(semi-)privatisation of many real estate activities within varying realms, ranging from 
social housing to commercial real estate development. These new, semi-private 
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entities often emphasized other goals than ‘wealth distribution’ and were open to 
(financial) innovation (Boon and Marel, 2010; Aalbers et al., 2017; Engelen et al., 
2014). Also, due to widening profit margins (see below) and re-regulation, real estate 
development and land speculation became profitable activities that opened urban 
development for (semi-)private corporations. Municipalities, that are allowed to profit 
from increases in land value, were very eager to facilitate “over-optimistic” urban 
development (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; Buitelaar, 2010; van der Krabben and 
Jacobs, 2013). 
This over-optimistic urban development was facilitated by an enormous influx of 
capital into real estate activities. Domestic real estate debt production became crucial 
input for the growth model of Dutch banks. On the one hand, banks lobbied 
successfully for reforms that both relaxed mortgage conditions and smoothed the 
securitisation of mortgages, thus enabling banks to grow and internationalize rapidly. 
These reforms combined with economic growth, increased labour market participation 
and increased home-ownership, spurring both housing prices and housing debt. 
(Aalbers, 2011a; Engelen, 2015). On the other hand, banks started to loosen borrowing 
conditions to real estate actors, and, also they started to participate in real estate 
development themselves. Moreover, with growing investment portfolios of Dutch 
institutional investors that still invested partly in Dutch real estate and the entrance of 
foreign investors, there was enduring demand for investment properties. 
Thiscontinuous influx (until 2007) of capital caused a long boom in real estate prices 
whereby all actors involved started to behave opportunistically and ‘manically’ 
(Kindleberger, 2000).  
In this context of neoliberalizing state agencies and financializing real estate 
markets, real estate development corporations started to adopt financialization tools 
and expanded rapidly, then giving birth to some of the largest European developers. 
Developers’ business models revolved around both increasing their corporate values 
and the value of their development projects, thereby paying less attention to actual 
cash flows. Debt was used to leverage their corporate and project values. This made 
their business models very dependent on the belief that future developments would be 
profitable enough to pay back their large loans and would then justify the opportunistic 
valuation of their corporations. These values were, as the credit crunch in 2007 
revealed, highly dependent on the continuous influx of new money (both debt to finance 
their own activity and investment capital to be able to sell properties to real estate 
buyers) and, as the enormous devaluations after 2007 showed, imaginary to a 
considerable degree. 
In this new, financialized mode of urban development, supra-local state 
agencies regulate a sophisticated planning system that facilitates large, complex real 
estate development projects that are often aiming to develop large districts. This 
requires close cooperation between various actors thereby paving the way for financial 
actors to finance these large projects that had, as long real estate prices rose, the 
predictable, positive results in the form of profits (Taşan-Kok, 2010; Buitelaar and 
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Bregman, 2016). As these profits were shared, also with municipalities, actors 
developed close ties and had incentives to prioritize the profitability of projects in 
particular as the municipal real estate organizations (i.e., land banks) operated in great 
autonomy (Gielen and Taşan-Kok, 2010; Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012).  
On the one hand this financialized model of urban development strongly relied 
on continuous real estate debt creation. On the other hand, with the large influx of 
finance into real estate, real estate had become an important element of the Dutch 
political economy. This required that, to sustain economic growth, urban development 
should keep pace. As a result, and in line with countries as Spain and Ireland (cf. Coq-
Huelva, 2013; Byrne, 2016), urban development and debt-fuelled real estate markets 
had become important engines for economic growth: a real estate finance driven 
growth regime was established (Hofman and Aalbers, n.d.; Smart and Lee, 2003). As 
such, the perspective switched from an emphasis on the use of value of the built 
environment towards an emphasis on its exchange value, thus prioritizing investment 
logics (Chiapello, 2015). This belief is embedded within a political economy 
characterized by powerful central state agencies able and willing to reform if that 
improves the county’s economic profile, labour unions that emphasize economic 
growth, large pension funds active on international financial markets, and large 
multinational corporations with an international orientation (Engelen et al., 2010; Bruff, 
2011). 
 
7.2 The non-financialization of urban development 
 
 Research Question 1b) To what extent is the financialization of urban 
development observable in Belgium/Flanders? And, how does it take 
place? 
 
Although there are financialization processes (Romainville, 2017; Deruytter and 
Derudder, 2015), finance is not dominant over Belgian urban development. As such, 
the Belgian case offers insights on barriers towards the financialization of urban 
development. These barriers relate back to Belgium’s long history with private 
ownership and management of both land and financial assets (Kesteloot and 
Maesschalck, 2001). In contrast to the Netherlands, wealth management is primarily 
an individual project and many households invest in housing and Belgian firms/bonds. 
Usually, they do so with a long-term investment horizon that also takes non-financial 
goals, such as reputation and socio-economic wealth, into consideration (Daems, 
1998; Molly et al., 2012). Also, fragmented land-ownership and a complex, layered 
state have stood in the way of the establishment of a strong urban planning system 
(De Decker et al., 2005; Van Den Broeck and Verachtert, 2016; Taşan-Kok, 2010). 
The resulting sprawling built environment is characterized by fragmented investment 
and piecemeal developments that do not need large external capital provision and 
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professional, technocratic actors to direct them. Consequently, until fairly recently, the 
largest amount of housing was produced through the self-provision of households, 
often in cooperation with small construction firms (Ruimte Vlaanderen, 2016; Halleux 
et al., 2012).  
In addition, real estate developers, usually with familial block-holders, are often 
resistant to external capital and corporate value growth: they aim to reproduce multi-
generational wealth in a stable manner, while primarily focusing on stable revenue and 
a solid local reputation (Lehrer and Schmid, 2015; Lehrer and Celo, 2016). Therefore, 
developers remain relatively small and locally orientated, thereby not opening up for 
financialization processes. They are focused on the regular production process and 
aim to maximize profits through minimizing costs and maximizing revenue by 
consistently working to develop the largest amount of square meters allowed. 
Furthermore, whereas the securitisation of real estate debt became a crucial element 
of Dutch banks’ growth models, Belgian banks instead turned to inter-bank lending on 
global financial markets in order to spur their internationalization and then continued a 
relatively stable debt production towards Belgian real estate activities.  
Also, in Belgium a clear neoliberal turn can be observed around the year 2000. 
But, facilitated by ineffectual state agencies and opposed by strong labour unions, this 
turn seems to have enabled less pronounced neoliberalization and much less 
pronounced financialization processes (Loopmans, 2007; Van Den Broeck, 2008; 
Kesteloot and Maesschalck, 2001). In regard to urban development, as private actors 
were already dominant and state funding towards, for instance, social housing, was 
limited, the room for this shift to have a considerable impact thus seems to have been 
much smaller: change is more incremental (Lindblom, 1959). What is clearly 
observable, however, is a shift in funding since the 2000s, , whereby public funding is 
used to regenerate residential properties in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, in hopes 
to spur urban regeneration.  
 Nevertheless, urban development projects still remain to be of relatively small 
size and the projects usually take a relatively long time to be completed. Furthermore, 
although municipalities have become more active on local real estate markets, their 
involvement is primarily based on attempts to improve neighbourhoods and make 
municipal real estate portfolio’s more efficient and not the profit seeking behaviour 
observed in the Dutch case. In this regard, the dominance of patient capital seems to 
play a crucial role as it echoes the wider belief that real estate is a proper investment 
category. The dominant view is that real estate investment means object-oriented 
investing: characteristics of a property such as it letting potential and use value are, in 
general, much more important than how the potential property value is evaluated by 
other investors. This belief is embedded within a political economy and characterized 
by the regionalization of public policy and state agencies, a local orientation of many 
domestic firms, the strong position of labour unions, ineffectual, fragmented state 
agencies that lack power to reform, and opaque governance structures that only seem 
to allow small incremental changes (Quentin and van Hamme, 2011; Moulaert and 
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Willekens, 1985; Stouthuysen and Jans, 2009; Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010). 
Within the Belgian political economy real estate is conceptualized as individual 
investment that needs protection; financializing it to spur economic growth at the 
domestic or federal level apparently has a lower priority (De Decker et al., 2005). 
Therefore, it is difficult to observe a financialization of urban development. 
 
7.3 The variegation of financialization processes related to urban development 
 
 Research Question 2) Are there important differences in the way the 
financialization of urban development takes place in the Netherlands and 
Belgium/Flanders? How and in what ways are these differences context 
specific?  
 
Table 7.1 gives a stylized summary of the main results of chapters 3 to 6 and tries to 
indicate which domains within political economies play a role in facilitating or 
hampering the financialization of urban development. Highlighting the role of the 
different actors helps to better understand possible causes for the difference between 
the relatively low financialization observed in the Belgian/Flemish case and the high 
levels within the Dutch case. Four of these context specific differences, that are 
interrelated, seem to be “necessary conditions” (cf. Goertz and Mahoney, 2005) and 
should be taken into account in any future studies on this topic. It is less clear if these 
four conditions are, when taken together, also sufficient for the financialization of urban 
development:   
 
State agencies’ abilities to facilitate neoliberal policies that underpin financialization 
processes. In both countries a new, clear preference of state agencies for more market 
oriented solutions towards urban development has been extensively described 
(Loopmans, 2008; De Decker, 2011; Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000; Taşan-Kok, 2010). 
In the Dutch case this included the extensive national re-regulation which facilitated 
the debt-fuelled growth of real estate markets (Aalbers et al., 2011), and a new urban 
planning paradigm that emphasized economic goals and openness towards private 
actors (Taşan-Kok and Korthals Altes, 2012; van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013; 
Buitelaar, 2010).  This received a warm welcome by municipalities as it enabled them 
to co-profit from urban development (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; Segeren et al., 
2005). At the same time, centrally organized, cooperative state agencies that shared 
an ‘optimistic’ view on the future and played a directive role in urban planning were 
crucial to implement this new regulation dynamic (Doucet, 2013; Terhorst and Van De 
Ven, 1997; Taşan-Kok, 2010). Accordingly, this meant a clear break from previous 
practices in which urban development was more oriented towards goals of equality that 
were associated with spatial Keynesianism such as the geographic redistribution of 
wealth. 
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Table 7.1 Financialization of urban development: role of different actors (pro or contra 
financialization) 
 
  Belgium/Flanders, barriers towards … The Netherlands, openings for … 
Financialization 
RE markets 
Medium High 
Financialization 
urban dev 
Low High 
Household’s 
assets 
Contra: individual wealth management, 
(patient capital): risk averse investment 
strategies, domestic oriented portfolio’s 
including direct real estate and land 
Pro: institutional (impatient capital): 
Anglo-American investment strategies, 
international portfolio’s including real 
estate shares 
Contra: high housing wealth and low 
mortgage debt 
Pro: high housing wealth and high 
mortgage debt 
Banks  
Pro: strongly connected to global 
finance  
Pro: strongly connected to global 
finance 
Contra: banks not using domestic real 
estate to accelerate growth: stable debt 
production 
Pro: domestic real estate crucial to 
accelerate growth: volatile debt 
production mimicking financial markets 
NFCs, Real estate 
development 
corporations 
Contra: familial shareholders (PC); local 
orientation; avers to rapid growth/high 
levels of debt; focus on stable dividend; 
relatively small projects 
Pro: different types of owners (including 
banks/institutional investors) but 
primarily acting opportunistically, 
usually internationally oriented, focused 
on larger projects and corporate value 
increase. 
 'Central' State 
Contra: regionalized, fragmented state: 
weak facilitator of neoliberalization 
processes 
Pro: centralized, strong state: strong 
facilitator of neoliberalization processes 
State: Urban 
Planning 
Contra: weak planning institutions, 
piecemeal, small simple (sub)urban 
development projects; increased 
preference market oriented solutions 
Pro: sophisticated, large, complex 
(sub)urban development projects based 
on optimistic visions for the future; 
cooperation between many (semi-
)public and private actors 
Local 
state/municipality 
Pro: prioritizing market oriented 
solutions 
Pro: entrepreneurial attitude: 
participates on local RE markets  
Contra: but relatively small financial 
risks 
Pro: prioritizing market oriented 
solutions 
Pro: entrepreneurial: very active on 
local land markets both as planner and 
speculator, large financial risk taking 
through municipal land banking 
 
  The Belgian state, due to its strong “centrifugal dynamics” (Stouthuysen and 
Jans, 2009), was never successful in implementing “spatial equalisation” policies, 
neither in industrial policy (Oosterlynck, 2007) nor in urban development, where it was 
impossible for state agencies to contest the dominance of private actors (Halleux et 
al., 2012; De Decker et al., 2005; van Criekingen and Decroly, 2009). As such, the 
room for urban development to ‘open up’ to private actors was much smaller as private 
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landowners, developers, construction firms and households already were powerful 
actors within urban development. Nevertheless, both local and supra-local state 
agencies adopted a more entrepreneurial stance towards urban development which 
was exemplified by the rise of more public - private partnership and more urban 
oriented developments in higher densities and of larger scale. However, weak, 
fragmented state agencies were not able—or willing(?)—to  transform local regulation 
dynamics in a way that it would enable financialization. Accordingly, a Belgian-like real 
estate market with many small, private, locally orientated actors seemed to be less 
prone to financialization than a Dutch-like real estate market with many large, 
internationally oriented actors.  
 Therefore, it comes to light that, to facilitate the financialization of urban 
development, strong state agencies that are willing to reform in the favour of financial 
actors are a crucial condition.  
 
Dominant types of capital provision.  In line with Deeg et al. (2016) this dissertation 
has put the practices of capital providers central in order to better understand changes 
in urban development. There are problematic elements to categorizing entire groups 
of actors on this continuum of patient to impatient whereby patience refers to the 
prominence of long-term goals that also include non-financial goals and impatience 
refers to the prominence of short-term, financial goals. Nonetheless, the idea that there 
are many different sources to finance urban development but that these still can share 
certain goals should be taken seriously.  
As argued in more detail below, in the Dutch case, the behaviour of impatient 
capital providers led to capital flowing into new districts in large sums, considered to 
be “cataclysmic money” of which the providers had an abstract vision on cities that was 
primarily based on financial parameters (Jacobs, 1961; Aalbers and van Loon, 2017; 
Bieri, 2015). In the Belgian case many development projects are of a relatively small 
size and usually, for a considerable part, financed by individuals and funds that have 
a local orientation. Combined with the long duration of projects and the piecemeal 
approach, this patient capital consequentally flows in a more gradual way into 
(sub)urban districts.  
 
Openness of all involved actors to adopt financialization tools. As the literature on 
financialization is primarily focused on cases where financialization did take place, its 
perspective on agents that are less willing to adopt financialization tools is less clear. 
With respect to urban development, there are also many actors involved that have 
wider goals and are thus less interested in financial instruments that help to increase 
financial profitability. This indicates that analyses should distinguish between the 
different motives and actions of the actors involved in urban development, but, also to 
processes–i.e., financialization, neoliberalization—that create interconnections 
between them. As this PhD thesis showed, when countries are compared, the 
openness of actors towards the adoption of financialization tools can differ greatly. In 
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the current study, it was shown to be (very) high in the Netherlands and much lower in 
Belgium. 
 
Size of development projects. The Dutch case showed that large scale, semi-public 
urban projects that are capital intensive and require close cooperation between various 
real estate, financial and state actors are much more prone to financialization 
processes than small, piecemeal, private-led development projects that are dominant 
in the Belgian case (cf. Bieri, 2013).  
 
This examination gives rise to an interesting question, especially as more recently 
financialization processes related to residential real estate and infrastructure do seem 
to appear in Belgium. This includes a strong increase in housing prices that is partly 
the result of the introduction of mortgage interest rate deductibility and securitisation 
(Romainville, 2017; Deruytter and Derudder, 2015; Winters and Van Den Broeck, 
2016; Damen et al., 2016). Namely, whether Belgium with its slow regulatory dynamics 
caused by a thick and complex web of institutions just ‘lags’ behind when it comes to 
the adoption of new phases of capitalism, or, that the causes for non-financialization 
are so deeply rooted in its political economy that Belgium will retain its distinct, different 
pathway of urban development discussed above. To elaborate on that, the next section 
zooms out, to look at how this doctoral thesis contributes to a better understanding of 
the openness of both political economies towards the rise of financialized capitalism.  
 
7.4 Variegation within domestic political economies 
This PhD thesis shows that even in a context in which two political economies are 
embedded in the same currency zone and subject to the same monetary policy, 
capitalism can still function differently. Accordingly, we need a critical political economy 
perspective that can both account for existing geographical differences and the rise of 
financialized capitalism. As such, “variegation” (Dixon, 2011; Brenner et al., 2010), 
which urges us to analyse how global developments interact with the existing 
structures of urban and domestic political economies, is a fruitful approach.  
Instead of developing a comprehensive analysis of two political economies this 
doctoral thesis has focused on urban development, and studied urban development 
through different cases whereby non-financial corporations have been at the centre of 
the attention. As a result, the two crucial theoretical concepts to explain the (non-
)financialization of urban development, patient capital and fictitious capital, derive from 
theoretical fields that put the functioning of non-financial corporations central in 
studying how capitalism functions (cf. van Treeck, 2009; Deeg and Jackson, 2006). It 
is acknowledged that other domains, such as institutional investing and real estate, 
have risen as important elements of political economies that are not necessarily directly 
attached to the production process. In spite of that, to discuss the interplay between 
patient capital and fictitious capital Figure 7.1 presents a conceptualization of the role  
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Figure 7.1 Conceptualization of fictitious capital in financialized capitalism 
 
 
 
of patient capital within both financialized and non-financialized firms. Capital flows 
related to the production process of firms tie together both the theorizing on patient 
capital and fictitious capital. 
 So, at the firm level, the financialization of non-financial corporations shows that 
the production processes now absorb much more fictitious capital than only the debt 
and equity needed to enhance the production process, and thus, to increase surplus 
value. In financialized capitalism, corporations also use fictitious capital in order to 
trade in financial assets and thus generate not only surplus value but also pure financial 
profits. In other words, also non-financial corporations now make money “from money 
(or from financial instruments) rather than from production” (Godden, 2011, p. 853). As 
a result, future—rather than historical—cash-flows become increasingly important 
urging to validate assets  and liabilities on ‘market value’ (Perry and Nölke, 2006). This 
validation rests on a calculation of future income stream which is not only much more 
unpredictable than the valuation models suggest, but, this anticipation on future 
income streams also gives rise to new financial markets that help to insure against 
uncertainty, such as derivatives markets.  
Crucially, there are not only important geographical differences in the adoption 
of financial assets and instruments to enhance financial profitability by firms, but also, 
within economic sectors of a country firms can operate in very different ways (Lehrer 
and Celo, 2016). In this respect, both internal (i.e., equity) and external (i.e., debt) 
capital provision towards firms create crucial connections between finance and the 
ways in which firms operate. A useful way of looking at both debt- and equity providers 
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is to analyse their patience, their commitment to invest long-term and also include non-
financial goals into their considerations (Deeg et al., 2016). In this regard, patient 
capital can form a crucial barrier that prevents the stretching of a corporation’s financial 
balance sheet, thus hindering the expansion of financialized capitalism. As the case of 
Immobel showed in chapter 5, this is not about the non-adoption of financial assets 
and instruments, it is about mechanisms and structures within corporations that 
prevent financialization tools to make finance dominant over a corporation’s strategy. 
In the case of Immobel, concessive block-holders hampered financialization by 
changing the corporation’s strategy once financialization tools were becoming too 
dominant. Chapter 5 also shows that, at the level of the individual firm, the patience of 
capital providers can vary, and, chapter 4 showed that at the sector level complex 
mixtures can exist. 
Therefore, theorizing on the variegated financialization of domestic political 
economies means acknowledging differences, not only between countries but also 
within countries, domains and actors. However, this does not exclude howcertain 
trends can become dominant (cf. Moulaert and Jessop, 2013). For example, it is 
striking how different the pathways of the Netherlands and Belgium are in urban 
development, and yet how similar their banking history is. As non-financial corporations 
are only one actor within a political economy, it is crucial to theorize more on the 
interplay between different forms of capital provision among other actors (e.g., 
households, the state, financial institutions) and how these shape political economies.  
In this regard, the enormous creation of fictitious capital/financial markets 
seems to urge a critical re-thinking of Marxist theory, by acknowledging the new power 
of finance (Bryan et al., 2009; Fine, 2013). For instance, excess capital such as horded 
surplus, money capital and idle cash is not “held up” (Harvey, 2006) anymore: it has 
become an independent force that, through financialization processes and the active 
support of states, structurally change the functioning of political economies. Crucial 
parts of this new financial realm and all its interconnections are still un-mapped, un-
discovered territory. We are in dire need for more empirical mapping and theorizing on 
the ‘finance’ that drives the expansion of ‘financialized capitalism’ (e.g., Fichtner, 
2016).Through zooming in again on urban development, the next two sections will 
subsequently put fictitious capital formation and the diversity of capital provision 
forward as crucial terrains which can further our understanding of the role of finance, 
steering non-financial spheres, such as urban development. 
 
7.5 Fictitious capital formation driving financialized urban development 
 
 Research question 3) How does financialization structurally change urban 
development? 
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Reflecting on the Dutch case helps to show how the rise of financialized capitalism 
transforms the production of the built environment because it is a European variegation 
of a highly financialized political economy. As argued below, the willingness of capital 
providers to provide abundant capital and the willingness of developers, municipalities 
and real-estate buyers to receive high levels of fictitious capital made fictitious capital 
formation crucial for urban development. The resulting integration of real estate and 
financial markets structurally changed urban development by making, in line with the 
case of Chicago (Weber, 2015; Weber, 2010), the pace of urban development, which 
depended on volatile, global financial markets. 
 
Useful indicators to measure the pace of urban development in other contexts are 
value or square meters of new building permits and the (value of) square meters of 
realised new properties. Useful indicators to measure the extent to which urban 
development is financialized are:  
1) the influx of impatient (both debt and equity) capital to real estate developers 
which is exemplified by outstanding debt to the development sector; the height of LTVs 
on development projects; impatient capital providers buying (stock in) developers; 
outstanding complex financial instruments to developers (e.g., derivatives). 
2) the influx of impatient capital (both debt and equity) to purchasing new 
properties (i.e., the financailization of real estate markets) exemplified by high LTVs of 
real estate investors (including home-buyers); high capital values (e.g., reflected 
through ‘yield compression’); growth of real estate investment funds. 
As for this PhD thesis reliable, comparative data sources were lacking, future, research 
projects could investigate the quantitative dimension of the financialization of urban 
development.For example, is there a certain ‘tipping point’ in impatient capital provision 
that makes financialization dominant? 
 
Structural change also relates to the adoption of a shared convention that prioritizes 
the exchange value of real estate. In other words, in the Dutch case, a central “focus 
on the financial gains” has replaced object-oriented investing that focused “on what it 
is that is invested in” (Sayer in Clark, 2014, p. 393). Accordingly, whereas state urban 
planning institutes historically looked at urban planning as a ‘public good provision’ 
they now prioritize facilitating the development of properties that have investment 
value. Local governments shifted from being a local facilitator of national urban 
planning policies towards the realisation of land gains that helped to finance municipal 
entrepreneurial ambitions. Real estate development corporations used increased profit 
margins to leverage themselves and adopt a focus on corporate value and the 
investment value of projects. Banks transformed from relatively conservative lenders 
to active pushers for reforms to be able to over-borrow to real estate activities. 
Institutional investors shifted from a perspective in which real estate assets were partly 
based on social aims and local ambitions towards looking at only the financial 
dimensions of real estate investments. Home-owners willingly, and supported by rules 
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that allowed for the deduction of mortgage-interest from income tax, adopted high 
levels of leverage, thereby spurring housing values and creating expectations of 
generating profits from their housing careers.  
This new emphasis on the exchange value of real estate over its use value was 
combined with an increased willingness of all actors involved to take up high levels of 
debt. In particular until 2008, it was expected that real estate prices would always 
increase thereby allowing to not only pay back the initial borrowed sum plus interest, 
but also to extract a healthy profit for all actors involved. Thus, this shows how 
financialization structurally changes urban development through a massive take up of 
debt from all actors (ranging from developers to the buyers of real estate) involved in 
urban development. This ballooning of both debt and equity provision towards both 
developers and development-projects, can be looked at as fictitious capital, i.e. 
marketable claims “on the production of surplus value and on the perceived value of 
the underlying asset–both of which are relationally produced in time and space” (Pani 
& Holman, 2014, p. 218).  
 
Fictitious capital is essential to capitalism as it provides capital “in advance, in 
anticipation of future labor as a counter-value” (Harvey, 2006, p. 266). Therefore, 
investment made with fictitious capital, such as in machinery or infrastructure, should 
improve the production process to create more surplus value so both the capital 
provider and borrower can extract a profit while the growth of capitalism is sustained. 
However, through investing, the capital becomes tied to specific uses while capital 
providers prefer liquid investments so they can switch easily once other activities seem 
to become more profitable. Fictitious capital enables easy switching as a piece of 
paper, e.g. shares and bonds, can be traded independently from the production 
process (Godden, 2011; Harvey, 2006). The prices of these papers or digital titles may 
then fluctuate according to their own laws “quite independently of the movement of the 
value of the real capital” (Harvey, 2006, p. 268), e.g. on stock exchanges. This 
distances investors from the objects they invest in as they primarily monitor them 
through their calculated, financial appearance (Theurillat et al., 2016)   
As the Dutch case shows, even the value of conventional bank loans to an 
opportunistic developer as Multi (see chapter 4) can fluctuate heavily within years 
based on a turn of financial and real estate markets. As such, the financialization of 
urban development requires the continuous provision of fictitious capital in order to 
sustain development-project and property values. Accordingly, it requires market 
makers that convince fictitious capital providers that future income streams from urban 
development will be sufficient enough to cover both development costs and profits 
(AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016; Weber, 2015). However, always, the danger looms that 
the realised properties do not produce sufficient rental income or that household’s 
ability to borrow for more expensive houses is not strong enough to pay back the initial 
capital provided plus desired financial gains.  
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 Or, in Minsky’s terms’, the danger looms that finance moves from no-risk 
funding towards high-risk “Ponzi” finance strategies in which the ability to receive back 
the capital provided plus a financial gain becomes increasingly illusionary (cf. 
Kirkpatrick, 2016; Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012; Nesvetailova and Palan, 2013). 
Consequently and inevitably, financial crises hit, often triggered by an unexpected 
event, a so-called “Minsky moment” (Jessop, 2015): “moments when claims to value 
are no longer taken ‘at face value’ but instead fail to achieve liquid transferability into 
other forms of capital” (Haiven, 2011, p. 115).  
As such, ultimately, the financialization of urban development closely ties 
financial markets with real estate markets and thus makes real estate production much 
more volatile. Within financialized capitalism urban development now amplifies both 
up and downturns of real estate cycles, thereby creating intense periods of “over-
building” (Weber, 2015) resulting in ghost towns and even ghost cities. Put differently, 
fictitious capital has become so dominant over real estate markets that problems within 
fictitious capital circulation can cause huge shocks in real estate markets. Once the 
mechanisms that facilitate the continuous production of new fictitious capital halt, 
financialized urban development comes to a standstill. Or, the other way around, 
financial innovation or loose monetary policies that stimulate fictitious capital formation 
bring urban development booms to new heights (cf. Harvey, 2011; AlShehabi and 
Suroor, 2016). Consequently, financial markets and monetary policies, instead of 
urban planners and government regulators, start to dictate the direction and pace of 
urban development. 
  
Financialized capitalism manifests itself through the built environment, not only through 
the financialization of urban development but also through the financialization of real 
estate investment that is discussed in the following paragraphs. The financialization of 
urban development and real estate investment can be so powerful that ‘managing’ real 
estate/financial cycles becomes a main political priority. Accordingly, quite similar to 
neoliberal capitalism, the spread of “financialized conventions” (Chiapello, 2015) is 
observable across domains, actors and even countries, thereby unifying a diverse 
array of actors in a prioritization of financial “practices, measurements [or] narratives” 
(Aalbers, 2017a, p. 3). The Dutch case, and possibly other countries where ‘real estate 
mania’ and financialization are clearly observable (such as Ireland (Byrne, 2016), 
Spain (Coq-Huelva, 2013), Bahrein (AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016) and Anglo-American 
countries (Weber, 2010; Rutland, 2010)) indicate that “financialized capitalism” 
(Lapavitsas, 2009; Moreno, 2014) seems to be a more proper term to describe 
contemporary capitalism than “neoliberal capitalism” (Fine, 2013; Peck et al., 2009) as 
fictitious capital formation has become the crucial driving force. 
First, with the continuous influx of investment capital searching for an outlet to 
be invested in (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Clark and 
Hebb, 2004), the sheer size of global financial markets has risen to unprecedented 
proportions (Bain Capital, 2012; Fichtner, 2016). As such, there is continuous pressure 
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on activities, things and spheres to be commodified into tradeable, financial assets: 
into fictitious capital. Accordingly, a new dimension of financialized capitalism arises, 
where finance penetrates much more than only the regular production process. As 
described by Harvey (2006): large parts of state tasks have become commodified and 
financialized as for instance studies on social housing and infrastructure illustrate 
(Ashton et al., 2016; O’Neill, 2013; Allen and Pryke, 2013; Fields and Uffer, 2014; 
Aalbers et al., 2017). Large parts of the built environment are now approached as 
outlets for capital instead of as properties that are fixed to the regular production 
process, or that facilitate the reproduction of labour power. This requires new 
conceptualizations on the working of fictitious capital within a critical political economy 
framework. What are the implications of fictitious capital, instead of government 
investments whichbecome (within many highly financialized political economies) 
critical requirements for social expenditure? What does it mean when paying back the 
original sum plus interest/dividend does not rely on surplus-value creation, but on 
educating teenagers, housing the poor or caring for the elderly? And, taken the 
tendency of real estate finance to act in a Ponzi-like-manner combined with current 
high global debt levels, what happens when only a minor part of the fictitious capital 
stock can be repaid? From a RA-perspective the ‘finance-led regime’ could be seen as 
the final phase of American world hegemony. Accordingly, to study historic 
comparisons with previous hegemonies (Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italian city 
states) could be extremely interesting (Arrighi, 1994; Boyer, 2000).   
Second, with the ballooning of financial markets, reinforced in recent years by 
loose monetary policies, the tendency of paper claims to fluctuate according to their 
own laws has increased tremendously. As both the production of and the investment 
in/buying of real estate is a rather capital intensive practice, real estate has proven to 
be an extremely interesting outlet for ballooning financial markets and financial 
innovation. In this regard, the financialization of real estate through the invention of 
REITs, securitisation and specific urban designs (Guironnet et al., 2016; Gotham, 
2006; Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Bieri, 2013; Aalbers, 2008) helps to satisfy the desires of 
financial actors. It also enlarges financial markets even further. However, with the 
globalisation of finance and real estate (investment) markets, the diversity of investors 
has also increased considerably, thus setting in motion interesting interactions. For 
instance, this instigates interactions between local real estate actors that remain a 
distinctive local focus and global players. Therefore, the next section will argue that we 
need a much more profound understanding of these actors and the ways in which they 
finance, and thus steer urban development.  
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7.6 Towards a more nuanced understanding of capital flows to urban 
development13 
Money is a powerful force both for city decline and for city regeneration. But it must 
be understood that it is not the mere availability of money, but how it is available, 
and for what, that is all important. (Jacobs, 1961, p. 291)  
 
In line with a recent study on Bahrein (AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016), the Dutch case 
illustrates how the sheer size and related power of finance makes fictitious capital 
formation dominant. This thus distinguishes financialized capitalism from neoliberal 
capitalism with the built environment as a crucial catalyst. However, the Belgian case 
clearly shows how practices related to the built environment can also form a barrier 
towards the rise of financialized capitalism. In this regard, it is very promising that so 
many recent studies take the financial dimensions of urban development seriously, 
consequently creating new sophisticated, insights on urban development while 
alsoshowing the powerful role of financialization processes in a wide range of different 
contexts (Kutz and Lenhardt, 2017; AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016; Gonzalez and 
Oosterlynck, 2014; Fernandez et al., 2016; Hofman and Aalbers, n.d.; Mosciaro, n.d.; 
Yrigoy, 2016; Coq-Huelva, 2013; Ward, n.d.; Halbert and Attuyer, 2016; Halbert et al., 
2014; Zhang, n.d.; Di Feliciantonio, 2016; Di Feliciantonio, 2017; Gert Jan Wijburg and 
Aalbers, 2017; Patatouka, 2015; Stroher, 2017). Nevertheless, we, as urban studies 
scholars, still need to develop a much more sophisticated view on variety in capital 
provision and how these various capital providers influence urban development 
(differently). In urban studies, there is a dire need to not only study how finance flows 
into cities, but, much more crucially, how finance morphs cities.  
In this respect, it should be acknowledged that financialization can penetrate 
urban development through various actors that are important for urban development, 
that are real estate development corporations (Sanfelici and Halbert, 2015), urban 
governance (Kirkpatrick, 2016; Weber, 2010), real estate markets exemplified through 
the main buyers that are both households (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016) and a wide 
range of investors (Guironnet et al., 2016; Lizieri and Pain, 2014; Gotham, 2006). And, 
there are complex relationships between these actors and other (financial) actors that 
need to be scrutinized throughout case by case analyses.  
Nevertheless, to generate venues for future research, Figure 7.2 presents a 
stylized view by primarily focusing on financial flows towards urban development. 
Challenged by Bieri (2015), and previously explored by Aalbers & Van Loon (2017), 
Figure 7.2 brings Jane Jacobs’ (1961) ideas on how “gradual money” and “cataclysmic 
money” shape urban re-development to the present by proposing that the patience of 
                                            
13 This section, including Figure 7.2, is an attempt to further develop ideas from a previous essay, 
Aalbers and Van Loon (2017). Accordingly, many elements of this section heavily draw upon that 
essay and discussions with Manuel Aalbers who also came with the underlying idea to, inspired by 
Bieri (2015), bring Jacobs’ work to the present to study variety within capital provision towards 
urban development. 
  
171 
 
capital is the contemporary equivalent of gradual and cataclysmic money. Jacobs’ work 
shows how two main financiers of urban re-development, banks and government 
agencies, can adopt a similar view on the built environment based on an orthodox, 
technocratic, Corbusier-inspired, urban planning ideology that ignores “lived space” 
(Aalbers and van Loon, 2017; Lefebvre, 1996). This paves the way for state-led 
modernistic interventions setting in motion a sudden influx of “cataclysmic money” that 
erases historic, diverse urban districts including their rich, lived spaces. The opposite, 
“gradual money”, relates to piecemeal interventions by small actors, such as families, 
that develop, barter and hoard systems, but also ‘invest’ in free labour and sharing 
construction materials. Taken together, their efforts set in motion incremental urban 
growth, that, as Jacobs argues, adds rich layers to the existing urban fabric (Jacobs, 
1961, pp. 290–317). 
 
Figure 7.2 The more restless capital providers, the more volatile urban growth (?) 
 
 
 
When we expand our view to include both urban development (and not only 
urban re-development) and non-American cities, it comes to the forefront that there is 
a wider range of capital providers that finance urban development. Also, in 
contemporary capitalism, the complexity of financial flows to urban development has 
increased dramatically. A first important change is the rise of large, real estate 
investors with international portfolios (i.e., institutional investors; large REITs, private 
equity; SWFs) that perceive real estate as ‘just another asset class’ (Gotham, 2006; 
van Loon and Aalbers, 2017; Lizieri, 2009). Second, the adoption of high levels of debt 
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by both home buyers and certain groups of private investors leads to higher debt flows 
to housing markets, and thus, also to urban development (Fernandez and Aalbers, 
2016; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). Third, the neoliberalization of the state implies 
that state agencies increasingly act entrepreneurially, thereby aiming to put their cities 
and countries on the global map through large, capital intensive, prestigious urban 
projects (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Lauermann, 2016). 
 On the one hand, and as suggested in Figure 7.2, in this conclusion I have 
argued that these financial actors, fed by marked oriented banks and global financial 
markets, spur the financialization of urban development by morphing it into a process 
of fictitious capital formation. This relates to a shared financial perspective that 
approaches complex, layered urban realities through seemingly reliable financial 
numbers, it puts “adjusted rates of returns” and “financial gains” central (Clark, 2014; 
Hebb and Sharma, 2014). Or, as investors discussed during a panel discussion of the 
Urban Land Institute in Brussels on May 10th 2016, they look for the “geographical 
diversification of their portfolio”, “affordable assets”, “risk curves”, “market liquidity” 
while also  taking “entry barriers” into consideration. This abstract vision stimulates 
large scale urban development, or the influx of “cataclysmic money”, of posh residential 
towers, enormous shopping malls and mono-functional office districts. These are 
complemented by entrepreneurial state investments that are put into prestigious public 
infrastructures, such as opera-houses, mass-transit stations and bridges. These 
developments, designed by the same group of ‘stararchitects’ (e.g., Calatrava, Gehry), 
look similar everywhere, and either totally ignore, or even erase, the existing, closely 
knit urban fabric. Future studies should show if this dominance of impatient capital 
providers over urban development is also observable in other European countries with 
highly financialized (urban) real estate markets. Countries that would be interesting to 
study could include Denmark, Spain, United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain (Fernandez, 
2016). 
 On the other hand, impatience looked as a continuum introduces the possibility 
of more variety both between and within different groups of capital providers. Put 
differently, although the main proposition Figure 7.2 puts forward is ‘the more restless 
the capital provider, the more volatile the urban development’, we should be open to 
diversity. In this regard, studies in other sectors that demonstrate how sovereign wealth 
funds are important providers of patient capital (which is more aimed at long-term 
developments) could be an intriguing starting point (Thatcher and Vlandas, 2016; 
Haberly, 2014). Is global, mobile capital flowing as cataclysmic money into urban 
districts more diverse than the examination above suggests? Put differently, do all 
capital providers have pure financial views on cities, or, are there also perspectives 
that acknowledge ‘lived spaces’ (cf. Aalbers and van Loon, 2017) or aim to realise 
geopolitical goals (Büdenbender and Golubchikov, 2016)? This also requires to further 
scrutinize the behaviour within certain groups. For instance, could there be differences 
between Arab and Norwegian sovereign wealth funds in the ways in which they 
approach financing urban development? Accordingly, the precise placement of actors 
  
173 
 
within Figure 7.2 is simply a first suggestion, that future research should show to which 
extent actors placed in the same box show similar behaviour.  
 Looking at the other side of the continuum, patient capital providers have a more 
long-term investment perspective whereby the realization of many non-financial goals 
is also central. With respect to urban development, one could, for instance, think about 
housing associations that prioritize social goals through asking for below-market 
rentals, re-investing rental income into (disadvantaged) neighborhoods and only 
moderately leveraging their real estate portfolios (Boelhouwer and Priemus, 2014). 
Moreover, there are still also many maintenance oriented investments of ‘non-
entrepreneurial’ state agencies that aim to facilitate the desires of local constituencies 
(Cox, 2010). In this regard, one could think of ordinary public amenities that are aimed 
at satisfying the need of local citizens at the neighborhood level. For example, basic 
swimming pools, small libraries and public schools. Also, not all housing markets have 
been financialized. Accordingly, there are still plenty of cities where household 
mortgages are only a small part of the money that is needed in order to spur 
development. In these contexts, personal savings and non-financial investments still 
play an important role. Moreover, these actors not only tend to work with lower amounts 
of external funding, but they also often obtain this from more patient external capital 
providers, such as relationship banks or state agencies.  
 Because of the long-term commitment of these capital providers and their deep 
local roots, their investments into urban development are much more attuned to the 
existing urban fabric. Moreover, as they are less capital intensive, they create the more 
continuous, incremental growth of cities, whereby the new urban layers are much more 
complementary to the existing city. Future studies should explore if the dominance of 
patient capital providers over urban development is also observable in countries with 
less-financialized (urban) real estate markets/stronger presence of family capital such 
as Italy, Greece, Germany and France (Fernandez, 2016). Nonetheless, in line with 
the discussion directly above, the diversity within these groups should be further 
investigated, as, for instance, many Dutch housing associations have moved towards 
more financialized and market-oriented practices (Lennartz, 2016; Hochstenbach, 
2017; Aalbers et al., 2017). 
All in all, the basic argument stipulated above is that the different time-horizons 
of capital providers influence the pace and scale of urban development to a great 
extent.  But, this argument and Figure 7.2 is now primarily based on the experience in 
the Low Countries. It would be very interesting to develop specific figures for particular 
cities and relate them to real financial flows to districts. This would allow for the analysis 
of the mixture on a low level of scale and how this shapes urban development. Such 
an analysis should also show how the interplay between actors plays out differently, 
and what other elements play a role in making urban development incremental or 
volatile.  
The recent wave of case studies scrutinizing financial flows around urban 
development could be a useful starting point (Halbert and Attuyer, 2016; Halbert et al., 
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2014; Coq-Huelva, 2013; AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016). However, these case studies 
are biased towards financialized projects and should thus be enriched with more 
research projects in areas with high potential for patient capital.  Such work could help 
to develop a more comprehensive perspective that captures all relevant actors that tie 
capital provision to urban development. Through this, a better understanding of capital 
provision towards urban development is created, which is crucial as it enables critical 
scholars to contest dominant paradigms, and, finally (or hopefully) to answer Jane 
Jacob’s call: 
The forms in which money is used must be converted to instruments of 
regeneration—from instruments buying violent cataclysms to instruments buying 
continual, gradual, complex and gentler change (Jacobs, 1961, p. 317)  
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Appendix I List of interviewees 
In the list below, the function of the interviewee indicates the function he/she had at 
the moment of the interview. When relevant, previous functions are included. At the 
request of some interviewees their identity has been, to differing degrees, anonymized. 
 
Interviews the Netherlands (chapters 3—5) 
Interview 1 Partner of a firm holding a sizeable portfolio of Dutch RMBS, also partner 
in some firms related to the Dutch mortgage industry, partner in a firm providing short 
term finance to small Dutch real estate investors.  
Interview 2 Nico Roozen, director and owner of real estate developer/investor NR 
vastgoed BV.  
Interview 3 A strategic position within a larger real estate development corporation. 
Interview 4 Senior and junior consultant at a real estate consultancy firm primarily 
working for institutional investors and housing associations. 
Interview 5 Higher management in the trust industry.  
Interview 6 A partner of a small real estate development corporation.  
Interview 7 Real estate analyst at a large asset manager for Dutch institutional 
investors. 
Interview 8 Frank van Beek, founder of Urban Concepts and non-executive board 
member of housing association Pré Wonen and Woongoed Zeist, previously,  founder 
of developer Lingotto, manager real estate development at Amvest and the City of 
Amsterdam. 
Interview 9 Risk Managers at a Dutch loan provider to real estate actors. 
Interview 10 Paul Konings, Vice President at MSCI. 
Interview 11 Rudy Stroink, partner at Dutch Spring, various commissionerships at 
(semi-)public organisations, previously founder and CEO of developer TCN.  
Interview 12 Analyst of a mayor Dutch bank providing loans to real estate actors. 
Interview 13 Rob Koning, director of the Dutch Securitisation Association. 
Interview 14 Former director of one of the main loan providers to real estate actors. 
Interview 15 Erik Jan van Kempen, director housing markets at the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations. 
Interview 16 Roelof Kuik, director housing association Thus Wonen. 
Interview 17 René Hogenboom, CEO of the private real estate fund Altera Vastgoed, 
previously director of developer Wilma Vastgoed and ABP real estate. 
Interview 18 Dick van Seventer and Reinout Overbeek, directors at real estate fund 
Vastgoed Syndicering Nederland. 
Interview 19 Frank van Blokland, director of the association of institutional investors 
into real estate, the Netherlands (Vereniging van Institutionele Beleggers in Vastgoed, 
Nederland; IVBN). 
Interview 20 Wiggert Karreman, managing director of real estate investment manager 
APF international. 
Interview 21 Jean Klijnen,  partner in Panta Rhei Partners and CEO at Hartelt Fund 
Management, previously CEO at Bouwfonds REIM and manager global indirect 
investments real estate at ABP. 
Interview 22 Roel van de Bilt  and Maarten Donkers, respectively director and senior 
researcher at FGH Bank. 
Interview 23 Kees de Boo, member of the supervisory committee of real estate fund 
Vesteda, previously director at various institutional investors with direct real estate 
holdings. 
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Interview 24 Henry Meijdam, various positions including director of the institute of 
environment and infrastructure (RLI, Raad voor Leefomgeving en Infrastructuur) and 
partner at Meijdam & Overmars. 
Interview 25 Guido Verhoef, Head of Private Real Estate at PGGM/PGGM 
Investments, previously investment manager/director at various large real estate 
funds. 
Interview 26 Jan Fokkema, director of the association of Dutch real estate development 
corporations, NEPROM (Vereniging van Nederlandse Projectontwikkeling 
Maatschappijen). 
Interview 27 Heino Vink,  various functions including CEO from 2011-2014 and 
currently COO at Multi: commercial real estate developer, asset manager and 
shopping center manager. 
Interview 28 A manager within a listed real estate fund. 
Interview 29 Paul Delbeek, Head section property sales, The Central Government Real 
Estate Agency, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. 
Interview 30 Staff member at the division of risk management and ALM, DNB (Dutch 
National Bank). 
 
Interviews Belgium (chapters 3—5) 
Interview 31 Manager and real estate consultant at a real estate consultancy firm that 
works for corporations and state agencies. 
Interview 32 Director of a sizeable real estate developer and related real estate 
investment funds. 
Interview 33 Filiep Loosveldt, juridical expert in urban planning. 
Interview 34 Managing directorof a large listed real estate fund. 
Interview 35 Jacky Scheerens, Director at real estate developer DMI Vastgoed. 
Interview 36 Director of finance and the real estate portfolio of a sizeable municipal 
real estate corporation. 
Interview 37 Marnix Galle, at the time of the interview CEO and majority shareholder 
of real estate developer Allfin, currently Executive Chairman and majority shareholder 
of listed real estate developer Immobel.  
Interview 38 Kim Creten MRICS, CEO KBC Real Estate. 
Interview 39 Daniel Beirinckx, Aareal Bank AG – Brussels Representative Office. 
Interview 40 Head of the real estate finance department of a major loan provider to 
Belgian real estate corporations. 
Interview 41 Director and manager at the urban planning institute of the Flemish region. 
Inteview 42 Director real estate development and real estate developer at a larger real 
estate development corporation. 
Interview 43 Peter Gestels, director real estate development at van Roey Vastgoed. 
Interview 44 Dominique van der Span and Aurel Gavriloaia, both AG Real Estate, 
respectively Head of Real Estate & PPP Finance and Head of Office Development 
BeLux.  
Interview 45 Philippe Van Wesenbeeck, Head of the urban development and urban 
planning service at the City of Ghent. 
Interview 46 Stephan Sonneville CEO of, and shareholder in listed real estate 
developer Atenor. 
Interview 47 CEO at a large residential real estate developer. 
 
Interviews Antwerp (chapter 5) 
Interview 48 Higher management financial department of the City of Antwerp.  
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Interview 49 Dries Willems, former director AG Stadsplanning and urban planning 
entities of the City of Antwerp. 
Interview 50 Two experienced employees of the financial department of the City of 
Antwerp. 
Interview 51 Jan Leroy, director of assocation for Flemish cities and municipalities 
(Vereniging van Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten), expert on municipal finance. 
Interview 52 Griet Geerinck, currently expert on project- and City finance at AG Vespa 
(municipal real estate corporation), former director of AG Stadsplanning (municipal 
urban planning institute). 
 
Interviews Apeldoorn (chapter 5) 
Interview 53 Pauline Bieringa, Managing Director Public Finance at BNG Bank & 
Robert Bakker, Spokesman BNG Bank. 
Interview 54 Maarten Koldewijn, controller of Apeldoorn’s land bank & Marco Elshof 
plan economist with Apeldoorn’s land bank. 
Interview 55 Alex Elemans manager external auditing at the province of Gelderland, 
Ben Gesthuizen financial client manager of Apeldoorn at the province of Gelderland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
